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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines how Slovakia formulated its foreign policy regarding the 
unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. Even though 
considerable external pressure to recognise Kosovo was brought to bear on 
Bratislava by the United States and key members of the European Union, 
particularly during its non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security 
Council (2006-2007), the thesis shows how the decision not to recognise Kosovo 
was ultimately driven by domestic political factors. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that the prevailing external view that Slovakia’s 
position was shaped by concerns over the issue of the ethnic Hungarian minority is 
incorrect. Instead, the foreign policy-making process was primarily driven by the 
leader of the Slovak opposition, Mikuláš Dzurinda, as he sought to regain domestic 
political power. While the Hungarian minority issue did play a role in the debate, its 
significance extended only to cementing the Slovak position and preventing any re-
consideration of its view.  
Thus, although the Slovak non-recognition policy was the result of an 
interaction between several factors, this thesis shows that it was, in essence, an 
internal affair to Slovakia. Although key members of the European Union, as well as 
the United States, sought to secure EU unity on the question of Kosovo, this thesis 
shows that there are limits to the EU’s ability to shape the foreign policies of its 
members – even smaller and newer ones – when strong domestic opposition to a 
particular course of actions exists in those states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘…in Kosovo, history is not really about the past, but about the future. 
 As always in the Balkans, and elsewhere, for that matter 
 the truth is not what matters, it is what people believe it to be.’1 
 
1. Aims 
 
This thesis examines the interaction between domestic factors and external pressures 
from the EU and other international actors in the formation of an EU member’s 
foreign policy. Specifically, this will be shown in the case of Slovak foreign policy 
adopted towards Kosovo’s independence.  
 
In February 2007 Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo and former 
Finnish President, submitted his proposal on the final status of Kosovo. In it he 
recommended ‘supervised independence’. One year later, on 17 February 2008, 
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, a move that was recognised 
shortly afterwards by the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
2
 
Since then, many other states, including the majority of European Union states, have 
joined them. However, this step was rejected by Serbia and major international 
actors such as Russia, India and China. 
 
The hope was that settling Kosovo’s status would complete the ‘unfinished stories’ 
left by the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
3
 However, it 
has neither succeeded in resolving the Serb-Albanian dispute, nor has it settled the 
                                                          
1 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (London: Yale Nota Bene, 2002), p. 2.  
2 As Rosemary DiCarlo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, indicated during 
a meeting with Slovenian counterparts in December 2007, ‘the session of the Kosovo Parliament, in which they 
pass the declaration of independence, were to be on Sunday, since this way the Russian Federation would not 
have the time to call for the UN Security Council. In the meantime, the first recognitions would already have 
happened’. Indeed, 17 February 2008 was a Sunday. See Tomaz Mastnak, ‘Kosovo: A New Versailles?’, Foreign 
Policy In Focus, 7 March 2008.  
3 Alexandros Yannis, ‘The Politics and Geopolitics of the Status of Kosovo: the Circle is Never Round’, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9 (2009), 161-70 (p. 162). 
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future of the region including Kosovo.
4
 International opinion still remains divided on 
the issue and as of 24 June 2013, only 100 out of 193 UN members recognised 
Kosovo as an independent state.
5
 These differences extend to the EU where five 
countries – Cyprus, Spain, Romania, Greece and Slovakia – do not recognise 
Kosovo’s statehood. There are some claims that the five EU members have taken 
this stance because the issue has an indirect influence on their national security and it 
is not just a question of their foreign political orientation.
6
 It has been argued that the 
independence of Kosovo ‘has become a much more complicated story than the West 
anticipated’ and ‘the EU’s role cannot fully develop as long as it remains divided 
over Kosovo’.7 Despite the argument that the position of the five EU non-recognisers 
is ‘one of constructive abstention’, in practice, however, it is still considered to be ‘a 
drag on European leadership’.8 Unlike the case of Montenegro’s independence in 
2006, when EU members agreed on a common approach to recognising Montenegro 
when it seceded from Serbia, a different approach had been taken to the recognition 
of Kosovo.
9
 On 18 February 2008 the General Affairs and External Relations 
                                                          
4 Yannis, ‘The Politics and Geopolitics of the Status of Kosovo’, p. 162. Considering the current social and 
economic situation in Kosovo, Sláviková argues that after the declaration of independence, Kosovo’s isolation 
only further deepened. See Eliška Sláviková, ‘Nekonečný príbeh kosovskej nezávislosti’, Zahraničná Politika, 2 
(2012), 7-9 (p. 9). In view of Kosovo’s path to the EU, Ker-Lindsay and Economides note that without Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence its way to become an EU member would have been easier, particularly if one 
considers that under the UN administration Kosovo was widely accepted. In this sense, Kosovo’s institutions 
could have eventually substituted the UN control, thus avoiding a number of issues created after the unilateral 
declaration of independence. See James Ker-Lindsay and Spyros Economides, ‘Standards before Status before 
Accession: Kosovo’s EU Perspective’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14 (2012), 77-92, p. 88. 
5 However, some of these recognitions remain contested, for instance those by Sao Tome and Principe, Nigeria or 
Uganda. See Edona Peci, ‘Dispute Arises over Kosovo’s 98th Recognition’, BalkanInsight, 10 January 2013. In 
order to take a seat in the UN, Kosovo needs to secure a recommendation by the SC and support of two thirds 
majority of the 193 UN General Assembly members. 
6 See ‘Kosovo/EU: Pressure eases on anti-independence five’, Oxford Analytica, 4 January 2010, p. 1; Shpend 
Kursani, ‘Western Balkans and Europe: waiting for the Mediterranean breeze from Greece’, Art of the Possible: 
The Cambridge University Journal of Politics, 13 February 2011, available at <http://artofthepossible-
cambridge.com/index.php?a=12& title=1297598745.html> [accessed 7 June 2011]. 
7 ‘Kosovo/EU: Pressure eases on anti-independence five’, Oxford Analytica, 4 January 2010, p. 1. It was also 
argued that the five EU members’ refusal to recognise Kosovo seriously weakened the position of the 
International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR). See Stephan 
Keukeleire, Arben Kalaja and Artan Çollak, ‘The EU and Kosovo: Structural Diplomacy in Action - but on the 
basis of one-sided paradigms?’, Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network on “The Diplomatic System of the 
European Union”, Policy Paper 4, February 2011, pp. 2-3. Notably, ICR’s supervision of Kosovo – under the 
Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith – officially ended in September 2012. See ‘Kosovo declared “fully independent”’, 
BBC News Europe, 10 September 2012. 
8 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), ‘European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013’, Justin Vaïsse and 
Susi Dennison with others,  January 2013, p. 68. 
9 ‘Kosovo: International Law and Recognition’, A Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion 
Group meeting held on 22 April 2008, Chatham House, p. 4. Notably, as Miroslav Lajčák, the Slovak Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, commented, ‘unlike Montenegro, which decided to engage in a difficult dialogue with Serbia 
before declaring independence and to accept compromises in order to consolidate its independence at a later stage 
in a relatively comfortable manner, Kosovo’s leaders chose the opposite way – a simpler road at the beginning, 
but with the risk of great complications after the separation’. See ‘Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity: 
Awkward bed-fellows’, Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Miroslav Lajčák, 
Chatham House, London, 20 April 2009. 
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Council of the EU agreed that the recognition of Kosovo was a matter for national 
governments to decide ‘in accordance with national practice and international law, 
on their relations with Kosovo’.10 As a result, the EU did not show unity on this 
issue.
11
 
 
This thesis examines the position of Slovakia as one of the five EU member states 
that has not joined the majority of the EU in the recognition process and has not 
reconsidered its view to date, although some expected this to happen with the change 
of Slovak government in June 2010. So why did Slovakia decide not to recognise the 
independence of Kosovo? This is the central research question that this thesis sets 
out to answer.  
 
Given the relatively recent nature of events, there have been few studies on how each 
EU member state has developed its views on what is an extremely complex and 
contested issue. Kosovo’s independence and its impact on the region has been 
widely debated in literature, however there has not been a detailed study analysing 
the evolution of the Slovak position over a prolonged period of time. Indeed, other 
events in Slovak foreign policy have attracted wider international debate, such as the 
political transformation after the fall of communism and the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia; Mečiar’s government between 1994-1998; Slovakia’s non-
accession to NATO in the first wave in 1999; or the process referred to as ‘catching 
up’ with Europe, after Slovakia was initially allocated to the second group of 
candidate countries for EU membership.
12
 As for Kosovo, there have been articles on 
the subject, but these have focused either on specific periods in the evolution of the 
Slovak view or on one particular event without going into great detail (for instance 
the passing of the ‘Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the 
                                                          
10 ‘General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations’, Council of the European Union, 2851th Council 
Meeting, Press Release, 6496/08 (Presse 41), Brussels, 18 February 2008, p. 7. 
11 Ahtisaari argued that it does not matter that many countries did not recognise Kosovo; rather, it mattered that 
the economic clout of nations (such as the US and majority of Western Europe) did so. Ahtisaari further added: 
‘It really doesn’t matter if Paraguay hasn’t recognised. Well over 65% of the wealth of the world has recognised. 
That matters’. See Julian Borger, ‘Kosovo state inevitable, says Nobel laureate’, The Guardian, 18 October 2008, 
p. 28. 
12 See for example, Tim Haughton, ‘Vladimír Mečiar and his Role in the 1994-1998 Slovak Coalition 
Government’, Europe-Asia Studies, 54 (2002), 1319-38; Vladimír Bilčík, Can Slovakia Catch Up? The 
Implications of EU Accession Talks a Year After the Helsinki Summit (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of 
International Affairs, 2001); Tim Haughton, ‘Facilitator and Impeder: The Institutional Framework of Slovak 
Politics During the Premiership of Vladimír Mečiar’, Slavonic and East European Review, 81 (2003), 267-90; 
Karen Henderson, ‘The Slovak Republic: Explaining Defects in Democracy’, Democratization, 11 (2004), 133-
55. 
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Solution of the Future Status of the Serbian province Kosovo’ in March 2007; 
tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations; or the reaction to the Advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo’s declaration of independence).13 
This thesis, however, examines a longer period of time with the aim of discussing 
key stages of Slovak foreign policy towards the Balkans in the 1990s, which will 
provide a necessary background to the main period under review, and will give a 
detailed account of the evolution of the view on the Kosovo issue in Slovakian 
politics, which eventually led to the decision not to recognise Kosovo in 2008.   
 
The Slovak position on Kosovo represents an important case study of foreign policy-
making with broader implications for the EU. The search for European unity on 
foreign policy has been a key theme in discussions on the European Union.
14
 The 
Balkans, and Kosovo in particular, have represented cases where unity was 
perceived as crucial – and yet a number of EU countries, including Slovakia, refused 
to conform.
15
 The decision by Bratislava is worthy of study for a number of reasons. 
First, it exposes the limits of the EU’s ability to shape the policies of member states 
when strong opposition to a particular course of action exists in those states. The 
concept of European unity and the ability of the EU to forge unity in similar 
circumstances then become uncertain. Second, by highlighting the impact the Slovak 
position had on debates around Kosovo’s statehood and on its contribution to the 
EU’s non-unity on this question, this research underlines the importance of a small 
state’s foreign political decision.16 Finally, as outlined above, no detailed study on 
this issue exists.  
                                                          
13 See for instance, Kai-Olaf Lang, ‘Slowakei: Keine Anerkennung, aber Partnerschaft’, Südosteuropa, 56 
(2008), 435-40; Eliška Sláviková, ‘Ako SDKÚ zachránila slovenskú reputáciu’, Strategické štúdie, 3 (2007), 3-6; 
Milan Šagát, ‘Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans: Potemkin Villages’, International Issues & 
Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 17 (2008), 45-62; Július Lörincz, ‘Assisting the Painful Process of Coming in 
Terms with the Past’, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 17 (2008), 63-71. For a brief 
discussion of the Slovak non-recognition of Kosovo see also Jozef Bátora and Veronika Pulišová, ‘Slovakia: 
Learning to add value to EU foreign policy’, in The New Member States and the European Union: Foreign 
Policy and Europeanization, ed. by Michael Baun and Dan Marek (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 68-83. 
14 See for example, John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (ed.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing 
visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998); Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (ed.), European Union 
Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity and Effectiveness (Oxford: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012); Daniel C. Thomas (ed.), 
‘Special Issue: The Negotiation of EU Foreign Policy’, International Politics, 46 (2009), 335-504. 
15 See ‘Spain, Romania, Cyprus, Slovakia lead pack of countries refusing to violate international law’, Kosovo 
Compromise, 19 February 2008; Aristotle Tziampiris, ‘Greek Foreign Policy with Regard to Kosovo’s 
Independence’, Südosteuropa, 56 (2008), 403-6. 
16 As political scientist Christos Kassimeris points out, in the post-Cold War era the foreign policy formation of 
small states represents a worthwhile topic because the actions of these states have a greater impact on world 
politics. See Christos Kassimeris, ‘The Foreign Policy of Small Powers’, International Politics, 46 (2009), 84-
101 (p. 85). 
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This thesis aims to develop an understanding of foreign policy-making beyond the 
case of Kosovo. This is particularly linked to the fact that literature examining states’ 
behaviour in recognition issues, and specifically decisions related to non-recognition 
policy, is relatively limited.
17
 Due to the absence of the EU’s collective action 
towards Kosovo’s statehood, EU members took their decisions individually. When it 
comes to the recognition of states, it is a country’s own decision to judge which 
territory to recognise as an independent state, and why and when to do so.
18
 As a 
result, there is no official way that would oblige a state to recognise a country, and 
the reasons countries refuse to do so vary.
19
 Importantly, as Ker-Lindsay states, ‘we 
appear to be moving into a strange new era in which there are states that are 
recognised as such by some countries but not by others’.20 Considering that several 
EU states now face secessionist movements,
21
 it is vital, and indeed timely, to 
understand how states respond to declarations of independence and, importantly, 
why they do so. The Slovak case study is crucial as it provides an understanding for 
why a small EU member state decided to go against the mainstream and even 
resisted the pressure coming from the US and key EU diplomats to reconsider its 
position. In this respect, by presenting an account of ‘why’ Slovakia refused to 
recognise Kosovo, this thesis adds to the existing scholarship. As will be shown, 
apparent reasons for the Slovak decision widely identified in the literature – 
specifically related to ethnic minority issues – lack an in-depth understanding of the 
                                                          
17 Literature dealing with recognition of states includes, for instance, Richard Caplan, Europe and the 
Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Nina Caspersen, 
Unrecognised States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012); Nina Caspersen, ‘From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto States’, Südosteuropa, 
56 (2008), 58-83; Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (ed.), Unrecognized States in the International System 
(London: Routledge, 2011); Beverly Crawford, ‘Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: 
Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia’, World Politics, 48 (1996), 482-521.  
18 James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 7. This book is an excellent and first comprehensive account of why 
parent states prevent recognition of territories that unilaterally seceded. It focuses on the cases of Serbia, Cyprus 
and Georgia and their attempts to prevent the recognition of Kosovo, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, 
South Ossetia and Abchazia respectively. For a section on non-recognition in international politics, see 
particularly pp. 12-14. 
19 Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, pp. 12-13. 
20 Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, p. 18. 
21 Indeed, in 2014, two European regions – Scotland and Catalonia – will hold referendums on independence 
from the UK and Spain, respectively. In September 2014, the Scottish voters will be asked to answer the 
following referendum question: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ See Andrew Black, ‘Scottish 
independence: Referendum to be held on 18 September, 2014’, BBC News, 21 March 2013; Giles Tremlett, 
‘Catalonia joins Scotland in push for 2014 independence vote’, The Guardian, 13 December 2012; ‘World is 
watching Scotland, says former UK minister’, Interview with former UK minister Mark Malloch-Brown, BBC, 
20 February 2013. Likewise, a secessionist movement is on the rise in Belgium (Flanders). 
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specific political context. As Katzenstein suggests, ‘there is a great difference 
between understanding-a-thing-on-its-own and understanding-a-thing-in-context’.22 
 
What made Slovakia’s position especially significant was that between 2006 and 
2007, it was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC).
23
 It was in early 2007 that Kosovo’s future status received special attention 
from Slovak politics. Kosovo was high on the agenda of the UNSC and thus 
Slovakia was directly involved in debates on the subject.
24 At that time, Slovakia’s 
position stood in marked contrast to the position adopted by the four other members 
of the EU on the SC (Britain, France, Italy and Belgium),
25 
all of whom were broadly 
in favour of independence. In this context, Slovakia’s position was seen as key to 
preserving EU unity.
26
  
 
As will be examined in this thesis, in March 2007, after five initial proposals and a 
heated debate, the Slovak Parliament passed a Declaration on Kosovo’s future status, 
taking a position against independence if no consensus was reached between 
Belgrade and Pristina. When, in February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared 
independence, Slovakia ‘took note’ of Kosovo’s act but did not change its position, 
despite lobbying from the US and its EU partners to reconsider. In September 2008, 
Ján Kubiš, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, met in New York with 
Richard Holbrooke, the former US Ambassador to the UN, and Frank Wisner, the 
former Special Representative of the US Secretary of State to the Kosovo Status 
                                                          
22 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Small States and Small States Revisited’, New Political Economy, 8 (2003), 9-30 (p. 9). 
23 Russia was UNSC president in January 2007. Slovakia took up presidency in the SC in a crucial time of 
February 2007 when Kosovo’s status was high on the agenda. According to International Crisis Group, 
supporters of a ‘quick solution’ for Kosovo, particularly Ahtisaari and the US planned to come up with a decision 
in March 2007. See International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead’, Policy Briefing Nr 
45, 20 December 2006, p. 6. After the Russian and Slovakian presidency in January and February 2007 
respectively, South Africa was president in March, followed by the UK in April and the US in May. Belgium 
held the presidency in June and China in July 2007. 
24 In a leaked confidential cable from a meeting of the US Ambassador to Finland, Marilyn Ware, with Martti 
Ahtisaari, sent from the Embassy Helsinki, Ware stated: ‘Ahtisaari is also directly lobbying EU member states 
and current or incoming UN SC members. Some (he named South Africa, Spain, Romania, Sweden and 
Slovakia) have needed more persuading than he would have expected [...]’. See ‘Ambassador Ware’s Meeting 
with President Ahtisaari’, Embassy Helsinki, reference ID 06Helsinki1252, 8 December 2006,  available at 
<http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/12/06helsinki1215.html> [accessed 15 May 2011]. The UNSC discussions on 
Kosovo’s status eventually ended without passing any resolution as it became clear that in the case of a UN vote 
Russia would use its veto right.  
25 In addition to the five permanent UNSC members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), the non-
permanent members in 2007 were: Belgium, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, South Africa 
and Slovakia.  
26 See ‘Slovakia will not discuss status issues during UNSC UNMIK meeting’, US mission UN New York, 
reference ID 07USUNNEWYORK, 17 March 2007, available at <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/03/07USUN 
NEWYORK215.html> [accessed 3 May 2012]. 
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Talks. Although both American representatives called upon Slovakia to recognise 
the independence of the former Serbian province, Kubiš confirmed that the Slovak 
stance would not change.
27 
This is of great significance as it was expected that, 
sooner or later, Slovakia would give in to these pressures. This study aims to explain 
why these attempts did not lead to a substantive change in Slovakia’s policy.  
 
In August 2008, Serbia asked the General Assembly of the UN to request an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether the 
unilateral declaration of Kosovo was in accordance with international law.
28
 In 
October 2008, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in favour of referring the 
matter to the Court.
29
 Countries were invited to submit their comments on the 
request for an advisory opinion and Slovakia sent a written statement to the Court 
explaining its view; however, it did not participate at the hearings.
30 
In July 2010, 
almost two years after the request was initiated, the ICJ issued its verdict which 
concluded that ‘the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 
did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or 
the Constitutional Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not 
violate any applicable rule of international law’.31 However, the ICJ did not touch 
upon the questions of independence as such and of recognition, and, as a result, the 
countries that had not recognised Kosovo were given no reason to change their 
                                                          
27 ‘J. Kubiš sa stretol s R. Holbrookom a F. Wisnerom’, The News Agency of the Slovak Republic (TASR), 22 
September 2008. 
28 ‘Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the sixty-third session: Request for an 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of 
Kosovo is in accordance with international law’, United Nations General Assembly, A/63/195, 22 August 2008.  
29 The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 77 in favour, 6 against (incl. Albania, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, United States) and 74 abstentions. As for Slovakia, it voted in 
favour of the resolution. See ‘Backing request by Serbia, General Assembly decides to seek International Court 
of Justice ruling on legality of Kosovo’s independence’, United Nations General Assembly, 63rd Session, 22nd 
Plenary Meeting, GA/10764, 8 October 2008. 
30 ‘Statement by the Slovak Republic for the International Court of Justice on the request made by the United 
Nations General Assembly (resolution A/RES/63/3 of 8 October 2008) for an advisory opinion on the question 
‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in 
accordance with international law?’, No. 2225/2009 NLVV, The Hague, International Court of Justice, 16 April 
2009. Interestingly, Slovakia sent the statement only one day before the time limit fixed by the Court for the 
written statements. Document available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/ 15626.pdf> [accessed on 15 
April 2010]. 
31 ‘Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo’, 
Advisory Opinion, The Hague, International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010, p. 43. The final verdict was 
supported by 10 out of the 14 judges. However, 5 out of the 14 judges initially voted against the decision to give 
advisory opinion and were of the view that the Court should have declined the request. For a detailed advisory 
opinion of the Vice-President of ICJ judge Tomka (from Slovakia) who voted against the verdict, see his 
declaration appended to the Advisory Opinion, ‘Declaration of Vice-President Tomka’, 22 July 2010, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15989.pdf> [accessed 15 May 2011]. 
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position.
32
 Despite stating that the unilateral declaration of independence was not 
contrary to international law, the ICJ’s non-binding opinion did not judge whether 
Kosovo’s declaration had led to the creation of a state nor whether other countries 
acted legitimately in recognising Kosovo’s independence.33 Unsurprisingly, the 
Slovak stance did not change and the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Slovakia, Mikuláš Dzurinda, who was the main initiator of the 2007 Slovak 
Parliament’s Declaration on Kosovo’s status, confirmed this by saying that the 
solution of the status question should be based on the consensus of both parties or on 
the decision of the UNSC.
34
 With regards to the latter, considering the Russian 
position and its veto right on the SC it was clear that this would not happen.
35
  
 
As will be shown, the position taken by Slovakia was clearly decided by its political 
elite. This type of elite reacts to domestic popular pressure. To explain a political 
leader’s behaviour we need to consider not only the institutional context but also 
her/his tactical calculations.
36
 As Putnam suggests, ‘insofar as political decisions 
matter, political decision makers do, too’.37 The role of the political elite in this issue 
is important in understanding the decision-making process over a longer period of 
time. Therefore, this thesis will primarily focus on the actions of the political elite. 
As Suzanne Keller states, ‘powerful, influential elites as the pivotal actors on the 
social stage continue to be the critical gatekeepers for modern societies’.38 In this 
respect, this study explains why the leader of opposition, Mikuláš Dzurinda, despite 
                                                          
32 James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Legal or not, this has not solved issue of recognition’, The Independent, 23 July 2010, p. 
21. 
33 John Cerone, ‘The World Court’s Non-Opinion’, Opinio Juris, 25 July 2010, available at 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2010/ 07/25/the-world-court%E2%80%99s-non-opinion/> [accessed 18 June 2011]. See 
also Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Are We Really Secessionists Now?’, Project Syndicate, 26 July 2010, 
available at <http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/are-we-really-secessionists-now-> [accessed 29 
August 2012]. In general, however, the issue with unilateral steps and solutions enforced externally is that they 
do not lead to long lasting settlements. Therefore, only a negotiated agreement by both parties would have the 
potential to settle the status question effectively. See Spyros Economides, James Ker-Lindsay and Dimitris 
Papadimitriou, ‘Kosovo: Four Futures’, Survival, 52 (2010), 99-116 (p. 111). 
34 ‘Dzurinda: Aj tak ho neuznáme’, SME, 23 July 2010, p. 10. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 
‘opinions of the International Court of Justice are advisory in nature, which means that they are not legally 
binding. The opinion will not have a direct impact on the position of the Slovak Republic to the unilaterally 
declared independence of Kosovo’. See ‘MZV SR k poradnému posudku o nezávislosti Kosova’, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 22 July 2010. 
35 In regard to the Russian position, Yannis notably remarked: ‘Geopolitical considerations left Russia open to, 
rather than against or in favour of, independence. This was either not fully understood or Kosovo was not worth 
bargaining over. Were Russia to have played along, would the rest have played differently?’ See Yannis, ‘The 
Politics and Geopolitics of the Status of Kosovo’, p. 167. 
36 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. x. 
37 Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. ix. 
38 Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society, rev. edn (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. xv. 
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his previously very pro-American views, so openly opposed Kosovo’s independence 
without Belgrade’s consent and why he mobilised other parties in support of his 
view. These questions have not been addressed.  
 
Although respect of international law was presented by the Slovak officials as the 
prime reason for the Slovak stance, this thesis argues that, in fact, the most important 
factors in understanding Slovakia’s foreign policy towards Kosovo are: firstly, a 
tactical factor related to internal politics and the role of political party opposition in 
Slovakia; and, secondly, a principled factor connected to the ethnic Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia and Slovak-Hungarian relations. They were both of high 
importance for the Slovak political elite, and therefore the reasons for the failure of 
all attempts for a ‘common’ EU foreign policy on Kosovo. As a result of these 
aspects, Slovak politicians elevated national interests above EU interests and resisted 
pressure from EU actors. Both factors will be considered in turn. 
 
The first important factor in explaining Slovakia’s policy on Kosovo concerns the 
role played by the political party opposition. In other words, the issues between 
political parties in the domestic context impacted on this foreign political decision. It 
will be argued that it was a tactical step of the leader of one of the parties in 
opposition, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (SDKÚ-
DS), to bring up the topic of Kosovo’s independence and express the necessity for an 
official statement by the Slovak Parliament represented by the Declaration on 
Kosovo’s status passed in March 2007.  
 
It is this element of tactical calculus, i.e. inter-party rivalry, which impacted on the 
evolution of the situation. In 2006 there was a change of government and SDKÚ-DS, 
formerly in the government, became part of the opposition.
39
 However, prior to 
2006, the Kosovo issue was not raised in the debates and no domestic actors paid 
much attention to it. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2007, when the Ahtisaari plan 
was presented, Dzurinda, the leader of the opposition party SDKÚ-DS, decided it 
                                                          
39 After the 2006 elections, the governing coalition was built by Direction-Social Democracy (SMER-DS), 
Slovak National Party (SNS) and People’s Party-Movement for Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS). The 
opposition parties included: Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS), Party of the 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK) and Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). 
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was the right moment to turn this issue into a political tactic and challenge the 
coalition. 
 
Because the government was not united on this issue and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ján Kubiš, saw Kosovo’s independence as inevitable, it appeared to be a 
‘suitable topic’ for an attack on the ruling coalition, arguing that coalition leaders 
were not dealing with an issue so important for Slovak state interests.
 
In turn, the 
leading coalition party, Direction-Social Democracy (SMER-SD), responded 
tactically by putting the Kosovo issue high on their agenda.  
 
However, at the EU level, the Slovak position was a surprise, even more so because 
the initiator of the debate was SDKÚ-DS, and notably its leader, Mikuláš Dzurinda. 
Dzurinda was the Prime Minister in the previous two governments (1998-2006) and 
his politics were very EU and NATO oriented. It was during his term of office that 
Slovakia entered both the EU and NATO in 2004. However, his aim of regaining 
domestic political power, ultimately leading to a parliamentary declaration on 
Kosovo, considerably limited the manoeuvring space of the Slovak Ministry of 
Foreign affairs in the question of Kosovo’s independence. In the end, the 
parliamentary Declaration led to a change of policy and non-fulfilment of the 
Ministry’s main intent – remaining with the EU on Kosovo and demonstrating its 
role as a responsible EU, UNSC and NATO member. This shows the importance of 
political party opposition and its impact on Slovak policy, exposing how an internal 
party political issue ended up having a considerable impact on a key foreign policy 
decision. Even calls for unity on the EU level did not persuade Slovak political 
representatives to change their course of action. 
 
The second argument, that the recognition of Kosovo could be used by the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia for its own autonomist aims or secessionist 
tendencies is an important aspect that needs to be explored. However, once again, 
one needs to look at it in a particular political context.  
 
There is a historical and numerical significance to the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia. From a historical perspective, the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and post-World War I settlements, particularly the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, 
15 
 
considerably cut Hungary’s territory and population. As a result, more than three 
million Hungarians became minorities in neighbouring countries, and Slovakia (then 
part of Czechoslovakia) was one of the states to which they were allocated. 
Hungarians still perceive Trianon as an injustice and Hungarian politicians have 
unsuccessfully attempted to annul the legislation several times. On the other hand, 
Slovaks bitterly remember the last period of the Kingdom of Hungary. From the 
1870s the non-Hungarian nationals of the multi-national Kingdom were subject to 
the so-called process of Magyarisation.
40
 These briefly outlined examples of 
historical events have impacted on the relations between Slovakia and Hungary. 
More recently, tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations were caused due to 
difficulties related to the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam,41 and disagreements over 
Hungarian minority rights in Slovakia.
42
  
 
From a numerical perspective, according to the last census from May 2011, the 
Hungarian minority accounts for about 8.5 percent (i.e. 458,467) of the total 
population and lives predominantly in the southern part of Slovakia.
43
 It represents a 
                                                          
40 Slovakia, known as Upper Hungary, was between 1000 and 1918 ruled by the Kingdom of Hungary. From 
1879, the Magyar language was compulsory in all people’s schools and the teaching of Slovak was dramatically 
reduced which eventually led to the registration of Slovak children as Magyars. During the last census in the 
Kingdom which took place in 1910, people were asked to identify their mother tongue; however, this was not 
considered to be the tongue one learnt from the mother but one that a person spoke best and most willingly. 
Considering the political situation, for many Slovaks it was dangerous to write that the Hungarian language was 
not dear to them. See Ladislav Deák, ‘On the Reliability of the Hungarian Nationality Statistics from 1910’, in 
Insight into Slovak-Magyar Relations, ed. by Ján Doruľa (Bratislava: Slovak Committee of Slavists in 
cooperation with the Institute of Slavonic Studies of Ján Stanislav of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2009), pp. 
7-9. Furthermore, from 1898 Slovak officials were forced by law to magyarise their surnames, which was 
strongly criticised by the British historian and political activist, Robert W. Seton-Watson. For more on this and a 
detailed account on the 1910 census, see Vladimír Jancura, ‘Slováci, dajte si pozor na sčítacích komisárov’, 
Pravda, 24 July 2010, pp. 30-31. 
41 ‘The conflict is rooted in a 1977 treaty between Hungary and then Czechoslovakia to build a series of dams on 
the Danube River. After Hungary abandoned its work in 1989, citing potential long-term environmental damage, 
Slovakia completed a modified version of the complex entirely on its territory. Under pressure from the European 
Union (EU), in 1993 the two sides filed suit against each other at the ICJ; Hungary sued Slovakia for trans-
boundary environmental damage, applying the precautionary principle to international law, while Slovakia sued 
Hungary for treaty violations. Remarkably, the dispute has now survived the collapse of communism, the 
disintegration of Czechoslovakia, successful political and economic transitions, and NATO and EU 
membership’. See Stephen Deets, ‘Constituting Interests and Identities in a Two-Level Game: Understanding the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Conflict’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 5 (2009), 37-56 (p. 38). For more on the 
judgement, see also Peter H. F Bekker, ‘Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). Judgement’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 92 (1998), 273-78. 
42 Ivo Samson, ‘Slovakia: Misreading the Western Message’, in Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. 
Volume 2. International and Transnational Factors, ed. by Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 363-82 (p. 378). Dispute over the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dam was officially 
resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1997. However, as the decisions by the ICJ are not binding, 
the resolution has still not been implemented and continues to be a subject of continued negotiations between 
Slovakia and Hungary. Nevertheless, as Samson notes, since 1999 this issue has not been a major focus of 
political discussions between the two countries; rather, it is the Hungarian minority issue that has been subject of 
attention. See Samson, ‘Slovakia’, p. 378. 
43 ‘Základné údaje zo sčítania obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2011: Obyvateľstvo podľa národnosti’, Štatistický 
Úrad Slovenskej Republiky, Bratislava, July 2012. In comparison, in 2001, the Hungarian minority accounted for 
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substantial percentage and any questions that consider an increase in self-governance 
of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia have been a source of tension between 
Slovakia and Hungary. 
 
More recently, the Slovak political scene in 2007 was influenced by other factors: 
changes in the leadership of Slovakia’s Hungarian minority party – the Party of 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK); a deteriorating relationship with Hungary; SMK’s 
cooperation with the right-wing political party Alliance of Young Democrats 
(FIDESZ) in Hungary; supportive statements on Kosovo’s independence made by 
representatives of the Hungarian minority party; and the revival of the subject of 
autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in the political discourse of the SMK, particularly 
by Miklós Duray, one of its representatives. Furthermore, in the second half of 2007 
the SMK initiated debates on various aspects of the Hungarian minority’s status in 
Slovakia. 
 
It will be argued that all these elements shaped Slovakia’s firm stance and prevented 
it from re-considering its position. The fear of precedent has to be understood in this 
political context. In different political circumstances the Kosovo issue may not have 
been as important as it was. In addition to the above factors, the change of 
government in Hungary in April 2010, when the political party FIDESZ came to 
power, was also crucial. The following month, Hungary changed its citizenship law 
with the aim of making it easier for ethnic Hungarians to apply for Hungarian 
citizenship. All political parties in Slovakia, with the exception of the Hungarian 
minority party, were against this amendment. As a retaliatory measure, Slovakia 
changed its own citizenship law. After the change, if Slovak citizens voluntarily 
decide to obtain another citizenship, in most cases, they would lose their Slovak 
citizenship. 
 
This political context was central to the Hungarian minority playing a role in the 
Kosovo issue.
44
 Only in the setting described above can one understand the political 
                                                                                                                                                                    
9.7 percent. See ‘Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov v roku 2001’, Štatistický Úrad Slovenskej Republiky, 
Bratislava, 2004. Table on the population by nationality available at <http://portal.statistics.sk/ 
showdoc.do?docid=6366> [accessed 20 March 2011]. 
44 For instance, in the case of Bulgaria, the minority issue did not play a role. On 20 March 2008 – relatively soon 
after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence – Bulgaria recognised Kosovo’s statehood despite its large 
Turkish minority. 
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decisions made. The bilateral relations between Slovakia and Hungary and the 
domestic implications of Hungarian activism represent important aspects that need to 
be taken into consideration.  
 
2.  Methodology, Methods and Sources 
 
It is important to note that whilst the findings of this thesis are predominantly 
empirical, the insight and arguments have been informed by theory. This study 
adopts an area studies approach and draws on theoretical literature from different 
disciplines to contribute to an understanding of the empirical puzzle of the case study 
in question. These disciplines include politics, sociology and history, albeit a very 
recent history usually referred to as ‘history of the present’.45 In terms of the 
methodology – based on an examination of primary sources and available archival 
documents – this work is positioned at the intersection of contemporary history and 
politics.
46
 
 
Les Back sees writing as ‘a movement of imagination’. As he notes, ‘on the page we 
take our readers to places, often to situations where our research has led us, to things 
we have seen and people we have listened to’.47 With this in mind, this thesis aims – 
particularly through Chapters 4 and 5 where the main arguments are presented – to 
take the reader to a particular time and place, thus introducing the necessary political 
context for understanding the Slovak refusal to recognise Kosovo and in doing so, 
explaining matters that were unfolding. ‘A sense of uncertainty about the things that 
everyone is so certain about’, as Rachel Dunkley Jones put it to Back, 48 was what 
led to conducting this research and investigating issues that appeared to be so widely 
understood.  
                                                          
45 Timothy Garton Ash supports the idea that we should not wait until the archives of our period will open but 
start writing the history of our times. See Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and 
Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1999). The term ‘history of the 
present’ was originally introduced by American diplomat and historian George Kennan in his review of Ash’s 
book The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (London: Random House, 1989). See George 
Kennan, ‘Witness’, The New York Review of Books, 1 March 1990. 
46 Ole R. Holsti noted that there is a general tendency to separate scholars in disciplines and the convergence 
areas between diplomatic historians and political scientists have been underexploited. See Ole R. Holsti, 
‘Theories of International Relations’, in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. by Michael J. 
Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 51-90 (p. 51).  
47 Les Back, ‘Take your reader there: some notes on writing qualitative research’, available at 
<http://www.dur.ac.uk/ writingacrossboundaries/writingonwriting/lesback/> [accessed 31 August 2012]. 
48 See Les Back, The Art of Listening (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2007), p. 173.  
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A significant proportion of this research is based on semi-structured interviews, 
particularly interviews with political elites (diplomats, members of parliament, 
representatives of the government and other officials) who may be considered 
strategic to the Kosovo policy. This thesis benefited from unprecedented access to 
officials directly involved in policy-making. Their first-hand accounts and insights 
brought new evidence to bear on the Slovak position towards Kosovo’s statehood. 
For the purpose of this study, Keller’s identification of the so-called strategic elites 
has been used:  
 
Whereas elites are important in some social and psychological contexts, 
only some are important for society as a whole. These must somehow be 
distinguished from the rest. [...] Certain elites may arouse momentary 
attention, but only certain leadership groups have a general and sustained 
social impact.
49
 
 
Two criteria have determined who belongs to this strategic (politically) elite group. 
The first decisive criterion for considering interviewees to be strategic elite members 
is that they have been actively involved in the Kosovo issue and the Balkan region 
either from the Slovak or the European perspective. In other words, they have direct 
knowledge and/or first-hand experience of the Kosovo case. This group includes: 
Slovak Ministers of Foreign Affairs, officials from the Slovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs working on the Balkan region, Slovak MPs involved in debates on Kosovo, 
Slovak and foreign diplomats, and EU representatives who observed the position of 
individual member countries on the recognition of Kosovo and/or were involved in 
the Kosovo status process negotiations. The opinions of this community have either 
had a direct impact on the official position of Slovakia or their views have been 
widely discussed and had a considerable influence on the debate on Kosovo. The 
second criterion is based on the power element. As Burnham and his colleagues 
state, ‘not every opinion is equally valid or influential’50 and ‘the reality of modern 
democracy is that many political decisions are taken by small groups of highly 
qualified and knowledgeable individuals’.51 This is reflected in the study, so that the 
                                                          
49 Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 
1963), p. 20. 
50 Peter Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, 2nd edn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 2. 
51 Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, p. 247. 
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interviewees who had power to influence political decisions are part of the strategic 
elite.
52
  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, semi-structured interviews have been considered the 
most appropriate means for gaining the subjective views, beliefs and opinions of 
political representatives involved in the debates around Kosovo’s independence. 
They have enabled the sourcing of data which would be inaccessible in any other 
form. As stated by Rubin and Rubin, qualitative interviewing is particularly good at 
describing political processes or how and why things change.
53
 However, it is also 
necessary to keep in mind that qualitative interviewing requires flexibility in 
reactions and that ‘it can be wonderfully unpredictable’.54 
 
In addition, non-elite interviews were conducted with journalists, researchers and 
analysts who brought insight to the situation from different perspectives. Their views 
have been crucial in gaining a ‘bigger picture’ and in establishing an understanding 
of the political dynamics and their impact on the Slovak political scene as perceived 
from the outside (i.e. from non-politicians). This group was not considered part of 
the ‘strategic elite’ as its members were not in a position to influence any decisions, 
but their views were important in reconstructing and understanding the evolution of 
the Slovak position towards Kosovo’s independence.  
 
Also, one telephone interview was conducted during the course of the research.
55
 
Prior to the conversation, the interviewee was sent a list of core questions. Because 
he was interested in the subject and had previously published articles on Kosovo, it 
was not difficult to engage him in the discussion, as can be the case when there is no 
face-to-face contact. 
 
                                                          
52 Various types of elites were identified in the literature. A special category of elite was discussed in a valuable 
article by Zuckerman, namely the Nobel Prize laureates. She referred to them as the ‘ultra-elite’ and described 
them as ‘the thin layer of individuals with the greatest influence, prestige and power in an institutional sphere’ or 
‘the most highly placed members of elite’. For more information, see Harriet Zuckerman, ‘Interviewing an Ultra-
Elite’, The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (1972), 159-75 (pp. 159-60). 
53 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd edn (London: 
Sage Publications, 2005), p. 3. 
54 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, p. 12. 
55 With Peter Weiss, the Slovak Ambassador to Hungary. 
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The design of the sample was of high importance to ensure the reliability of the data 
gathered. The criteria discussed above were designed to ensure the actors were 
knowledgeable, experienced and reflected a variety of perspectives.
56
 The research 
started with a limited number of key conversational partners
57
 who were identified 
through secondary sources (government publications, newspapers, periodicals, 
reports and parliamentary debates) and the internet, and with whom it was possible 
to initiate contact. The political elite is a community of actors which is quite difficult 
to penetrate. As Goldstein put it, ‘“getting the interview” is more art than science’.58 
Getting access to these actors was initially difficult; however, once some contact was 
established, they recommended or referred other relevant interviewees. This 
technique is called ‘snowball’ or ‘referral’ sampling.59 Sometimes, it was more 
important to establish contact with the gatekeeper. Often access was denied to an 
individual, but with the help of other internal contacts,
60
 who went to talk to the 
individual directly, arrangements were made to speak to the official. This was 
particularly so when conducting interviews at the EU Commission in Brussels. This 
experience led to an increased awareness that it is ‘who you know’ that matters and 
that, in order to be granted access to the higher levels, it is necessary to build up 
important inside contacts. In Brussels, it was also noted that this topic was ‘too 
sensitive to be discussed’; this was another challenge that needed to be overcome.  
 
Elite interviewing is considered the ‘most popular research technique in political 
science today’.61 Odendahl and Shaw identify personal interviews as ‘an effective 
method of data collection for research on elite subjects and culture’.62 However, 
despite this, the literature available on elite interviewing is limited and a number of 
scholars have identified a shortage of relevant methodological sources. Richards 
notes that the literature concentrates mainly on non-elite interviewing,
63
 or as stated 
                                                          
56 For more on how to make research credible, see Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, pp. 64-78. 
57 Rubin and Rubin used for their study the term conversational partner as an equivalent to interviewees and 
informants. They stressed that using the term conversational partner reminds the researcher that the flow and 
direction of the interview depends on the concerns of both parties and it emphasizes the active role of the 
interviewee. See Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, p. 14. 
58 Kenneth Goldstein, ‘Getting in the Door: Sampling and Conducting Elite Interviews’, Political Science & 
Politics, 35 (2002), 669-72 (p. 669).   
59 Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, p. 233. 
60 For example through a friend who worked in the organisation as a trainee. 
61 Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, p. 7.  
62 Teresa Odendahl and Aileen M. Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’, in Handbook of Interview Research: Context and 
Method, ed. by Jaber F. Gumbrium and James A. Holstein (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 299-316 (p. 300). 
63 David Richards, ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls’, Politics, 16 (1996), 199-204 (p. 199). 
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by Odendahl and Shaw, materials which are dedicated to interviewing rarely 
differentiate elite from non-elite interviews.
64
 Burnham and colleagues argue that the 
lack of literature might be caused by the fact that ‘it is difficult to generalize from 
“how it was for me” studies’.65 In other words, every researcher experiences elite 
interviewing in a different way and brings her/his personality into the arena. It often 
depends on the interviewer, her/his attitude and what she/he can take from the 
situation.  
 
Pridham notes that, similar to other methods of research, researchers need to bear in 
mind that elite interviewing is a constant learning process.
66
 Although every 
interview with a member of the strategic elite was different, with time it was possible 
to learn more about the hierarchy structures of this group and what was expected. In 
comparison to non-elites, when eliciting information from people in a ‘powerful’ 
position it was necessary to be well prepared for the interview and to know the 
subject in detail.
67 
Without this, the interviewees did not engage in deep conversation 
and provided only widely accessible information.
68
 
 
As Kvale mentions, the original Greek meaning of the word ‘method’ is ‘a route that 
leads to the goal’.69 Although there are disadvantages, elite interviewing may be 
considered to be an appropriate method for achieving the research goals set out in 
this thesis. As Burnham and colleagues state, ‘it is often the most effective way to 
obtain information about decision makers and decision-making processes’.70 By 
making the best possible use of elite interviewing and applying it to this study, 
access to invaluable data was gained. However, this thesis has not explicitly relied 
                                                          
64 Odendahl and Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’, p. 301. 
65 Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, p. 232. 
66 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Interviewing Party-political Elites in Italy’, in Research Methods for Elite Studies, ed. by 
George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 72-88 (p. 87). 
67 For example, when I conducted an interview with a representative of the European Commission on the Kosovo 
case, he kept asking questions like ‘So what do you think about it?’ or commenting ‘You probably know more on 
this’. 
68 In this connection I would like to refer to Zuckerman’s quote. Although she dealt with the ultra-elite, in my 
view it also reflects in the political field. She said: ‘Top elites are unwilling to devote time that otherwise might 
be fruitfully spent to projects they consider trivial. Another chemist admitted at the close of the interview: ‘I said 
to myself before you came, ‘If she wants to ask me about social things, I will get her out of here fast’. But you 
asked me about important things. What is written about science is never quite right. You have to hear it from the 
people who were there’. See Zuckerman, ‘Interviewing an Ultra-Elite’, p. 165. In this sense, the last part of the 
quote could be applied also to the field of politics as in ‘What is written about politics is never quite right. You 
have to hear it from the people who were there’. This is another reason why qualitative interviewing appeared as 
the best way how to gather information on my research topic. 
69 Steinar Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (London: Sage, 1996), p. 4. 
70 Burnham and others, Research Methods in Politics, p. 231. 
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on the data from the interviews. In order to increase the validity and credibility of the 
research findings, the principle of triangulation involving ‘more than one method or 
source of data in the study of social phenomena’71 was applied. Therefore, the 
findings were supplemented with analysis of newspaper articles, reports, political 
leader speeches and archival material. 
 
In addition to interviews, this thesis draws on primary sources including: statements 
published by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s office 
documents, resolutions by EU Commission/Parliament, briefings, speeches by 
political leaders and public statements. Of particular importance were transcripts of 
Slovak National Council debates on Kosovo from March 2007 as no account yet 
written incorporated these parliamentary discussions in the analysis. Other relevant 
materials used in this thesis include documents published between 2007 and 2010, 
for instance: the European Parliament’s resolution on Kosovo and the role of the EU, 
statements by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs (on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in 2008 and ICJ Advisory Opinion in 2010), the Slovak Parliament’s 
‘Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Solution of the 
Future Status of the Serbian province Kosovo’ passed in 2007 and speeches by 
Slovak Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  
 
Another exceptionally valuable source of information was leaked US cables released 
through Wikileaks, mainly in September 2011. Data from these dispatches were very 
useful in confirming evidence from other sources, supporting the arguments and 
demonstrating behind-the-scenes activity necessary for understanding the 
development of Slovakia’s position towards Kosovo’s independence.    
 
The study has also benefited from material obtained from the Archive of the Slovak 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the archives relating to the Kosovo period remain 
classified, documents from previous events were used, particularly documents 
discussing NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and yearly reports 
about the state of Slovak Foreign Policy. Furthermore, materials from the archive of 
the Slovak daily Pravda were used. In addition to these materials, visits to the Vane 
                                                          
71 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 379. 
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Ivanovic Library at Kingston University and its unique collection of specialised 
documents relevant to Yugoslav and South-East European history and politics 
contributed to this research. 
 
The ability to generalise in qualitative research often leads to challenges. However, 
as Devine argues, qualitative research can be designed in a way that facilitates an 
understanding of other situations, and therefore the findings can have relevance 
beyond the time and place in which they were gathered.
72
 This means that 
researchers are able to make a wider argument and claim that their research findings 
are applicable to other cases, ultimately resulting in further research opportunities. 
This thesis subscribes to this view.  
 
3. Structure 
  
This chapter’s objective was to set the scene for the rest of the thesis. The following 
five chapters aim to explain why Slovakia decided to pursue a non-recognition 
policy. This thesis is designed to convey a key message: to understand the Slovak 
position on Kosovo one needs to look at the actions of the political elite and 
importantly, the political context in which the decision was implemented.   
 
The first chapter will look at Kosovo’s history and reflect on main events from the 
twentieth century that shaped the question of Kosovo’s status leading up to the 
appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for Kosovo’s status talks. This is 
not meant to be a comprehensive account of Kosovo’s history and the region; rather, 
the aim of this section is to provide a historical background to the thesis and 
understanding of developments leading to the final decision to settle Kosovo’s status 
in the early twenty-first century.    
 
Thereafter, Chapter 2 will review the literature on EU foreign policy-making and 
consider the concept of Europeanisation in the context of foreign policy studies. It 
will also look at the role of agents in policy-making. It emphasises that there is a 
                                                          
72 Fiona Devine, ‘Qualitative Methods’, in Theory and Methods in Politics Science, ed. by David Marsh and 
Gerry Stoker, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 145. See also Janet Ward Schofield, 
‘Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research’, in Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, 
ed. by Martyn Hammersley (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 200-25 (pp. 206-8).  
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difference between process Europeanisation and policy Europeanisation. While 
processes have been constantly Europeanised and reflected at the level of national 
foreign ministries, the same cannot be argued for the latter. Accession to the EU 
leads to changes; however, the extent to which countries adapt to policies depends 
also on the political context and a number of other factors at play. As it will be 
shown, this was not fully appreciated in understanding the Slovak position over 
Kosovo.  
 
Chapter 3 is structured in two parts and follows a chronological time frame. The first 
part highlights relevant events from the 1990s and beyond relating to Slovak foreign 
policy and the Balkans, providing a necessary background to Slovakia’s policy 
towards Kosovo. While until 2004, integration into the EU and NATO was a clear 
foreign political priority of Slovakia, once the integration was completed, there was a 
turning point in foreign policy, as demonstrated by the Kosovo case. The second part 
provides an analysis of the existing literature on Slovakia’s view on Kosovo and the 
arguments underlying its decision not to recognise Kosovo’s independence. It 
discusses five arguments that have been identified as having an impact on the Slovak 
stance and assesses their relevance: 1) Slovak-Serbian relations; 2) regional stability; 
3) the issue of international law; 4) the role of political party opposition; and 5) the 
notion of Kosovo as precedent. Examination of these arguments builds an essential 
foundation for the factors dealt with in the following two chapters. 
 
The core of this thesis and the two main lines of argument are discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5. They consider two of the aforementioned arguments: the role of political 
party opposition and the notion of Kosovo as a precedent, which is closely connected 
to the Hungarian minority issue, as key to understanding reasons behind the 
decision-making process of the Slovak government. These chapters put the Kosovo 
issue in a political context and explain how both of these factors determined the 
Slovak position. Specifically, Chapter 4 looks at Slovak parliamentary debates on the 
question of Kosovo’s independence and explores the position of Slovak diplomacy 
throughout the Slovak membership in the UNSC (2006-2007). It will demonstrate 
how the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in light of domestic political events – 
and despite external lobbying – needed to adjust its initial course of action on 
Kosovo. As will be seen, political party opposition – specifically its leader – were 
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important actors to be considered in the development of this matter. While in many 
instances the impact of major powers such as the US, the UK, France or Germany 
played a role in shaping policies of other, rather smaller, states, this was not to be the 
case with Slovakia.  
 
Following on from this, Chapter 5 examines the importance of the Hungarian 
minority issue and the role of precedent in Slovakia’s non-recognition policy 
towards Kosovo. The aim is to show that although the ethnic minority factor 
considerably shaped Slovak policy, the situation was actually far more complex than 
it appears on the surface. It shows that the Slovak view was not only a product of its 
issues with the Hungarian minority but rather a response to a combination 
of activities by representatives of Hungary and the ethnic Hungarian party SMK. 
This chapter also highlights the role of collective rights as presented in the Ahtisaari 
plan in 2007 and their perception by Slovak officials. As will be shown, given the 
then issues with ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, granting collective rights – as part of 
the Ahtisaari plan – could have created a problematic scenario domestically.  
 
Finally, the concluding chapter interprets, and reflects on, the findings and provides 
an analysis of the implications of the Kosovo case and its relevance for Slovakia and 
the EU. It also discusses this thesis’s contribution to the field and identifies future 
potential research areas arising from the study. 
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CHAPTER 1: History of Kosovo 
 
‘History happens, but mostly it’s made. Let’s make it wisely  
and don’t forget that politics is the art of the possible’.73 
  
Introduction  
This chapter covers the history of Kosovo with the main focus on the period between 
the First Balkan War (1912) and the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as the UN 
Special Envoy for Kosovo (2005). The aim is to provide a necessary background for 
understanding the process of determining Kosovo’s status – that will be debated in 
the following chapters – and to offer an insight into some significant historical 
developments impacting on the question of Kosovo’s status. Therefore, its goal is to 
put the question of Kosovo’s status in a historical perspective. 
 
Albanian and Serbian scholars have completely opposing theories about the ethnic 
development of Kosovo.
74
 The traditional Serbian view holds that the people who 
lived in Kosovo were overwhelmingly Serb until just a few generations back.
75
 The 
Serbs are certain that they came to the region in the sixth and seventh centuries, 
whereas Albanians arrived in the area in the fifteenth century with the triumphant 
Turks.
76
 Contrarily, Albanian historians have always claimed the right of ‘first 
possession’. They argue that their ancestors, the ancient Illyrians and Dardanians, 
lived here long before the Slav invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries. 
However, where the truth lies is not so clear.
77
 In any case, as Ker-Lindsay argues, 
the origins of the contemporary conflict go back to the First Balkan War.
78
  
                                                          
73 Milan Rúfus (1928-2009). See Dana Podracká, ‘Iné dejiny – iné Vianoce: Hovoríme s básnikom Milanom 
Rúfusom’, in Otvorené Okná Literárneho týždenníka I., ed. by Drahoslav Machala (Bratislava: Literárne 
Informačné Centrum, 1996), pp. 91-102 (p. 96). 
74 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst, 1998), preface xii.  
75 Judah, Kosovo, p. 2. 
76 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, preface xii. 
77 Judah, Kosovo, p. 2. In Calic’s view, probably none of these interpretations is accurate. As for the Illyrian 
origin of the Albanians, there is not sufficient historical or linguistic evidence to support it. Also, from the early 
Middle Ages it was probably mainly Slavs who populated the area of Kosovo. Nevertheless, Calic claims that in 
contrast to Serbian scholars’ statements, it is probable that many more Albanians lived in the region, particularly 
in the towns. Lastly, she argues that Serbian national historiography, claiming Kosovo was the original historical 
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In more modern terms, the relationship between Serbs and Albanians has since the 
creation of the Yugoslav state gone through a number of stages: in the first stage 
(1918-1941) Albanians lived under Serbian domination and did not have any 
explicitly guaranteed minority rights.
79
 The period before the Second World War 
was characterised by internal colonialism with a largely imported Serbian 
intelligentsia ruling the region’s majority population of Albanian peasants and 
craftsmen. In the Second World War, the situation reversed as a large part of Kosovo 
was united with Albania (under Italian rule). Serbs and Montenegrins lived in a 
vulnerable environment as many Albanians openly collaborated with the Italian and 
German administrations.
80
  
 
Relations in the period from 1945-1966 ranged from armed conflicts to efforts to 
resolve disagreements politically, including administrative restriction of the rights of 
Albanians, and even violence. In the so-called post-Brioni period (1966-1981) the 
minority rights of Albanians were acknowledged and assured on quite a wide scale; 
Albanian national emancipation was encouraged, which eventually became a 
powerful Albanian national movement contributing to political conflicts.
81
 This was 
also the period of the controversial constitution of 1974. As a consequence, the Serbs 
and Montenegrins felt threatened by the new atmosphere of Albanian self-
assertiveness.
82
 The fifth stage (1981-1992) witnessed the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
Nationalist movements were strengthened which led to conflicts and civil war in the 
regions of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia established domination over Kosovo and 
the Albanians increased efforts to create an independent and sovereign state of 
Kosovo.
83
  
 
The sixth stage can be identified as the period after Yugoslavia disintegrated (1992-
2006). The region witnessed a bloody period culminating with the launch of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
centre of the medieval Serbian state, is not accurate for Serbia did not gain influence in this region until 1200. 
See Marie-Janine Calic, ‘Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account’, in Kosovo and the Challenge 
of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, ed. by 
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 19-31 (pp. 22-23). 
78 James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 8. 
79 Dušan Janjić, ‘National Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians’, in Conflict or Dialogue: 
Serbian-Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans: Studies and Essays, ed. by Dušan Janjić and 
Shkelzen Maliqi (Subotica: European Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1994), p. 132. 
80 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, preface xiii-xiv. 
81 Janjić, ‘National Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Serbs and Albanians’, p. 132. 
82 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, preface xiv. 
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NATO’s military campaign against Serbia in 1999 aimed at eliminating Milošević’s 
power over Kosovo. After the bombing, Kosovo was put under international UN 
administration until the early twenty-first century, when the time came to decide its 
status. 
 
1.1 Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Wars 
In October 1912, Montenegro attacked Albanian territory belonging to the 
Ottomans.
84
 Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece immediately joined and declared war. 
Initially, Albanians tried not to engage, but the Balkan army penetrated deep into 
Albanian inhabited territory.
85
 As a consequence, Albanians joined the Ottoman 
Empire against the Balkan soldiers. Thousands of young Serbian volunteers joined 
the army; for them the declaration of war symbolised a national rebirth. The idea that 
Kosovo might be liberated after more than five centuries brought back emotions.
86
 
 
Within weeks, the Turks had been driven back. Montenegro gained possession of 
Peć and other parts of western Kosovo, while Serbia took hold of the rest. For 
Kosovo’s Serbs the return of the Serbian army meant liberation, but for the 
Albanians it meant they could not unite with the emerging Albanian state, which was 
officially recognised in 1913.
87
 Judah argues that Serbia was able to retake Kosovo 
because Serbs already had a state – which cultivated a national myth – and together 
with Montenegro had organised modern armies.
88
 
 
The Albanian national leaders were unprepared for the unexpected breakdown of the 
Ottoman army and the loss of Kosovo to the Serbs. Disrupted communication and 
lack of a central Albanian authority contributed to their loss to a great extent. The 
main goal of Serbia was to access the sea; it was not strongly opposed to the 
autonomous Albanian state as long as its leader was friendly to Serbia. Austro-
Hungary became more aware of the crisis on its southern border and of the need for 
quick action before Balkan allies gained more territories. It realised that the 
                                                          
84 For more historical information on the First Balkan War, see William Miller, The Ottoman Empire (1801-
1913) (Cambridge: The University Press, 1913). 
85 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 76. 
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Habsburg’s interests could only be secured by an independent Albania; this would 
stop Serbia’s expansion to the coast. Indeed, in November 1912 at the Congress of 
Vlora the independent Albanian state was proclaimed.
89
 
 
Austro-Hungary warned Serbia as they were reaching the Albanian coast that they 
would not permit them to invade any Adriatic seaport. Their military intervention 
was avoided by the Conference of Ambassadors in London in December 1912, 
which awarded large Albanian territories to the Balkan allies without consideration 
of the ethnic structure in the areas. The main matters were the international status of 
Albania, the organisation of the new state and the establishment of internationally 
acceptable borders. In Russia, public opinion was united in its support towards the 
Orthodox Slavs.
90
 
 
At the end of May 1913 the Balkan states finally accepted the Treaty of London. For 
the Ottoman Empire it meant that their European territory was reduced to Istanbul 
and the surrounding area in eastern Thrace. On 30 May, the Balkan allies signed 
peace with the Ottomans and the Serbians started to withdraw their army. Greece and 
Serbia were dissatisfied about Albanian independency, as they had hoped to divide 
the territory between themselves. Therefore, they sought compensation in 
Macedonia, leading to a conflict with Bulgaria. In June, Bulgaria unexpectedly 
attacked Serbian and Greek troops in Macedonia. However, the Bulgarians 
overestimated their military power and Romanian, Montenegrin and Ottoman troops 
entered the war. Bulgaria was soon forced to capitulate and, as a result, lost nearly all 
the territories gained in the First Balkan War.
91
 
 
Yet, the Second Balkan War left some questions unresolved: Macedonia remained a 
continuous source of dispute between the Balkan countries, the independent 
Albanian state did not include all parts inhabited by Albanians (more than half of the 
Albanians were left outside the borders) and Serbia had no access to the Adriatic 
Sea. The Treaty of London formally recognised Albania; however the settlement of 
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its borders was delayed until December 1913 when the Protocol of Florence was 
signed. Neither Albania nor other Balkan states were content with the new borders of 
Albania stated in the Protocol. As for Britain, it never claimed that the new borders 
were just, ‘but believed that preserving the peace of Europe took precedence over 
ethnographic considerations’. Sir Edward Grey openly stated to the House of 
Commons on 12 August 1913 that: 
The basic objective of the agreement on the borders was to satisfy the 
Great Powers, but that many criticisms could be raised by anyone who 
really knew Albania and viewed the issue from that country’s 
standpoint.
92
  
 
As a result, regional and ethnographic concerns were pushed to the background and 
the decision of the powerful states determined to a large extent the future of the area. 
As regards the recognised Albanian state, it included only half of the total Albanian 
population in the Balkans (around 800,000 people). Significant Albanian minorities 
in Kosovo and western Macedonia went to Serbia, and others remained in 
Montenegro and Greece. From this time forth, the wish for unification has been 
directing all national-oriented Albanians.
93
 
 
1.2 First World War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia period (1918-1941) 
The rising influence of the Serbian state (as well as the aim to liberate Bosnia from 
Austro-Hungary) resulted in a collision with the Habsburgs. Austro-Hungary was 
opposed to the new emerging power in the Balkans and furthermore to the idea of 
Yugoslavism.
94
 In 1914, when the Bosnian Serb Gavrillo Princip assassinated Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Austro-Hungary declared war on Serbia and the First World 
War began. After the fall of the Empire, in 1918, the circumstances changed and the 
creation of the south Slav state became possible.
95
  
 
1918 saw Serbs reoccupying Kosovo with the help of the allied forces during their 
northward offensive, and on 1 December 1918 the new Yugoslav state was 
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established.
96
 Following this, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 officially 
recognised the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, together 
with those of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Albania. 
The Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman Empires fell apart and new 
independent states emerged.
97
 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a 
unification of the Kingdom of Serbia; at the time of its creation it had a population of 
about 12 million. It also included the Kingdom of Montenegro, Macedonia and all 
provinces in the south of Austro-Hungary which were populated by Slovenes, Croats 
and Serbs. However, Croatia and Montenegro were not very keen about this as they 
were concerned with the loss of their previous national status.
98
  
 
The new political arrangements after the First World War yet again left half of the 
Albanian population outside Albania’s borders. Almost half a million Albanians 
were living in areas which were now part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (southern Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia).
99
 In Cviic’s view 
the post-1918 peace treaties left much ‘unfinished business’ behind. He argues that 
the old empires were not perfect, but ‘the national states that followed them were 
almost invariably worse’.100  
 
Guerrilla kaçaks, veterans of earlier battles against the Turks and Serbs (in 1912 and 
1913), continued fighting, leading to a bloody revolt. The kaçaks did not want 
Kosovo to be part of Yugoslavia, insisting that it was a state of the south Slavs and 
that the Albanians did not belong to this group. Albanian opposition grew stronger 
when the Albanian language schools were closed and Serbs and Montenegrins were 
encouraged to move to Kosovo – during this period, 70,000 colonists arrived there. 
Albanians lost their land and it is assumed that around 150,000 people left for 
Turkey (particularly between the years 1910 and 1920). Turkey supported the arrival 
of Albanians, because large areas of Anatolia were under populated due to the earlier 
emigration of Greeks from this region.
101
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In the autumn of 1918, the Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo – also 
known as the KK or Kosovo Committee – was founded. Similarly to the KLA in the 
1990s, the KK illegally traded arms across the border from Albania and organised 
attacks within Kosovo, western Macedonia and parts of Montenegro.
102
 The main 
goal of the Kosovo Committee, which lacked official status, was to support the anti-
Serbian insurgency.
103
 Extensive actions started in May 1919, particularly in the 
Drenica valley (north central Kosovo). However, the kaçaks were not well equipped 
and could not resist the machine-gun units of the Yugoslav army. In October that 
year, kaçaks presented their demands to the Serbs and asked to: 
 
Recognize the Kosovo Albanian’s right to self-government; to stop the 
colonization programme; to stop army actions carried out on the pretext 
of disarmament; to open Albanian schools; to make Albanian an official 
language of administration; and stop interning the families of the 
rebels.
104
  
 
The authorities started to form armed bands (so-called četas) using local Serbs and 
together with the četnik leaders began offensives against kaçaks. This resulted in 
kaçaks also attacking Serbian villages. As for Belgrade, it had two ways to suppress 
the revolt in Kosovo: gain control or neutralise Albania.
105
 
 
The phase of kaçaks resistance came to an end in December 1924. The authorities 
could not change the Albanians into law abiding citizens.
106
 In the end, the kaçaks 
accomplished very little, but achieved two things: they symbolically demonstrated 
that many Kosovo Albanians did not accept the legitimacy of Serbian or Yugoslav 
rule and they severely obstructed the colonisation programme. Colonisation’s main 
aim was to change the national composition of the population in Kosovo (and 
Macedonia) and to offer Serbs lands in order to stop their emigration to North 
America.
107
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Until 1929 the Yugoslav state was called The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes.
108
 Mikasinovich argues that the name was altered in order to foster 
national integration by creating a supra-nationality. The year 1929 was then marked 
by the unification and legal birth of a new Yugoslav nation. However, the parties 
who joined the new state did so for diverse reasons, which later turned out to be 
incompatible.
109
  
 
During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia period, the Kosovo issue did not yet have the 
features it gained in the last decades of the twentieth century. According to Petković, 
one reason for this was that Albanians considered themselves the defeated party in 
World War I in comparison to the victorious Serbs. Also, the political system at that 
time did not grant any special rights to national minorities and police repression did 
not allow anti-regime activities. Likewise, the balance of power in the Balkans and 
Europe at that time was favourable for Yugoslavia and did not permit 
internationalisation of the matter of Albanians in Yugoslavia.
110
 
 
1.3 Kosovo in the Second World War (1941-1945) 
Fearing Yugoslavia would be invaded, as German forces moved into the Balkans the 
Yugoslav government decided to join the Axis pact.
111
 However, in March 1941, 
Serbian officers in the Yugoslav army overthrew the government.
112
 Hitler regarded 
Yugoslavia as an obstacle in his way towards Greece and the Soviet Union. 
Claiming that the German minority in Vojvodina was abused he attacked Yugoslavia 
without declaring war.
113
 On 6 April 1941, Germans heavily bombed Belgrade and 
the invasion began.
114
 Yugoslavia capitulated eleven days later and the division of 
the country followed. Soon after, the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ was formed, 
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incorporating Bosnia and Hercegovina and establishing Italian and German zones of 
influence.
115
  
 
Despite the occupation, the region was given a good measure of local control under 
Albanian leadership. Bulgaria got a small part in the east. The rest of Kosovo and 
Albanian populated areas of western Macedonia were joined to Albania, which had 
been conquered by the Italians in 1939.
116
  
 
The areas of Kosovo belonging to Italy were under military rule until 1941; it was 
then made known that they would be under civil administration as part of the 
kingdom of Albania.
117
 Indeed, the public in Tirana enthusiastically approved this 
resolution. Italians also introduced education in the Albanian language and set up 
around 173 elementary schools in Kosovo and united almost all of the Albanian-
inhabited lands. However, one of the unpopular measures was the reintroduction of 
feudal dues on the peasantry. On 21 April 1941, German General Eberhardt met with 
local Albanian leaders in Mitrovica, including Xhafer Deva, the main representative 
for Mitrovica and a leading figure in the history of occupied Kosovo. It was agreed 
that Albanians would take over the local government in the Albanian inhabited areas 
and would have the authority to organise their education. However, Belgrade 
objected and German officials suspended the agreement. Still, some elements of the 
agreement were later implemented, for example the creation of 40 Albanian 
elementary schools in the Mitrovica area during the next two years. One of the 
central issues discussed during this meeting was also the expulsion of the Serbian 
and Montenegrin colonists from Kosovo. Eberhardt agreed to help with their 
removal but he insisted that everything in this matter should be done in a wise and 
peaceful way. However, this proved to be only an assumption; the Albanians had 
already started attacking Serbian villages, aiming to reclaim the confiscated land and 
remove the colonists.
118
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For some Albanians this was an opportunity for revenge on the Serbian and 
Montenegrin settlers. Serbian villages were burnt, armed gangs roamed the 
countryside and Serbs were killed and expelled. Serbs partly retaliated, but the 
predominance of power was on the side of the Albanians.
119
 Carlo Umiltà, the Italian 
Civil Commissioner described the situation in his memoirs, noting: ‘The Albanians 
are out to exterminate the Slavs’. In one region between Djakovica and Peć he found 
villages where ‘not one single house has a roof; everything has been burnt down… 
There are headless bodies of men and women strewn on the ground’, while the living 
anxiously sought refuge.
120
 However, Umiltà also noted that this was not a one-sided 
affair, as ‘Slavs and Albanians had burnt down one another’s houses, had killed as 
many people as they could, and had stolen livestock, goods and tools’.121 
 
Italy capitulated on 8 September 1943 and Germans invaded Kosovo and Albania. 
Although they immediately took control of the area they tried to retain the 
illusionary image of Albania as an independent country.
122
 Germans used the 
rhetoric of Albanian nationalism and independence in order to win the sympathy of 
the population. In reality, the government was selected and controlled by German 
officials. At the end of September, Germany officially recognised Albania as an 
independent state and ostensibly supported its acquisition of Kosovo. Soon 
afterwards, over the winter, came a new wave of Serb expulsion.
123
 
 
In their Second Session, held in November 1943, the Anti-Fascist Council of 
National Liberation of Yugoslavia decided to build the new Yugoslavia on the 
federal principle. It was declared that the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
was founded: 
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On the basis of the right of every people to self-determination, including 
the right to secede or unite with other peoples, and in conformity with 
the true aspiration of all the people of Yugoslavia, demonstrated in the 
course of a three year joint struggle for national liberation, which has 
forged the peoples of Yugoslavia into an indivisible brotherhood […].124  
 
In early 1944 a resolution was issued at a conference in northern Albania by two 
local committees of the Yugoslav Communist Party in Kosovo with the main 
passage stating:  
 
Kosovo-Metohija is an area with a majority Albanian population, which, 
now as always in the past, wishes to be united with Albania … The only 
way that the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija can be united with Albania 
is through a common struggle with the other peoples of Yugoslavia 
against the occupiers and their lackeys. For the only way freedom can be 
achieved is if all peoples, including the Albanians, have the possibility of 
deciding on their own destiny, with the right to self-determination, up to 
and including secession.
125
 
 
However, no Kosovo Albanians were at the meeting, and after the adjustments of the 
constitution, the right of self-determination did not apply to Kosovo Albanians.
126
 
 
1.4 Yugoslavia and the status of Kosovo under the rule of Tito (1945-1980) 
At the end of World War II, with support from the allies, Marshal Tito became the 
new Yugoslav leader and supreme commander of the Yugoslav army. He stayed in 
power for the next 35 years and held together the various Yugoslav nationalities.
127
 
Mikasinovich argues that this ‘harmony’ among the nationalities was created thanks 
to Tito’s political manoeuvring and liberal application of force.128 Most notably, 
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during his rule Kosovo achieved a form of autonomy which by the 1970s had almost 
equal status with the other federal units of Yugoslavia.
129
 
 
Before July 1945 there was a debate about which federal unit Kosovo should join. In 
addition to joining Serbia, union with Montenegro and Macedonia were 
mentioned.
130
 Edvard Kardelj, one of Tito’s close advisers, noted at a Central 
Committee meeting:  
 
The best solution would be if Kosovo were to be united with Albania, 
but because neither foreign nor domestic factors favour this, it must 
remain a compact province within the framework of Serbia.
131
 
 
Soon after, at the Regional People’s Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija in Prizren in 
July 1945 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia passed a resolution declaring that the 
region of Kosovo would be annexed to Serbia. It stated that Albanians would benefit 
from ‘true equality’. The main goal of this and other similar steps was to win them 
over to the communist government. For instance, earlier in March the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs temporarily prohibited the return of 50,000-60,000 Serbian and 
Montenegrin settlers who had fled Kosovo during the war; this was an effort to 
compensate injustice done to the Albanians, though it caused injustice to the 
Serbs.
132
 However, Malcolm argues that the decision to ban the return of Serbian 
colonists to their homes was in truth only provisional. Indeed, after two weeks Tito 
changed the arrangement and all settlers were allowed to return. This quick change 
generated alarm among the Albanians and Communist leaders in Kosovo; a 
compromise was thus made defining which colonists could return based on how they 
got possession of their land. Nevertheless, recalling the violence during the war, not 
all colonists wanted to return.
133
  
 
The Law on the Administrative Division of Serbia into Provinces was passed on 3
 
September 1945, creating the Autonomous Territory of Kosovo and Metohija, while 
similar law days earlier established the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. 
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Malcolm points out that the difference between region (oblast) and province 
(pokrajina) was never legally clear, but it was obvious that province was regarded as 
higher.
134
 Crucially, this was the last step in establishing the new Yugoslav 
Federation. In essence, Serbian historians see behind the creation of the Autonomous 
Territory of Kosovo and Metohija mainly three intentions: firstly, to determine the 
status of Albanians in Kosovo; secondly, to prepare the ground for integration of 
Albania into a Yugoslav federation; and thirdly, to secure a balance between the 
Serbs and the other Yugoslav nations based on the Leninist doctrine.
135
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Later in 1946, during the official discussions between President Tito and Enver 
Hoxha, the Albanian Communist leader, Tito said that ‘Kosovo and the other 
Albanian regions belong to Albania and we shall return them to you, but not now 
because the Great Serb reaction would not accept such a thing’.136 The Yugoslav 
Communist Party was trying to suppress the ‘Greater Serbian hegemonism’ by the 
creation of the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The new 
Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 stated in Article 103 that the rights and scope of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina were to be determined by the Constitution of the Serbian 
Republic; this should have served as an effort to resolve the Serbian question.
137
 That 
said, the new constitution acknowledged five nationalities including Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians and the minorities had a special status. 
Excepting Bosnia-Hercegovina, each republic was considered a nation-state.
138
 
  
Albanian Communists did not oppose the annexation of Kosovo, as they were very 
much under Yugoslav control; there was also a debate about the creation of a Balkan 
Federation, which would resolve Kosovo’s issue.139 Indeed, Hoxha stated in 
December 1946 that it was not the time to ask for Kosovo and, ‘That is not a 
progressive thing to do. No, in this situation, on the contrary, we must do whatever is 
possible to ensure that the Kosovars become brothers with the Yugoslavs’.140 
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Notably, the Constitution of 1946, excepting the autonomy, allowed the opening of 
elementary schools in the Albanian language, and enabled ownership and 
presentation of national symbols and development of Albanian culture.
141
 
 
The break up with Moscow 
In the first post-war years Tito’s prestige was growing and, as Vickers states, it was 
only a question of time as to when Stalin would get involved.
142
 On the other hand, 
Malcolm remarks that the motive for Stalin’s move against Tito was the issue of 
Yugoslav-Albanian unification. Hoxha and Tito had discussed earlier the aim to 
build a Balkan Federation including Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.
143
 For a long 
time, Moscow set an example for Yugoslav Communists. However, Tito realised 
that Stalin would not allow a second cult of personality within his sphere of 
influence. Tito’s advantage was that he had a relatively strong military behind him 
and furthermore was backed up by his indirect connection with NATO. Yugoslavia’s 
strong economy was also important.
144
 
 
Indeed, the idea of a Balkan Federation enraged Stalin, especially as it was a case of 
independent foreign policy-making by Yugoslavia, and he had not been consulted. 
Consequently, in June 1948 Yugoslavia was officially expelled from the 
Cominform.
145
 The break up with Moscow had in the short term some negative 
effects on Yugoslavia and Kosovo in particular.
146
 The controlling power of the 
Communist system was tightened and the security apparatus increased its influence. 
Still, the most important consequence was that Hoxha turned towards Moscow; he 
stated his loyalty to the Soviet Union and started to attack Tito’s policies.147 As a 
result, the split between Yugoslavia and Albania
148
 meant the end of the earlier 
discussed idea of Kosovo joining Albania and brought a stop to Albanian 
immigration to Yugoslavia.
149
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In any case, soon after, the Yugoslav authorities started to encourage people in 
Kosovo and Macedonia to identify themselves as ‘Turks’ by nationality. In 1951, 
Turks were declared a national minority; Turkish schools were opened and 
Albanians were encouraged to leave to Turkey. In 1953, Yugoslavia signed a treaty 
with Turkey and Greece and emigration of Yugoslav ‘Turks’ to Turkey was 
officially permitted. The main objective of this policy was to remove large numbers 
of Albanians
150
 and weaken the growing national awareness of Kosovo Albanians, 
whose population was growing twice as fast as the Yugoslav average.
151
  
 
In general, the second half of the 1950s was characterised by tensions between the 
Yugoslav republics. Slovenia was not satisfied that large funds from the federal 
budget were being used by the less developed parts of Yugoslavia, for example 
Kosovo.
152
 In order to resolve this tensed situation the concept of ‘Yugoslav 
consciousness’ had to be created.153  
 
The constitution of 1963 and Ranković’s removal 
Crucially, the Yugoslav constitution of 1963 fundamentally reduced the autonomous 
status of Kosovo. It stated that the republics could establish autonomous provinces 
on their own initiative, and thus the establishment of the provinces of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina was decided by the Serbian Assembly. In effect, this meant that the status 
of Kosovo was dependent on the internal decisions of the republic of Serbia.
154
 
 
A changing point came in 1966 when Alexander Ranković, the Vice-president of 
Yugoslavia, was dismissed. Ranković was a supporter of Serbo-centralism and had a 
direct responsibility for the Yugoslav Security Police UDB-a (Uprava Drzavne 
Bezbednosti) and its regular pressures on Albanians. Because of his high status, his 
work and activities were not supervised.
155
 Therefore, the Party Plenum held on 
Brioni decided to dismiss him, as they accused the security police of discriminatory 
actions and illegal practices, in particular towards the Albanians.
156
 Ranković’s fall 
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could also certainly be attributed to the clash between his and Tito’s views. Tito 
aimed to abandon the effort to create a homogenous ‘Yugoslavism’ and instead 
promoted development of national self-direction.
157
 After Ranković lost his power 
and his policies were publicly known, Albanians started to agitate for reforms, 
especially for greater autonomy.
158
 
 
November 1968 saw a large student demonstration in Pristina demanding the 
formation of a Kosovo republic. During that year a debate was held about 
amendments to the 1963 constitution aimed at softening the situation and calming 
public opinion; these were officially declared in December 1968. Indeed, it was 
amended that the autonomous provinces belong both to Serbia and to the federal 
structure; the name of Kosovo-Metohija, which always caused irritation among the 
Albanians, was changed to Kosovo only. Probably the most significant change was 
that autonomous provinces were equal to ‘socio-political communities’ (republics 
had the same description). It was also declared ‘that they would carry out all the 
tasks of a republic apart from those tasks which were of concern to the republic of 
Serbia as a whole’. From this point on, the Kosovo Albanians started to emphasise 
their request for a Kosovo Republic. However, Hoxha had already asked in April 
1968: ‘Why do 370,000 Montenegrins have their own republic, while 1.2 million 
Albanians do not even have total autonomy?’159 
 
Certainly, since the beginning of the 1960s, the position of Albania had changed 
considerably. It was no longer an ideological ally of the Soviet Union and it started 
to ‘repair’ relations with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, after the Soviet occupation 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tito realised that he needed all the anti-Soviet support 
available in the Balkans. Thus, a new development in the relationship of these two 
countries began. From 1969 Albanians in Kosovo were allowed to fly their flag, and 
later that year the University of Pristina was opened. With the help of Tirana’s 
teachers and teaching materials printed in Albania, Albanian language courses were 
launched. Malcolm points out that the year 1963 could be described as the nadir of 
                                                          
157 Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 324. 
158 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 164. 
159 Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 324-25. 
42 
 
Albanian interest in Kosovo, while the following period, culminating in 1974, was 
the zenith.
160
 
 
The 1974 constitution 
As for Tito’s 1974 constitution, it decentralised powers to the republics and 
supported equality between them – quotas and rotation systems were introduced to 
balance representation. Furthermore, all republics had the right of veto over federal 
legislation. In Hudson’s view, it was this constitution that brought difficulties in the 
1980s.  She explains that the locus of power became firmly republican and the 
decision-making process was slowed down, particularly by the right of veto. The 
changes in the 1974 constitution also gave Kosovo and Vojvodina virtual republic 
status within Serbia.
161
 
 
To the earlier amendments from 1971 (the provinces got equal status in most forms 
of the economic decision-making with the six republics, each with one representative 
in the collective body of the Presidency of Yugoslavia) other essential rights were 
added. Among them, the 1974 constitution gave Kosovo and Vojvodina the right to 
issue their own constitutions  – this was a crucial change as until then Kosovo’s 
constitution was passed on to them by the Serbian Assembly. All these changes 
increased the rights of Kosovo; however, the ultimate aim of Albanians to change the 
province into a republic was never achieved. The reason was that the Yugoslav 
federal system described the republics as entities for nations whereas Albanians were 
regarded as a nationality. A nation (in Serbian narod) was explained as a state-
forming unit, which as a part of the federation retained the right to become 
independent. On the other hand, a nationality (in Serbian narodnost) was a part of a 
nation which primarily lived somewhere else. In other words, Albanians in Kosovo 
were regarded as a nationality because they had their own state – Albania.162  
 
In any case, several amendments in the constitution (starting with that of 1946) 
reveal the changes that occurred within the federal republic under the rule of Tito.
163
 
Ending with the constitution of 1974, both autonomous provinces obtained direct 
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participation in the federal government.  Janjić states that the so-called Albanisation 
of Kosovo started after the constitutional changes of 1974. This affected especially 
the Serbs and Montenegrins who became a minority. The following comment by 
Janjić sums up the situation:  
 
The communist government managed to offset the conflicts between the 
Albanians and the Serbs by making concessions to the one or the other 
side alternatively and suppressing the national and nationalistic 
dimension of the confrontation. Naturally, the problems were not 
resolved, but were postponed and buried under new and still larger 
difficulties. With the coupling of the official nationalism of the 
communist elite and unofficial nationalism, peaceful and democratic 
resolution of problems through a dialogue was made more difficult by 
the very fact that the power and influence in both communities were 
taken over by elites which excluded each other.
164
 
 
1.5 Milošević’s rise to power 
The 1980s were characterised by the crisis in and over Kosovo. Indeed, the first 
protests began in March 1981 and rapidly developed during the following two 
months. Albanian demonstrators were pressing for formal recognition as a republic. 
Troops (primarily from Croatia and Slovenia) were sent to the province; however, 
complete order was not reinstated in the Albanian areas until 1983.
165
 
  
Kosovo’s autonomous status, granted by the 1974 constitution, did not satisfy the 
Albanian population. Furthermore, the widening gap in wealth between the north and 
south of Yugoslavia led to dissatisfaction with the system;
166
 the Kosovo riots in 
1981 were considered the worst disturbances in Yugoslavia since 1944.
167
 The 
revolts affected Serbs and led to their increased emigration from the province. 
Crampton argues that the sorrow of Kosovan Serbs – ‘real and imagined’ – led to a 
critical point in Serbian nationalism.
168
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Importantly, in 1986 the Serbian League of Communists got a new leader: Slobodan 
Milošević, who was born in central Serbia, though his family came originally from 
Montenegro. His friend Ivan Stambolić, who became president in May 1986, 
nominated Milošević as the head of the party. At that time it appeared to be a safe 
option.
169
 
 
However, soon it was clear that it was a mistaken choice, and it shortly brought great 
changes to both Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Stambolić, in his latest speeches highly 
critical of Serbian nationalism, asked Milošević to speak to a meeting of workers in a 
suburb of Pristina.
170
 He visited the province in the spring of 1987 and met the local 
Serbs, who complained about mistreatment from the ethnic Albanians and the 
inadequate protection they received from the police (mostly ethnic Albanian). In his 
speech, Milošević promised the Serbs in Kosovo that ‘nobody would ever beat them 
again’.171 This was a critical point. Milošević believed that Stambolić was 
responding too weakly towards the issues in Kosovo and that reform was necessary 
in Yugoslavia. He slowly eliminated all his opponents in the party apparatus.
172
 
 
Crampton describes three main political developments which took place in 
Yugoslavia between the constitutional changes in 1989 and the outbreak of the 
Bosnian war in 1992. First, the liberalisation of the political system allowed the 
activation of nationalist parties, together with those among the ethnic minorities 
within the republics. Second, the key authority institutions collapsed; and last, the 
crisis in Yugoslavia received international attention.
173
 
 
The 1989 constitution 
Meanwhile, the new constitution of 1989 removed the status of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina as autonomous provinces. Kosovo’s self-administration was removed and 
political and cultural institutions were dissolved. In response, Albanians in Kosovo 
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set up a parallel state of their own.
174
 Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (DLK), was elected as President. The main aim of Albanians was 
to organise an alternative society with an improvised political structure, schools and 
medical system.
175
  
 
However, during 1989 and the spring of 1990 violent conflicts with the police and 
mass demonstrations continued, widening anger and fear among Albanians.
176
 In 
December 1990, Milošević was re-elected President of Serbia with a large majority 
of votes. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the elections en masse and Milošević got a 
number of extra, totally unchallenged seats.
177
 
 
After 1989, ethnic tensions increased and the situation in and around Kosovo became 
a deadlock. Another chance to demand Kosovo’s independence came in 1990-1991 
when Slovenia and Croatia were aiming for independence. The Albanians forwarded 
their claim to the international community; however, Serbian authorities argued that 
Kosovo should remain part of Serbia and that the right to self-determination already 
applied to Albanians, as an independent Albanian national state already existed. 
After 1991, Albanians decided to boycott the elections and refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of any of the Yugoslav or Serb state institutions. In any case, Serbian 
opposition believed that if Kosovo would have participated in the elections 
Milošević could have been removed. Whether this would have been true remains a 
question mark.
178
  
 
Kosovan Albanians had two influential arguments for their independence: ‘why 
should their 1.7 million constitute merely a narodnost or “nationality”, when the 
status of narod or “nation” was enjoyed by approximately the same number of 
Slovenes, by the 1.3 million Macedonians and by the even less numerous 
Montenegrins?’ The second argument becoming legitimate in 1990 and 1991 
questioned ‘why should the 1.7 million Albanians who formed 90 percent of 
Kosovo’s population be denied minority rights within Serbia, which the Serbian 
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leader was demanding for the Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, the more so when Croatia’s 0.6 million Serbs were only 12 percent and 
Bosnia’s 1.2 million Serbs a third of the population?’ However, none of these 
arguments had any effect on Belgrade.
179
 
 
The fall of Yugoslavia 
In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia announced their separation from the federation. 
The Yugoslav People’s Army took positions along the international borders, but 
withdrew from Slovenia after ten days due to European mediation. In the summer of 
1991 the army unsuccessfully searched for an aim to validate its presence in the 
disputed areas of Croatia.
180
 Woodward argues that the real problem of this critical 
time for Yugoslavia was that there was no European Community (EC) position or 
collective policy in the West. Instead, domestic disagreements among Western states 
led to diverse messages. The impact of the conflicting signals was that all parties to 
the conflict were encouraged to believe that their chosen course would eventually 
win.
181
    
 
Indeed, the EC became alarmed at the breakdown of order in Yugoslavia and it 
received international attention. In November, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared 
Germany’s intent to recognise Slovenia and Croatia by Christmas; soon after, on 16 
December, the EC stated that by fulfilling certain criteria any Yugoslav republic 
could request recognition as an independent state. A commission led by Robert 
Badinter, a French lawyer, was responsible for the vetting process. By the deadline 
of 23 December, applications for independence came from Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, the Serbian Krajina in Croatia and the Kosovan 
Albanians. However, the last two applications were declined and considering the fact 
that Germany recognised Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December no action could have 
been taken. Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia were referred to the Badinter 
Commission, which required Bosnia to put the question to referendum.
182
 Although 
Serbs boycotted the vote, a large majority was in favour of independence, which was 
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declared on 3 March. A period of destruction followed, characterised by clashes 
between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims, Bosnian Croats and the Yugoslav National 
Army, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, and between Serbian units from outside 
Bosnia and forces loyal to the Bosnian government. On 6 April 1992,
183
 when severe 
fighting began in Sarajevo, the EC recognised Bosnia as an independent state. On the 
following day, the US followed suit (recognising also Slovenia and Croatia). A 
Macedonian request for independence was blocked by Greece while Serbia and 
Montenegro decided in April on re-establishing Yugoslavia on a new foundation. 
Either way, all the earlier mentioned events led to the dissolution of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, ending its existence as a political entity.
184
   
 
Crampton describes two of Yugoslavia’s weaknesses. First, Yugoslavia and its 
institutions were very complex. Between 1944 and 1991, it ‘was a state with one 
ideology, two alphabets, three main religions, four constitutions, five major ethnic 
groups, six republics, seven land neighbours, eight members of its presidency, nine 
parliaments and ten communist parties’.185 The second weakness was Yugoslavia’s 
institutional instability. Constant changes of the constitutions never allowed enough 
time for the institutions to settle in. Also, after 1980 there was no personality who 
could demand respect and stabilise the country in the coming turbulent times.
186
 
 
From the spring of 1992 until autumn 1995 Europe witnessed its most violent 
conflict since the Second World War. The fighting took place in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Hercegovina. Crampton explains how absurd the war in Bosnia was when at one 
point Muslims, Serbs and Croats were all at war with each other. The conflict in 
Bosnia was determined not only by changes in military campaigns and alliances but 
also by international involvement.
187
 At the beginning of 1993, after earlier 
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discussions at the London conference (August 1992), Lord Owen (representing the 
EC) and Cyrus Vance (representing the UN) came up with a peace proposal for the 
Bosnian conflict.
188
 Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan, which unsettled the 
international community and led to a vacuum. Increasing its involvement in the 
region, the UN Security Council created so-called ‘safe areas’ around Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, Goražde, Žepa, Bihać and Srebrenica.189 
 
In 1994 fighting intensified around the safe area of Goražde and on 22 April Serbs 
took the town. After the fall of Goražde, the UN’s reputation suffered severely. New 
diplomatic activity had been initiated by creating the Contact Group (CG).
190
 The 
CG came with a peace proposal which, like the Vance-Owen plan, was rejected by 
the Bosnian Serbs. After three crucial moments in the summer of 1995 the situation 
changed considerably.
191
 The patience of the international community ran out and 
NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, heavy air attacks on Serbian positions 
near Sarajevo. Serbs’ communication network in the western part of Bosnia was 
destroyed and Serbs were saved from an absolute defeat by diplomatic steps. These 
led ultimately to an agreement. Milošević organised a meeting in Belgrade including 
leaders from Serbia, Montenegro and the Bosnian Serbs. The settlement that 
emerged from this meeting authorised Milošević to lead the consultations team of the 
Bosnian Serbs; this was the first step towards Dayton.
192
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After the war, the main focus of the successor regimes was to build functioning 
independent states. Nevertheless, the key regional dynamic remained the conflict 
between Serbian nationalist and other ethnic groups. Yet, at this stage, the location of 
the dispute was within the Serbian republic, in Kosovo.
193
  
 
In 1995 the Dayton negotiations formally settled the conflict in Bosnia.
194
 Kosovar 
Albanians expected that the Kosovo issue would be part of the agenda. However, 
this was not the case. The side-lining of the Kosovo issue among the international 
community, particularly after the early 1990s, led to increased radicalisation of Serbs 
and Albanians resulting in additional inter-ethnic tensions.
195
  
 
Caplan describes three reasons why Kosovo had never been part of the Dayton 
discussions: first, there was too much to negotiate already; second, there was no 
intention to disaffect Milošević, who forced the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 
compromises required for the Dayton agreement; and third, it was thought there was 
no urgent need to deal with the question due to the absence of war in Kosovo. For 
Albanians in Kosovo this was a disappointment. Rugova thought that by avoiding 
conflicts with the Serbs he would achieve support from the international community 
and, gradually, backing for Kosovo’s independence. Yet, the international 
community clearly stated that it would not support independence because it would 
not encourage secession and the consequent redrawing of international borders, as 
this might awaken historical claims in other parts of the region. Kosovo’s Albanians 
lost faith in the peaceful ways of their leadership, which led to growing support for 
the emerging militant separatist movement Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or UÇK 
(Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). Following this, KLA increased its attacks on Serbian 
police stations and Yugoslav army sites; by July 1998, it had around 30 percent of 
Kosovo territory under its control.
196
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By 1992 Milošević began to be threatened with military actions. Indeed, on 24 
December 1992 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, President Bush’s Secretary of State, sent a 
cable to Belgrade saying:  ‘In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian 
action, the US will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo 
and in Serbia proper’.197As Bellamy points out, this threat set the tone for the try-
and-see diplomacy of the international responses to Kosovo until the incident in 
Račak in 1999.198 
 
Significantly, during a press conference in Belgrade held on 23 February 1998, 
Robert Gelbard, the US Special Balkans Envoy, discussed the situation in the 
Balkans, declaring that: 
 
[…] we are tremendously disturbed and also condemn very strongly the 
unacceptable violence done by terrorist groups in Kosovo and 
particularly the UCK – the Kosovo Liberation Army. This is without any 
question a terrorist group… And the actions of this group speak for 
themselves.
199
 
 
For Milošević this was enough of an authorisation to attack. On the first day of 
March Serbs started a major offensive in Drenica, burning villages and massacring 
hundreds of civilians.
200
 Caplan argues that although it would be overemphasising to 
say that the US gave Milošević a ‘green light’ for the attacks, the mentioned term 
‘terrorist’ gave Serbs enough legitimatisation for their armed move.201 
 
In the meantime, international concern about developments in Kosovo increased also 
due to the fear that if the Albanian population in Macedonia became involved it 
would lead to the destabilisation of Macedonia. The diplomatic activity intensified – 
CG, NATO, the UN Security Council and other bodies discussed the issue. Richard 
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Holbrooke, special US Envoy to the Balkans and Christopher Hill, the US 
Ambassador to Macedonia, participated at negotiations which were, nevertheless, to 
a great extent unproductive. That said, NATO started to consider the Kosovo issue in 
March 1998.
202
  
 
In September 1998 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, demanding to 
cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, and calling for a dialogue 
among the parties. It was decided that the non-fulfilment of the demands (including 
the demands mentioned in the March Resolution 1160)
203
 would lead to further 
action.
204
 In the same month NATO agreed on an ‘activation warning’, implying that 
air attacks could be launched at short notice. After Holbrooke’s visit, Milošević 
eventually approved to reduce the forces in Kosovo and gave permission to the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to send 2,000 monitors 
to the region. However, this victory did not last for long and tensions continued 
throughout the end of the year.
205
 
 
1.6 The Rambouillet talks and Operation Allied Force  
On 15 January 1999, it was reported that Serb forces entered the Kosovan village of 
Račak and killed 45 civilians. Viewed as a retaliation act for the death of two Serbian 
policemen, it made the CG change the try-and-see diplomacy to one of ultimatum.
206
 
However, what really happened in Račak is still unclear. Helena Ranta, a Finnish 
forensic scientist commissioned by the EU to investigate the incident, published 
different accounts in 2008. Among others, she reported that she was under intense 
official pressure when conducting the investigation. Particularly, William Walker, 
the US Ambassador and head of the OSCE Kosovo verification mission, was not 
pleased that Ranta did not want to express strong enough language in regards to the 
Serbs.
207
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Soon after, on 29 January the CG released a list of 26 nonnegotiable principles
208
 
granting Kosovo significant political autonomy, but under Serbian sovereignty, 
enforced by NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo. Both sides were requested to 
participate at a meeting in the French Rambouillet at the beginning of February 
1999.
209
 As for the final status of the province, it was to be determined after a three 
year interim period; this time, however, the international community would review 
the status by taking into consideration the will of Kosovo’s people. The addition of 
the ‘will of the people’ to the final version of the proposal eventually convinced the 
Kosovo Albanians to sign the document in Paris on 15 March 1999 and accept the 
protection of NATO.
210
  
 
The Serbian negotiators, however, rejected the plan. Two demands were crucial for 
their decision. First, the review of the future status after the interim period included a 
referendum in Kosovo, the result of which was more than clear. Second, the military 
annex included that NATO should have unrestricted access throughout Yugoslavia 
which was unacceptable for Serbia.
211
 Jatras notes that one senior administration 
official told the media off the record at Rambouillet: ‘We intentionally set the bar too 
high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that’s what they are 
going to get’.212 
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Soon after, on 20 March the OSCE monitoring team was withdrawn from Kosovo; 
despite Holbrooke’s warnings, Milošević did not change his attitude. Consequently, 
on 24 March the NATO Operation Allied Force began.
213
 As before, Crampton 
states, politicians forced their people into war assuming that the conflict would not 
last long; however, they were mistaken. He argues that unexpectedly the campaign 
had little effect on the Yugoslav forces, which remained persistently active. 
However, the operation led to a rapid escalation of Serbian activity against the 
Kosovan Albanians.
214
 
 
In an effort to terminate the conflict diplomatic activity intensified. A step forward 
appeared likely after Viktor Chernomyrdin, personal envoy of President Yeltsin, met 
with Milošević on 28 May. Indeed, Milošević accepted some deployment of NATO 
troops in Kosovo from countries which were not involved in the bombing. Soon 
after, Chernomyrdin went again to Belgrade, also with Martti Ahtisaari, who was 
nominated mediator for the EU and UN. Peace proposals drawn in Bonn by the G7 
plus Russia were presented to Milošević. He accepted them on 3 June. Ultimately, 
the bombing finished on 10 June when the first Serbian forces were withdrawn from 
Kosovo; the operation ceased ten days later when the last troops departed.
215
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1.7 Kosovo under UN rule  
After the NATO bombing campaign, the declaration devised for Kosovo was 
outlined in UNSC Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.
216
 It authorised to establish an 
international civil presence in Kosovo, with Kosovo enjoying ‘substantial autonomy’ 
within the FRY. The KLA was to be disarmed. EU, OSCE, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK)
217
 were to be placed in charge of the post-war reconstruction. In addition, 
an international police contingent of 2,000 was sent to Kosovo together with a 
50,000 strong NATO force (KFOR). Moreover, Kosovo was divided into five 
sectors: British, US, French, German and Italian.
218
  
 
From the beginning, Russia (together with China) strongly opposed the NATO 
strikes and described them as unnecessary and counterproductive, especially due to 
the fact that the alliance bypassed the UNSC.
219
 Russia’s possession of veto power 
would have little relevance if the US and its allies could ignore the SC decisions and 
act on their own. Another dismissal of Russia as a European power came at the end 
of the bombing when NATO leaders refused to give Russia a separate peacekeeping 
zone in Kosovo, despite the diplomatic efforts that Russia carried out in order to 
terminate the conflict. This led to a surprising entry of Russian troops into Kosovo 
and their seizure of the Pristina airport before NATO troops could arrive.
220
 The 
Russian paratroopers’ taking of the airport on 12 June may have been focused on 
putting pressure on NATO to agree to Russian terms for participation in KFOR. 
Also, it might have been an expression of disgust at the government’s diplomatic 
abandonment of Belgrade.
221
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NATO and Russian military commanders then eventually agreed that Russia would 
have more troops in the province. In the meantime, NATO persuaded Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania to deny Russia permission to fly through their airspace, a step 
that once again disturbed the relations between NATO and Russia.
222
 Wilton 
describes that Kosovo was seen as a challenge to NATO to prove its unity and role in 
the post Cold War era, and that it could act rather than merely claim readiness.
223
  
 
According to Crampton the first months after the adoption of Resolution 1244 were 
characterised by an inadequate order imposed by UNMIK and KFOR.
224
 By the end 
of 1999 around 100,000 Serbs had left Kosovo, as the harassment of Serbs by the 
Albanians was not prevented. Repeated tension was particularly high in Mitrovica, 
where both sides suffered casualties.
225
 These events created mistrust of external 
peacebuilders who were unable to guarantee general protection for the Serbs.
226
 
Although the KLA declared its disarmament and transformation into a civilian police 
body (Kosovo Protection Force), arms were found, especially in June 2000 near the 
headquarters of General Agim Ҫeku, former KLA commander. By the autumn, there 
were disturbing signals in south-west Serbia at the border with Kosovo that a new 
armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, had 
emerged. With a strategy similar to the KLA it brought insecurity to the area.
227
  
 
During the first phase of the international administration in Kosovo the main focus 
of Kosovo Albanians was almost ‘obsessively’ on independence. However, UNMIK 
managed to change the focus of Kosovo Albanians’ attention to other matters, for 
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instance the establishment of a functioning civil administration and the establishment 
of local structures of governance.
228
  
 
Yannis illustrates some major challenges that the UNMIK’s mission faced, including 
the establishment of an international administration with the full interim 
administrative responsibility over the whole territory of Kosovo. It raised many 
questions, including one about the meaning and function of sovereignty in such 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the most important challenge of the mandate has been 
the absence of an end state for the international presence – leading to uncertainty 
over the final status of Kosovo. Questions also arose in regards to the structures and 
operational requirements to fulfil a mandate that was closely connected to the degree 
of authority of the international administration. Yannis also identifies the absence of 
preparedness and operational capacity to set up an international administration at the 
speed required by the fast removal of the Yugoslav authorities.
229
 
 
In 2000 the International Commission on Kosovo reported that: ‘From the early 
1990s onwards, governments and international institutions were aware of the 
impending conflict in Kosovo. There were plenty of warnings… Yet prior to 1998, 
the international community failed to take sufficient preventative action’.230 More to 
the point, the Commission concluded: ‘One of the major lessons of Kosovo is that 
greater early engagement with a region in crisis with a view to preventing conflict is 
invariably a more effective response than late intervention using force’.231 
 
1.8 Towards the status talks 
In Serbia, the opposition parties continued consultations on a formal election alliance 
to be prepared for the end of Milošević’s term in July 2001. Their leaders nominated 
a joint candidate for the president, Vojislav Koštunica, leader of the small 
Democratic Party of Serbia. The elections took place in September 2000. After four 
days the commission released the results: Koštunica led with 48.96 percent. 
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However, because he had not achieved 50 percent, there had to be a second round, 
which was rejected by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. On 5 October more than 
a million people demonstrated in Belgrade and one day later the Constitutional 
Court, which at first annulled the elections, decided in favour of Koštunica. 
Milošević acknowledged defeat and his dark era ended.232 In April 2001, being urged 
by the West, Yugoslav authorities arrested Milošević, and in June he was sent to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.
233
 
 
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, declared 
by the international administration in May 2001 and followed by the elections in 
November, partly settled the need for a generally accepted mode of operation 
between the two local rivals on how to continue performing UNMIK’s mandate.234 
After the adoption of this Framework, Provisional Institutions of Self Government 
(PISG) were established.
235
  
 
In 2002, with a provisional government formed, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner 
formed the principle of ‘Standards before Status’ which, in 2003-2004, was refined 
into an operational policy. It was recognised by the CG as a standard for reviewing 
the progress of the PISG.
236
 This policy contained expectations for Kosovo’s 
institutions and society which should be achieved in order to start talks about the 
final status of Kosovo. The proposed eight standards were: 1) the existence of 
effective, representative and functioning democratic institutions; 2) enforcement of 
the rule of law; 3) freedom of movement; 4) sustainable returns of refugees and 
displaced persons, and respect for the rights of communities; 5) creation of a sound 
basis for a market economy; 6) fair enforcement of property rights; 7) normalised 
dialogue with Belgrade; and 8) transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps 
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(KPC) in line with its mandate.
237
 However, the Kosovo-Albanian community 
resisted the new policy and demanded ‘Status and Standards’ in parallel.238 
 
Riots in 2004 
The second significant test for KFOR came in 2004.
239
 Increasing frustration at slow 
progress in the question of Kosovo’s status was set alight by one sad accident.240 The 
media in Kosovo had published news that on 16 March three children were chased to 
the river Ibar by a group of Serbian dogs. According to the OSCE report this story 
seemed ‘to be unsupported by any journalistically valid accounts’.241 However, this 
incident led to massive violent demonstrations involving some 50,000-60,000 
people.
242
 During three days of violent riots 19 people, Serb and Albanian, were 
killed, a wave of Serbs escaped from Kosovo and churches were burnt. KFOR was 
unable to prevent this kind of incident which, as Wilton states, was by 2004 surely 
the most likely.
243
 2004 gave early signs of frustration at the continued international 
administration in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians were dissatisfied that their status was 
still unsolved and that they were viewed as ‘a petri dish in the laboratory of 
international intervention’.244   
 
After the riots, it became apparent that Kosovo’s status needed to be dealt with, 
sooner rather than later. Indeed, in May 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
appointed the Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide as UN Special Envoy to undertake a 
wide-ranging review of the situation in Kosovo in accordance with Security Council 
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Resolution 1244 (1999) and relevant presidential statements of the Security 
Council.
245
 The main aim of the evaluation was to state if adequate progress had 
been made to begin with the determination of the future status of the province.  
 
In October 2005, Eide presented the report to the Secretary-General. It summarised 
that progress had been made in many areas; however, the economic situation 
remained ‘bleak’.246 A significant achievement was reported in provision of 
educational and health-care services in almost all Kosovo, although there were 
crucial shortcomings in their quality. Organised crime and corruption remained the 
biggest problems and the basis for creating multi-ethnic society was ‘grim’. After the 
complete evaluation Eide concluded: 
 
There will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future 
status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. 
Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time 
has come to commence this process. […] Kosovo having moved from 
stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again be allowed to take 
hold.
247
  
 
Furthermore, he stated that the EU should ‘consider stepping up its presence on the 
ground’ and that after the status of Kosovo will be resolved ‘the EU will be expected 
to play a more prominent role, in particular with regard to the police and justice and 
in monitoring and supporting the standards process’.248 In the view of Serbian and 
ethnic Albanian officials, the report presented a relatively accurate and balanced 
assessment of the situation in the province.
249
 On the basis of the recommendations 
and assessment given by Eide, in November 2005, Annan appointed former Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for Kosovo and head of his own UN 
office (UNOSEK).
250
 Soon after, in early 2006, the status talks between Belgrade 
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and Pristina started with the aim to find a solution for Kosovo’s status. These 
negotiations and the key issues debated will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 2: Foreign Policy-Making: Domestic versus EU 
Factors 
 
Literature review 
 
 ‘European affairs are not foreign affairs but 
 they belong to an agenda which considerably impacts on our life (...)’.251 
 
Introduction   
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of domestic factors in the EU foreign 
policy-making process and review literature on Europeanisation in the context of 
foreign policy studies. It will also look at various agents that impact on foreign 
political decisions within EU member states. This chapter’s insights provide a basis 
for the analytical framework adopted for this thesis. 
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been the focus of many 
debates, particularly in recent years when the EU aimed to reinforce its independent 
foreign policy role. Important changes were made, however, due to different views 
among EU members; development of a clear direction for CFSP has been rather 
slow. After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
became the coordinator for EU foreign policy; yet, the definite foreign policy 
decisions are still made by individual member states in the European Council.
252
  
 
                                                          
251 Comment by Miroslav Lajčák on changing the name of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As of 1 
October 2012, the Ministry changed its name to the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak 
Republic. As Lajčák added, the aim was ‘to highlight the European dimension of our ministry’. In addition, 
Lajčák, as the head of the Ministry, serves for the first time in Slovak history also as the Deputy Prime Minister. 
‘Zahraničná politika SR v roku 2012’, Address of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and 
European Affairs of the Slovak Republic Miroslav Lajčák, Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), 
Bratislava, 18 December 2012. 
252 Wil James, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Civitas, Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 4/2007 
(last updated 4/2012). 
62 
 
EU foreign policy is perceived as ‘a system of external relations’, a collective 
enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, 
international actions.
253
 Although establishing a ‘coherent and credible European 
“voice” in world affairs’ remains one of the main concepts the EU aspires to, on 
several foreign political occasions the EU was not able to stand united.
254
 Ultimately, 
for a variety of reasons, individual members still implement national foreign 
policies, and considering the restricted role of legislation in the area of EU external 
action, their room to manoeuvre remains considerable.
255
 In this respect, Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in 2008 serves as a good illustration of member states’ 
diverging views over Kosovo’s statehood preventing a joint EU position due to a 
variety of factors at play.  
 
2.1 Domestic Factors in Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
Until the 1970s, the role of domestic factors in foreign policy decision-making 
focused above all on studies of the US. By then, the main approach to the study of 
foreign policy-making revolved around the importance of domestic structures in the 
decision-making process.
256
 However, according to political scientist Margaret 
Herman, models of foreign policy decision-making had ‘a distinct US-flavour’ 
which led to difficulties in the generalisation of government decisions in non-
American cultures.
257
 This partly contributed to the fact that neither of these models 
provides a suitable framework that could be directly applied to the Slovak foreign 
policy decision on Kosovo. This will be demonstrated in the following two foreign 
policy decision-making models.  
 
An approach that focuses on the role of leadership was introduced by IR scholar 
Robert Jervis. He analysed the role of leaders from a cognitive psychology approach 
and stressed the importance of foreign policy decision-makers’ perceptions of their 
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environment and other actors, which might be incorrect. In other words, political 
leaders’ misperceptions impact on their political actions and lead to inappropriate 
decisions. Jervis argues that the roots of a number of significant disagreements about 
policies are based on differing perceptions.
258
 His study examined great powers’ 
actions in a war context. This framework does not resonate with the Slovak case 
study because we cannot argue that ‘wrong’ perceptions by political leaders led to 
the Slovak non-recognition of Kosovo. None of the main actors misinterpreted the 
situation and it was understood by the politicians very clearly: for the leader of the 
opposition, Dzurinda, the Kosovo issue represented an opportunity to challenge the 
government and his main opponent, Prime Minister Fico. Fico, for his part, 
understood the situation from his perspective; on the basis of ‘retaining political 
power’, he re-adjusted his view.  
 
In this respect, scholarly work by Joe Hagan explains the role of political party 
opposition in the foreign policy decision-making process. Hagan analysed how 
domestic political phenomena interact to influence foreign policy decisions in non-
US settings, stressing that political opposition matters because foreign policy-
making is fundamentally political. As a result, government leaders and decision-
makers frequently monitor domestic political situations and factor these into their 
foreign policy calculations. Consequently, domestic politics have a considerable 
impact on foreign policy behaviour, because leaders react to the opposition and adapt 
national foreign policy accordingly.
259
 As Hagan suggests, ‘political opposition 
affects the extent to which a government is willing and able to commit to a course of 
action in foreign affairs’.260 In line with this view, this thesis will highlight the role 
played by the opposition in the context of Slovakia’s non-recognition of Kosovo.  
 
Other scholars, such as Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, highlight the 
importance of bureaucratic politics in foreign political decisions.
261
 Allison’s 
bureaucratic politics model focuses on the internal politics of the US government and 
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the role of bureaucratic structures and processes in US decision-making. In this 
model, foreign political actions are not considered choices or outputs, but outcomes 
of bargaining between actors hierarchically positioned in government.
262
 Individual 
political representatives represent different bureaucracies, supporting or rejecting 
certain policies on the basis of their bureaucracy’s interest.  
 
Allison’s model works well in countries with highly differentiated institutionalised 
structures. For example, under the US system, the president has an enormous 
influence on the final decision as he is not only the head of state but also the head of 
the government. In Slovakia the president does not have a dominant role in foreign 
policy decision-making. Foreign political decisions are made by the government.  
 
In contrast to the assumptions of the bureaucratic model, the Slovak foreign political 
decision in question was not a result of a bargaining process between individual 
bureaucratic organisations (president, cabinet, and parliament). ‘The pulling and 
hauling’263 was absent because Parliament, by passing a resolution against Kosovo’s 
statehood, bound the government to take a certain position. Instead of focusing on 
the bureaucratic milieu and its characteristics, we would gain a better understanding 
of the decision-making process and the essence of the decision if we looked 
specifically at the previously mentioned role of the political opposition in this 
context. Initially, it was obvious that the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
more open to discuss Kosovo’s future; however, after the Slovak Parliament passed a 
resolution on Kosovo, the Ministry’s view was re-adjusted to reflect the view of 
Parliament.
264
 
 
On the basis of Allison’s model we would expect the opposition leader and his party 
to recognise Kosovo. This would be consistent with previous political decisions 
related to the former Yugoslavia, such as their support of the NATO bombing of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999 and the approval of using Slovak 
airspace.
265
 However, in this case the opposition adopted a policy change that the 
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bureaucratic model does not explain. Furthermore, by focusing on specific 
bureaucracies this model does not look at the wider political context of the time, 
such as tensions related to the Hungarian minority party and statements made by 
Hungarian politicians supporting Kosovo’s statehood. Without appreciating these 
interactions one can neither comprehend Slovak policy on Kosovo in all respects nor 
understand the important role of ethnic politics in Kosovo’s non-recognition. 
 
By examining Slovakia’s policy on Kosovo this thesis will thus highlight the 
significance of small EU state foreign policy decision-making and demonstrate the 
importance of domestic-level factors over international ones. In other words, as the 
political scientist Miriam Elman argues: 
 
[…] small state foreign policy provides a unique opportunity for those 
scholars who insist that domestic politics matters in explaining 
international and foreign-policy outcomes. Put more formally, weak state 
foreign policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory. It is 
precisely in such cases where the conventional wisdom suggests that 
international factors can adequately account for state policy. If we can 
show that domestic politics matters even in these instances where we 
would expect that it should not, then we will have provided the strongest 
possible support for domestic level theorizing.
266
  
 
The following section will look at Europeanisation as a significant dimension 
leading to changes in EU member states, essentially impacting on their foreign 
policy-making. The question that remains, however, is to what extent countries 
‘Europeanise’ their foreign policies. 
 
2.2 Foreign Policy Studies and the Concept of ‘Europeanisation’ 
The Europeanisation literature has developed considerably over the last twenty 
years. Since the late 1990s, academics have increased their interest in European 
integration, its impact on member states and their adaptation to the EU. However, 
their main focus was on the EU’s first pillar policies (such as economic, social and 
environmental).
267
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In recent years the interaction between the EU’s common positions and member 
states’ national foreign policies has also been increasingly applied to foreign 
policy.
268
 As Wong and Hill point out, ‘the novelty of “Europeanisation” in foreign 
policy studies is a function of the debate on the existence of a common European 
foreign policy’.269 Nonetheless, an important aspect of this literature is that it has 
primarily dealt with countries that entered the EU before 2004 and therefore, only a 
limited number of studies concentrated on the new member states (NMS) accessing 
the EU in 2004 and 2007.
270
 As a result of this overall lack of studies focusing on 
foreign policy decisions of the NMS, there is a gap in understanding the internal 
processes behind their foreign policy-making.  
 
Alecu de Flers and Müller note the distinctive nature of CFSP in contrast to the EU’s 
first pillar in explaining why foreign policy has not been broadly studied through the 
prism of Europeanisation. Furthermore, they argue that compliance with EU 
requirements and adaptation to EU pressure (the so-called ‘goodness of fit’)271 by 
member states’ policies in the intergovernmental CFSP dimension is less important. 
As a result, Europeanisation of foreign policy due to its ‘unique nature’ was less 
likely and its impacts were expected to be considerably weaker than in the EU first 
pillar policies.
272
  
 
In this sense, Smith notes that procedures and policies in the area of foreign policy 
are taken at the intergovernmental level and in contrast to the actual role of member 
states; the role of EU institutions in this course is far less significant. Likewise, 
compliance with EU policies is not something that member states are obliged to 
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do.
273
 Due to this intergovernmental form of decision-making, member states’ 
policies towards CFSP are particularly significant, because if member states 
prioritise national policies over EU ones, CFSP cannot be considered ‘an effective 
policy instrument’.274 Therefore, cases where politicians elevate national interests 
above EU interests, and even resist pressure from EU actors, in practice question the 
effectiveness of EU common policies.   
 
To understand the dynamics of the Europeanisation process, Bulmer and Radaelli 
identify four characteristic patterns of governance in the European Union which are 
related to different policies: governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy, 
positive and negative integration, and facilitated coordination.
275
 Facilitated 
coordination is associated with policies where national governments remain the 
central actors. Thus, this type of policy process is not subject to European law and 
requires unanimity of the governments; the EU provides an arena for merely 
exchanging ideas. In practice, it is this pattern of governance in the EU to which 
foreign policy belongs to.
276
 Under facilitated coordination, supranational 
institutions possess very weak powers, leading to a ‘much more voluntary and non-
hierarchical’ type of Europeanisation.277 Therefore, common foreign policy 
understandings develop through ‘horizontal’ exchanges between member states’ 
governments and as a result of joint policy principles.
278
 As Alecu de Flers and 
Müller note, the pressure to adapt in the field of foreign policy is incomparable to the 
pressure in other policy areas, where policy templates are prepared at the EU level 
and supranational actors, such as the European Commission, play a significant 
role.
279
 In relation to European foreign policy, there is ‘no clear, vertical chain of 
command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member state’.280  
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As a result, Wong and Hill note, instead of an authoritative decision-making centre, 
persistent national foreign policies function under/alongside and sometimes in 
disagreement with EU foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European 
Parliament and/or the Council. Because the EU is not a consistently unified actor, its 
foreign policy is formed through the interaction between the individual foreign 
policies of its members, the EC’s external trade relations and development policy, 
and the EU’s CFSP. As Wong and Hill put it, ‘foreign policy suffers from 
incoherence, but that of the EU is subject to structural incoherence’.281 
 
With respect to the EU’s common approach to foreign policy, Thomas emphasises 
that the EU’s biggest challenge ahead is that integration has ‘transformed “nation 
states” into “member states” but not into a unified super-state’.282 This was 
manifested for instance on EU’s foreign policy adopted towards the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. The EU’s lack of ability to deal with Yugoslavia’s disintegration wars – 
based on different interests of its members and absence of institutional capacity – 
prevented reaching a consensus on the region.
283
 Another important aspect of EU 
foreign policy-making, highlighting the non-unity towards the Western Balkans, is 
based on diverse understanding of motivations in the region – those of the EU as a 
unified actor and of its individual member states.
284
 More recent examples of EU’s 
division over foreign policy issues were over Iraq in 2003, Kosovo in 2008 or Libya 
in 2011. These cases posed a significant challenge for the EU due to the lack of joint 
position, perceived as ‘damaging the image of European foreign policy and 
providing the excuse for future exercises in non-conformity’.285 Importantly, Hill and 
Wong note, ‘the very fact of surprise and irritation reveals that the expectation, both 
within and outside the EU is now that the 27 should speak with one voice, or at the 
very least not display their differences in public’.286 
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Although the EU has more mechanisms for how to conduct foreign policy, 
particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon ‘re-commits’ member states to follow joint 
policies, EU members often find it difficult to agree to common positions. Indeed, as 
Thomas suggests, to understand the EU’s role in global affairs we need to examine 
how member states search for common policies, as well as how they reach 
agreements.
287
 It might further be argued that it is important to look at the process 
even if it does not lead to a common agreement – as was the case with Kosovo’s 
independence – to understand decision routes taken by the EU member states. 
Furthermore, particularly because the CFSP is characterised by a horizontal type of 
Europeanisation, it is essential to understand the making of individual EU members’ 
foreign policies to gain insight into how each member state reached its position, and 
importantly, what shaped the final outcome of a particular foreign policy agenda.  
 
According to Tonra, Europeanisation of foreign policy is a ‘transformation in the 
way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which 
professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of 
norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy 
making’.288 Wong and Hill, who see the Europeanisation of CFSP as a process of 
foreign policy convergence, offer another perspective. They argue that: 
 
It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives 
emanating both from actors (EU institutions, politicians, diplomats) in 
Brussels, and from member state capitals (national leaders). 
Europeanisation is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as 
policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national 
policies amplified through EU policy (bottom-up projection).
289
 
 
However, in the case of the Slovak foreign policy adopted towards Kosovo, this 
transformation did not occur, or rather, the Slovak MFA’s efforts for convergence 
and an EU coordinated policy over Kosovo’s status were marred by the activity 
undertaken by Slovak national leaders.  
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In this respect, it is necessary to differentiate between process Europeanisation and 
policy Europeanisation. As Hill and Wong emphasise, the former has been 
progressively reflected over the last forty years through the structural adaption of 
national foreign ministries. However, as for the latter, it is far from corresponding 
with a regular unity on policies.
290
 This was particularly evident in the Slovak case. 
Accession to the EU required adaptation of the Slovak MFA and creation of new 
units dealing with European affairs. In short, there was a structural reorganisation of 
the Ministry and it came to an adaptation of procedures and change of structures.
291
 
However, in regards to policy adoption, as the example of the Slovak foreign policy 
towards Kosovo demonstrates, Slovakia did not reflect the wider EU view and adapt 
its policy accordingly. In contrast, Kosovo’s independence was a CFSP issue where 
it openly opposed the majority of EU countries. Ultimately, this implies that the 
influence of Europeanisation is ‘stronger at the level of procedure and of general 
orientation than it is at the level of detailed policy, where domestic and other 
international factors can generate idiosyncratic national positions’. 292 In essence, it 
confirms Wong and Hill’s view that foreign-policy making is a complex process 
influenced by a number of phenomena including domestic factors.
293
  
 
2.3 Member States’ Foreign Policies and Dimensions of Europeanisation 
Three dimensions describe the relationship between member states’ foreign policies 
and the EU, showing to what extent the former is influenced by the latter. The first of 
these, the so-called top-down process (‘Downloading’), is focused on states’ 
adjustment to EU policy demands. In other words it indicates the extent to which the 
EU had an effect on national foreign policies and the decision-making process.
294
 
The bottom-up process (‘Uploading’), the second aspect of Europeanisation, 
indicates the transfer of national ideas and preferences to the supranational level.
295
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Research on the bottom-up approach includes, for instance, Economides’s study of 
Greek foreign policy and Stavridis and Hill’s work considering domestic sources of 
foreign policy in the case of the Falklands war.
296
 Geoffrey Edwards looked at the 
‘uploading’ dimension in Central and Eastern European states (CEES) and argued 
that since their accession in 2004, they have been able to upload their ideas to the EU 
level. Significantly, he points out that there has been a continuous interaction of top-
down influences within EU institutions with a bottom-up transfer of CEES ideas to 
the EU level.
297
 Král anticipated that after their 2004 accession, most of the CEE 
governments would, in the near future, aim to make sure that the EU and the US 
would cooperate and act in unison on the most important foreign political issues.
298
 
Nevertheless, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that it was the aspiration of 
CEES, and the many intrusive rules related to their EU membership, that enabled the 
EU to have ‘an unprecedented’ impact on public policies and the reorganisation of 
institutions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
299
  
 
Being an EU member means that a country is ‘no longer a mere object of EU 
decisions, but is rather a co-maker and co-author;’ as a result, states have 
opportunities to go ahead with policies not aligned with the EU majority.
300 This 
implies that the EU’s leverage over candidate states is considerable; however, once 
they become actual members they have more freedom to act. Indeed, as for Slovakia, 
Bátora and Pulišová note that following its EU accession in 2004, there was a change 
from ‘full harmonisation’ with CFSP towards attempts to pursue Slovak national 
interests which at some points, went against views supported by the EU’s leaders in 
foreign policy-making.
301
 As an example of pursuing Slovak national interests, these 
authors refer to the question of Kosovo’s statehood. As they state, these Slovak 
interests became most obvious ‘in international situations where there is a tension 
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between, on the one hand, the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and, on the other, the right to self-determination of ethnic groups’.302 Therefore, 
having in mind Czechoslovakia’s peaceful disintegration, they further emphasise that 
Slovakia is a supporter of ‘orderly division’ of countries if preceded by an agreement 
between all parties involved.
303
 Although this is a point that cannot be disregarded, 
this thesis shows that Slovakia did not oppose Kosovo’s independence on the basis 
of its national interests. In contrast, the MFA advocated following the majority of 
EU countries in the question on Kosovo’s statehood. This was considered crucial 
particularly in view of its membership in the EU, NATO and the UNSC. Therefore, 
for the MFA, it was in Slovak national interest to support an EU united position 
towards Kosovo. Yet, once the Parliament passed a declaration on Kosovo, the 
Ministry had to re-adjust its view accordingly.  
 
The last process refers to the socialisation of interests, whereby European identity 
shapes the individual member states’ identities (‘Crossloading’).304 Wong identifies 
the so-called ‘pendulum effect’ as one of the indicators of ‘Crossloading’.305 This 
arises when there are two extremely different positions among EU members (usually 
one or more EU states versus the remaining ones, generally including the European 
Commission and the Parliament) on a particular foreign policy issue. There could be 
a tendency towards a compromise – a position in the middle of these two extremes – 
however this ‘eventual meeting of minds’ is neither certain nor bound to happen. In 
some cases parts of national foreign policy shift closer to those of a majority of other 
EU member states; however, other members’ foreign policy spheres of activity may 
remain considerably different.
306
 Table 1 gives an overview of all three aspects of 
Europeanisation and their indicators. 
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Table 1 Three dimensions of Europeanisation in national foreign policy
307
 
Aspects of Europeanisation  Indicators of National Foreign Policy 
a) Adaptation and Policy 
Convergence 
 
Harmonisation and 
transformation of a member state 
to the needs and requirements of 
EU membership (‘Downloading’) 
 Increasing salience of European political 
agenda 
 Adherence to common objectives 
 Common policy obligations taking priority 
over national domaines réservés 
 Internalisation of EU membership and its 
integration process (‘EU-isation’) 
 Organisational and procedural change in 
national bureaucracies  
b) National Projection 
 
National foreign policy of a 
member state affects and 
contributes to the development of 
a common European Foreign 
Policy (‘Uploading’) 
 State attempts to increase national influence 
in the world 
 State attempts to influence foreign policies 
of other member states 
 State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella 
 National foreign policy uses the EU level as 
an influence multiplier  
c) Identity Reconstruction  
 
Result of above two dimensions. 
Harmonisation process tending 
towards middle position; 
common EU interests are 
promoted (‘Crossloading’) 
 Emergence of norms/values among policy-
making elites in relation to international 
politics 
 Shared definitions of European and national 
interests 
 Coordination reflex and ‘pendulum effect’ 
where ‘extreme’ national and EU positions 
are reconciled over time via bilateral and 
EU interactions 
 
It can be claimed that Europeanisation of foreign policy is different from other areas 
of policy-making, particularly because the interaction affects all three dimensions 
(top-down, bottom-up and sideways). However, emphasis needs to be put on the 
horizontal character of policy-making – in fact, this is why at times it is complicated 
to reach an agreement among EU members, as states still consider their foreign 
policy as a domain réservé.  
 
Among EU members there is now a ‘solidarity default setting’, essentially meaning 
that rather than taking the lead on cooperation, it is a state’s responsibility to clarify 
its disunion. Furthermore, the combination of all three aspects of Europeanisation – 
downloading, uploading and crossloading – has constructed ‘a web of foreign policy 
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interactions’ not always leading to collaboration; rather, it ‘entangles the member 
states’ objectives with each other’.308 As Baun and Marek argue, there appear to be 
many factors that influence all three aforementioned dimensions of foreign policy 
Europeanisation, including a state’s size, history, geography and domestic politics.309 
In this respect, considering the size of Slovakia, it would have been expected that as 
a small state it would aim to join the mainstream. However, size was not decisive in 
this case. Rather, it was domestic politics that impacted on the policy taken towards 
Kosovo.  
 
Foreign policy cooperation among EU member states is defined by the acquis 
communautaire and the acquis politique. The first one legally obliges the member 
states to acknowledge EU agreements with third countries, whereas the second refers 
to the member states’ responsibility to respect the political agreements and positions 
implemented in relation to the CFSP. States are therefore committed to accept a 
range of certain foreign policy positions.
310
 The question of whether Europeanisation 
produces convergence has been dealt with widely in the literature. In particular, 
foreign policy studies of the 1986, 1995 and 2004 enlargements argue for 
convergence where, in order to align themselves with existing EU norms, the new 
EU member states reorganised their foreign policies.
311
 Adjustment to European 
norms was observable for example in the case of Spain when in 1986, the year of its 
accession to the EU, the country changed its position on the Western Sahara and 
recognised Israel. This was part of accepting the acquis politique. On the other hand, 
in 1992 Spain managed to push further its proposal to include the Mediterranean 
(Maghreb and Middle East) as an area accountable to EU Joint Actions,
312
 which 
was considered an achievement of Spanish diplomacy. In doing so, Spain 
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Europeanised its national area of interest.
313
 For instance, Austria revised its 
neutrality position after the Commission’s initial reservations towards the state of 
neutrality and its attendant concern about the fulfilment of Austria’s obligations. As 
a result, the Austrian government gave less importance to neutrality and expressed 
interest in participation in the CFSP.
314
  
 
In 1998 Austria ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam and at the same time amended its 
constitution in order to enable its participation, ‘in a spirit of solidarity’, in ‘peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management including peace-
making’, based on the condition that all these actions would be supported by an EU 
joint action or UN mandate.
315
 In addition, Austria decided to take part in NATO-led 
peacekeeping activities through the ‘Enhanced Partnership for Peace’. Nevertheless, 
Austria would not be bound to become involved in any particular NATO activity.
316
 
However, Alecu de Flers points out that the following year, the Irish and Austrian 
governments – being urged to prevent non-unity among the EU members – 
supported the NATO military intervention against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, albeit officially, the Austrian government refused to support it.317 
 
Nevertheless, as Wong and Hill note, these changes by member states could be 
perceived only as a one-off acceptance of the acquis politique.
318
 For instance, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier point out that EU influence after the CEES 
countries fulfil their membership aspirations could decrease due to the lack of the 
main integration incentive.
319
 In essence, Wong argues that ‘member states continue 
to resist being locked into a fixed path of identity and policy convergence’. German 
policies, in comparison to French or British ones, have often been seen as a model of 
Europeanisation. However, in 1991 Germany also showed that national interests 
supersede EU policy when it recognised Slovenia and Croatia as independent 
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countries.
320
 In view of this, national interests defined by the states’ elite still 
continue to play an important role in national foreign policy-making.
321
 
 
2.4 Limitations of Europeanisation and Actors in Foreign Policy 
As Bulmer and Radaelli mention, the lack of a vertical chain of command or a 
supranational entity limits the impact of Europeanisation on member states’ foreign 
policies. Wong and Hill note that initially the Europeanisation approach was applied 
to the influence of the EU on national foreign policies (first pillar) – a top-down 
approach – but in the case of CFSP, decision-making takes the form of a bottom-up 
process which ‘was certain to cause confusion about actors, structures, cause and 
effect’.322 In view of this, the following chapters aim to explain the case of Slovak 
foreign policy taken towards Kosovo’s independence, and ‘the confusion’ that arose 
when Slovak government officials decided not to recognise Kosovo as an 
independent state, going against solidarity with the EU.  
  
In any way, in respect to foreign policy-making, the EU’s ability to act is restricted 
because states resist passing on their sovereign rights to a central authority. In 
addition, with EU’s expansion increases not only the number of its members but also 
the interests that they bring to the EU level.
323
 As Economides notes, one of the main 
limitations in achieving a coherent European foreign policy is that there is not 
always an agreement over the need for ‘an expansive issue-based or geographic 
foreign policy’.324 In effect, some member states view the EU as a global actor with 
global ambitions, however others, perceive its role from a narrower perspective with 
rather geopolitically limited interests. Another limitation is linked to the division 
between the ‘Europeanist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ states which was particularly evident in 
the case of the US intervention in Iraq.
325
 Because of all these differences 
‘sovereignty remains an issue but in a very specific way’.326 
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Another point raised by Wong and Hill concerns the fact that the term 
‘Europeanisation’ in the field of foreign policy has still not been clearly identified. 
The question remains: does it mean reaching an ‘ideal’ EU foreign policy position – 
requiring coordination by member states – or should it be looked at rather from the 
perspective of a ‘negotiated convergence’ between conflicting positions?327 
Significantly, as Wong and Hill put it: 
 
The Europeanization process is just one – albeit a significant one – 
among many effects in the domestic politics, processes and foreign 
policies of EU Member States. It creates a new context in which national 
foreign policies have to be made and understood, but (as yet) no more.
328
  
 
By foreign policy we can understand ‘ideas or actions designed by policy makers to 
solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of 
another state or states, in non-state actors, in the international economy, or in the 
physical environment of the world’.329 At the highest level, in most political systems, 
policy is coordinated between the head of government, who does not have a 
particular portfolio, and the departmental minister, who acts as ‘the specialist’. Hill 
perceives this as a certain kind of ‘foreign policy executive’. In other words, a 
relatively small group of representatives from the government conducts foreign 
policy. Hill also gives an explanation why foreign policy is usually conducted in this 
kind of inner circle. Most political representatives look over their shoulders to the 
domestic base and are not inclined to spend too much time on foreign political issues 
where ‘there might be little return’.330 
 
Significantly, as Hill notes, in foreign policy the number of issues which arise 
unexpectedly is disproportionally high. As a result, politicians with power and 
initiative have an advantage. As Hill argues, foreign policy issues are often 
unstructured in advance; meaning that usually there is no time framework for their 
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consideration given.
331
 Indeed, this aspect will be illustrated on the Slovak policy 
adopted towards Kosovo as the Slovak MFA had, all of a sudden, to incorporate the 
parliamentary declaration on Kosovo in its final policy. Ultimately, this resulted in a 
change of the MFA’s original intention to support the mainstream in the EU on 
Kosovo. 
 
Generally, the minister of foreign affairs is the main actor in foreign policy 
operations. However, as Hill points out, ministers of foreign affairs struggle to keep 
control of all their wide responsibilities, and ‘are always likely to be trumped by a 
head of government who decides to take a direct interest in foreign affairs’.332 Hill 
argues that an individual personality – particularly the prime minister or minister of 
foreign affairs – might have a decisive influence on foreign policy. Either way, as 
Whitman and Manners emphasise, the ministries of foreign affairs ‘are having 
greater difficulty in the making and conduct of traditionally conceived foreign 
policy’. Thus nowadays it might be more suitable to look at the ministries more as 
coordinators rather than policy-makers.
333
 In essence, this reflects how Slovak 
foreign policy towards Kosovo developed. After the leader of the opposition, 
Dzurinda, challenged Prime Minister Fico, in respect to the policy on Kosovo, Fico 
became more involved in foreign policy-making than he used to. However, this 
considerably limited the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs’s efforts, initially aimed 
to support Ahtisaari’s proposal for Kosovo’s independence.334  
 
In the case of a cabinet government, the minister of foreign affairs needs to update 
his cabinet colleagues and keep them informed on the main lines of foreign policies. 
Furthermore, he needs to get their support for significant foreign policy issues.
335
 
Another individual who plays a role in foreign policy is the chair of the 
parliamentary foreign affairs committee, as he might be drawn into top-level 
consultations requiring wider political agreement.
336
 In general, it is the foreign 
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affairs committee that deals with questions of CFSP.
337
 This is essential to consider 
in respect to wider political party opposition. As Hagan argues, political opposition 
is a potentially important source of foreign policy, because leaders react to it and 
adapt national foreign policy accordingly. As he notes, the connection between 
foreign policy and domestic politics derives primarily from the domestic political 
imperative of retaining political power.
338
 However, as Quaglia and Radaelli point 
out, party politics have been frequently neglected in the study of Europeanisation.
339
 
Furthermore, as Rybář notes, ‘EU preference formation at the national level 
encompasses a variety of potential influence seekers. Given their access to the locus 
of national decision-making, political parties are the primary entities that one can 
expect to seek influence in the process. This is because parties enjoy privileged 
access to government (governing parties) and parliament (opposition parties)’.340 
Yet, it is particularly this aspect that needs to be taken into consideration to 
understand the Slovak perspective on Kosovo. On this note, recent research on 
NMS’s views towards the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty showed that unlike the 
old member states where opposition to the EU came from peripheral parties, in the 
NMS of Central and Eastern Europe, the opposition to EU views came from both 
peripheral political parties as well as mainstream ones.
341
 Significantly, this finds 
reflection also in the Kosovo issue as it was the leading opposition party SDKÚ-DS 
– an established Slovak political party traditionally known for its pro-EU orientated 
views – surprisingly taking the lead on Kosovo in the Slovak Parliament and arguing 
against Kosovo’s independence without Belgrade’s support. 
 
On this note, David Allen rightly points out that ‘states of the EU are becoming 
weaker in that their executives have less freedom of action and are becoming more 
distinctively different from one another as a result of responding to differing 
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domestic rather than similar international stimuli’.342 In other words, national 
governments of the EU cannot count on the domestic approval of arrangements done 
with their EU partners.
343
 The governments still report to parliaments on national 
positions, emphasising (and often overemphasising) the distinctiveness of their input 
into European consultations, and downplaying the extent to which they have 
compromised national priorities in struggling to reach common policies.
344
 
 
However, as Kassim notes, collaboration between the EU and national parliaments is 
relatively limited to treaty ratification, the transposition of EU legislations and the 
scrutiny of ministers. In this respect, the greatest interaction is in the last field, 
although Kassim argues that the possibilities of the legislators in terms of impacting 
on the actions of the executive are rather restricted.
345
 In general, it is the national 
executive that takes decisions in respect to foreign policy-making, and the national 
parliaments have limited authority in these matters.
346
  Nevertheless, the fact that 
‘parliaments are able to force governments to uphold a position that denies them 
room for manoeuvre in the endgame of negotiations’ could create difficulties for EU 
member states.
347
  
 
Thus, in practice, the politics of foreign policy has two sides: ‘the slow-moving 
international system, and the darting, sometimes unpredictable movements of the 
individual players the system contains’.348 It is this unpredictability that makes the 
decision-making process difficult. Similarly, Bickerton highlights that ‘EU foreign 
policy is regularly trumped by the primacy of national politics; not, it should be 
noted, of national interest, but of the unpredictable conflicts that break out 
locally’.349 The lack of informed opposition and electorates lies behind the fact that 
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convergent governments do not result in ‘convergent domestic debates on foreign 
policy’.350 In this respect, he refers to Hill’s ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap and 
translates it into foreign policy as the expectations and aspirations of the EU elite in 
this area. However, the capabilities are restricted by the political will, which depends 
on the support that governments gather for their international commitments.
351
  
 
As to small states, they ‘are usually forced to adapt to the changing world 
environment by aligning themselves with EU positions’.352 However, as Gillisen put 
it, in certain conditions small states can achieve their independently set foreign 
policy objectives.
353
 Small states’ representatives are mostly cautious when standing 
out on EU issues and if they do so, it is on ‘carefully selected issues’ – on questions 
of no explicit concern, they join the majority.
354
  
 
As Wallace puts it, smaller states in Europe have reacted to ‘shared dilemmas’ in 
different ways: ‘domestic politics, national myth and identity, economic strength or 
weakness, geographical position and security constraints, shape perception of 
interests’.355 In regards to initiatives coming from Brussels, they will not succeed 
unless they find acceptance at the domestic ‘home’ level first.356 Wallace makes an 
important point by saying that the domestic public in small states expect their 
governments to protect national interests.
357
 However, as the Slovak case shows, 
complications arise when these interests are differently interpreted by the executive 
power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the legislative power (Parliament). Most 
notably: 
 
The difficulty which all member governments of the EU, large and small, 
however confront in concentrating on the management of domestic 
opinion is that the commitments they make to Parliament and public bind 
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their hands in EU negotiations where they need flexible negotiating 
objectives in order to participate in multilateral bargains.
358
 
 
As for the understanding of small states’ actions, a variety of actors at several levels 
need to be incorporated in the analysis. In fact, for small states, coalition building is 
essential if they want to make an impact on EU policies.
359
 Thorhallsson and Wivel 
emphasise: 
 
So far the study of the EU has focused mainly on institutions and great 
powers, largely ignoring the impact of small member states. However, 
the seemingly ever-growing majority of small states and the emerging 
divide between small and big EU member states on institutional issues 
necessitates a better understanding of how and why small states act as 
they do.
360
 
 
When discussing EU foreign policy-making and the actors involved, we cannot omit 
the role of the Quint. Although many informal member state groups within the EU 
have an impact on foreign policy-making, it is the Quint that has a considerable 
influence on its policies. It is considered a special group because it consists of four 
EU member states (the UK, France, Germany and Italy) and the US. The Quint is 
particularly noted for its debates on the EU and the Balkans.
361
 As Gegout puts it: 
The quint is considered here as a directorie, in the sense that it appears to 
be a leadership group in the EU decision-making process that takes 
decisions affecting the interests of other EU Member States and this 
without their participation: on some occasions the final EU decision 
seems to reflect the outcome of the discussions made within this 
directorie. The quint therefore appears to be more than a mere 
consultative group that pools ideas; it is a group that takes initiatives, 
discusses EU foreign policy issues and small EU countries have to 
accept its authority.
362
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This thesis will show that the Quint was considerably involved in the Kosovo 
case,
363
 and indeed tried to influence Slovak officials on a number of occasions to 
make sure that Slovak policy on Kosovo would be in line with their views. However, 
for internal domestic political reasons, Slovakia did not accept its authority. 
Importantly, the MFA did not lack willingness to do so, yet, because of the 
parliamentary declaration it could not change its view.  
 
Gegout also notes that the Quint is a ‘very discreet institution’. Its existence is 
known and ‘some small countries are indeed quite upset about it’, but the diplomats 
either do not want to share any information on it or know little about its functions.
364
 
In fact, Gegout argues that in a way, the Quint can be perceived as a ‘negation of the 
CFSP’ for three particular reasons. First, it is completely external to EU foreign 
policy-making, but there is a regular discussion of CFSP issues. Secondly, it is a 
‘dangerous exercise’ because some member states are excluded from it, including the 
big ones, such as Spain and the Netherlands. Lastly, through participation in the 
Quint, the US has an impact on EU foreign policy-making, and could be perceived as 
an ‘unofficial external member of the EU’ in the area of foreign policy.365 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding the national preferences of EU members and agents that impact on 
foreign policy-making enables comprehending their actions externally. In respect to 
CFSP, individual member states’ policies are significant because they impact on 
common decisions. Lacking a vertical chain of command in relation to EU foreign 
policy-making, at times member states diverge in their positions towards particular 
foreign political questions, as was also the case over Kosovo’s independence. 
 
Comprehending the actual reasons behind member states’ non-agreement on a 
particular EU foreign policy could help create better conditions for avoiding non-
conformity and allow a wider space for compromise. Ultimately, whether member 
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states consider the EU a restriction or an opportunity for their foreign policies 
depends ‘on whom, in what context, and when the question is asked’.366 Yet, it is 
particularly the political context and the role of domestic actors that is often not fully 
appreciated or rather misunderstood. Importantly, as Copsey and Haughton put it: 
 
The nature of national policy preferences, as well as the mechanisms by 
which they are determined, are of crucial importance to scholars who 
seek to understand the future policy agenda of the European Union. The 
impact of NMS’ [new member states] policy preferences on the EU will 
rise considerably over the next decade; however, we still know too little 
about the nature of these preferences and how they are formed.
367
 
 
In light of this comment, it is this thesis’s aim to add another perspective to the 
understanding of foreign policy-making in Slovakia as a new EU member state, and 
crucially, to emphasise the role of domestic factors that shaped the decision-making 
process behind its non-recognition of Kosovo. There is also a need to widen the time 
frame and look at the evolution of the Slovak view on Kosovo over a longer period 
rather than focusing on one event, such as the passing of the parliamentary 
declaration on Kosovo. One needs to understand what preceded it, and essentially, 
what followed.  
 
The next chapter will look at Slovak foreign policy in the pre-EU and NATO 
integration context and the change that occurred after it became a member of these 
institutions. Particular attention will be given to the case of Kosovo’s independence 
and the arguments identified as causes of the Slovak non-recognition of Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Evolution of Slovak Foreign Policy          
(1992-2008) 
 
‘What you see may well depend on where you sit, but which seats 
 give the best view in the house?’368 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the evolution of Slovak foreign policy with a focus on key 
foreign political events taking place between 1992 and 2008.
369
 Until 2004, EU and 
NATO integration was the Slovak foreign policy priority. The completion of this 
integration led to a turning point in foreign policy, as the Kosovo case clearly 
demonstrates. The aim is to show the change of policy after Slovakia’s accession 
into the EU and NATO. A chronological time frame will be used to highlight key 
foreign political events as they happened. This section will focus on the following 
foreign policy events: NATO intervention against Serbia
370
 (1999), the US-led 
invasion of Iraq (2003), the integration of Slovakia into the EU and NATO (2004) 
and debates in Slovakia prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence (2007-2008). 
This will enable reflection on the evolution of the Slovak foreign policy direction, 
leading to a discussion about Kosovo’s independence. While a detailed account of 
Slovak foreign policy after 1993 is beyond the scope of this chapter, its aim is to 
provide an understanding of the main foreign political events that shaped the 
evolution of Slovak foreign policy.  
 
The second part of the chapter will focus on Slovakia’s policy towards Kosovo and 
show how this became a key foreign policy issue after the country joined NATO and 
the EU. It will present five key arguments as to why Slovakia did not recognise 
Kosovo’s independence: 1) Slovak-Serbian relations; 2) regional stability; 3) the 
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issue of international law; 4) the role of political party opposition; and 5) the notion 
of Kosovo as precedent. The chapter is divided in two main sections: debate about 
the key events in Slovak foreign policy evolution and discussion of the research gaps 
in the existing academic debate on the reasons behind the Slovak non-recognition of 
Kosovo. 
 
3.1 Prelude: Czechoslovakia and the Breakup of Yugoslavia 
By the start of 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had 
collapsed. On 16 January of that year, the EU recognised the independence of 
Croatia and Slovenia. As for Czechoslovakia, it joined the EU in recognising the 
new states.
371
 However, on the Czechoslovak domestic scene, in particular within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was opposition to the move. For example, the 
former Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiří Dienstbier did not agree with 
the recognition. He refused to accept what he called ‘salami tactics’ in regard to the 
recognition of individual states. As he argued, anything other than a politically 
agreed division of Yugoslavia would lead to catastrophe.
372
 In 1992, Czechoslovakia 
was a country in transition, with its own political issues and a question mark about 
its future either as a federation or as two independent countries. As a non-member of 
the EU and NATO, it was not an influential foreign political player and was largely 
expected to join the majority in the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian statehood.  
 
3.2 Slovak Foreign Policy in the Context of the EU and NATO Pre-Accession 
(1993-2004) 
In 1992 Czechoslovakia peacefully broke up leading in 1993 to the emergence of 
two independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The negotiators of 
Czechoslovakia’s separation were the victors of the June 1992 parliamentary 
elections in both countries, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar, respectively.373   
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The basic framework for the execution of foreign policy in Slovakia is set in the 
Constitution of the Slovak Republic, adopted in September 1992. The main part of 
the foreign policy powers falls under the executive power represented by the 
Government, which decides on fundamental questions of foreign policy (Law no. 
460/1992 Coll. Article 119). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including diplomatic 
missions abroad, ‘constitutes the coordinative and executive backbone of foreign 
policy of the Slovak Republic’.374 The President represents Slovakia outwardly and 
has more representative functions. The legislative body of the Slovak Republic is 
represented by the National Council, consisting of 150 MPs. 
 
After its independence in 1993, Slovakia started to formulate its own foreign 
political priorities. For the new country this was a long process. As Henderson 
argues, after independence Slovakia lacked experience in formulating and 
implementing its own foreign policy and identifying its specific interests in the 
international arena.
375
 However, from the perspective of a new state this was 
understandable. Weiss reminds us that during the federation, foreign political 
decisions were taken in its federal centre – Prague. In this respect, Slovakia did not 
have a long term tradition of its own statehood, foreign policy and diplomacy.
376
 It 
would be wrong to argue that it was without any experience; however, it faced a 
number of challenges, for instance in regards to diplomatic personnel.
377
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In the 1990s, Slovakia was dominated by Prime Minister Mečiar’s government 
(1993-1994, 1994-1998)
378
 and in the post-1998 period by Prime Minister 
Dzurinda’s leadership (1998-2002). Mečiar’s era was viewed critically by outside 
observers and there is a consensus ‘that it created a negative image of Slovakia’.379 
While Mečiar’s government programme included a desire to bring Slovakia closer to 
EU and NATO structures, with eventual membership in both organisations,
380
 his 
politics went against these aspirations. Therefore, while economic indicators put 
Slovakia in the first round of candidate countries for EU membership, the political 
situation threatened Slovakia’s early accession to NATO and the EU.381 In fact, 
Slovakia was not among the first group of candidate countries for NATO 
membership.
382
 In July 1997, during the NATO Madrid summit, Slovakia was not 
invited to join the Alliance. Likewise, in December of that year, the European 
Council meeting in Luxembourg postponed the start of accession negotiations with 
Slovakia. The 1997 ‘Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for 
Membership of the European Union’ concluded ‘that Slovakia does not fulfil in a 
satisfying manner the political conditions set out by the European Council in 
Copenhagen, because of the instability of Slovakia’s  institutions, their lack of 
rootedness in political life and the shortcomings in the functioning of its 
democracy’.383  
 
The 1998 elections marked a turning point in Slovakian history when Dzurinda’s 
government – a broad right/left coalition of parties which opposed the previous 
government, and included a Hungarian minority party – came to power.384 As a 
result of this, the main focus of its national policy was reoriented towards the EU and 
on ‘how not to miss the boat’.385 By the end of the 1990s, Slovak foreign policy was 
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very limited and driven by the main goal of becoming a member of the EU and 
NATO. According to Henderson, while the Mečiar government failed to determine 
the foreign policy direction after 1993, ‘by the end of the decade, it was clear that a 
“back to Europe” aim for integration into Euro-Atlantic structures left little scope for 
independent policy-making’.386 While bilateral relations with other states were 
important for Slovakia during the early to mid-1990s, towards the end it was obvious 
they were subordinated to the integration goals.
387
 This was shown when, in 1999, 
Slovakia took a crucial foreign political decision. 
 
3.2.1 The 1999 NATO Military Intervention in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
The NATO military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was 
the first significant foreign political event that Slovakia had to face after 
independence. As will be shown, despite internal dissent within the government, and 
a clear lack of public support, it opened its air space and allowed NATO to use its 
transport infrastructure for the intervention in FRY. This was not in Slovakia’s 
economic interest given the level of trade with Serbia.
388
 At the same time it had the 
potential to lead to harm to the Slovak minority living in Serbia’s province 
Vojvodina. However, this step did put Slovakia into a group of ‘reliable allies of 
NATO’.389  
 
Considering the neutrality of Austria and Switzerland, Slovakia provided relatively 
important assistance to the Alliance.
390
 Vachudova analysed how the behaviour of 
NATO candidate countries was influenced during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and 
what role the countries’ aspiration for NATO membership played.391 Her analysis of 
Slovak behaviour during this crisis affirms that, as an aspiring ally, this was a crucial 
time for Slovakia to express solidarity with the alliance and come closer to 
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membership. Furthermore, the new government’s aim was to improve its reputation 
after Mečiar’s rule392 and change the negative perceptions of Slovakia.393 In this 
regard, Sláviková notes that the motivation of the Slovak government was at that 
time pragmatic and strategic, having membership of the EU and NATO in view.
394
 
While bilateral relations were important to Slovakia during the early to mid-1990s, 
towards the end it was obvious they were subordinated to two major foreign political 
goals: integration into the EU and NATO.
395
  
  
The Justice Minister Ján Čarnogurský opposed Slovak support of NATO actions and 
the opening of Slovak air space was challenged by the opposition and the Slovak 
minority in Vojvodina.
396
 The majority of the government was keen to pursue the 
latter policy, but the Slovak public was opposed to it – 64 percent of the public 
disagreed with this decision and some 69 percent opposed the NATO intervention.
397
 
Clearly, the influence of the international environment translated into Slovak support of 
the NATO campaign even though the decision clearly went against public opinion.   
 
In Krejčí’s view, most of Slovakia’s power elites evaluated the conflict according to 
the criteria of loyalty to the current rulers of the largest Western powers.
398
 In other 
words, this Slovak step has been perceived as the behaviour of a de facto ally, 
opening the door to NATO.
399
 According to the Slovak political analyst Mesežnikov, 
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the crisis in Kosovo was the first international political event to impact on the 
internal political life of Slovakia. No previous conflict had led to this type of 
confrontation between Slovak politicians as NATO’s military operation in 
Yugoslavia did.
400
 He assumes that if Slovakia had had a different government, led 
by the then opposition parties, it would have probably taken a position of solidarity 
with Yugoslavia.
401
 Mesežnikov expected that, in the future, international political 
events would have an increased impact on politics in Slovakia. In fact, he talked 
about a ‘direct impact on the internal political life in Slovakia’.402 This would be 
seen again in the case of Kosovo’s independence, which would have a direct impact 
of domestic politics on Slovak foreign policy. 
 
In the meantime, at the end of the 1990s, Slovakia began to be more directly 
involved in the Balkans through the so-called ‘Bratislava process’ (1999-2002). 
Lukáč describes it as an initiative by Slovak diplomacy, aimed at organising 
meetings between the Serbian opposition and non-governmental organisations on 
‘neutral’ territory, in Bratislava. It facilitated discussions about the removal of 
Milošević’s regime and restoration of democracy.403  
 
3.2.2 The 2003 US-led Military Intervention in Iraq 
The next major development in Slovak foreign policy came in 2003, a year prior to 
the Slovak accession to the EU and NATO, when Slovakia needed to take an 
important foreign political position towards the planned US intervention in Iraq. As 
with NATO’s intervention of FRY in 1999, the US invasion of Iraq was not 
authorised by the UNSC. However, the timing of this operation was crucial for 
Slovakia. Despite the fact that Slovakia completed the accession talks with the EU in 
December 2002, the EU members still needed to ratify the Accession Treaty.
404
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As Samson argues, after the 2002 parliamentary elections, there was a confirmation 
and strengthening of Slovak pro-US foreign policy, due to the fact that the 
government was built by traditionally US-oriented centre-right parties. 
Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement, KDH) was not 
openly pro-US and the liberal party Aliancia nového občana (Alliance of New 
Citizens, ANO) did not emphasise foreign policy; however, Slovenská demokratická 
a kresťanská únia-Demokratická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-
Democratic Party, SDKÚ) and Strana maďarskej koalície-Magyar Koalíció Pártja 
(Party of the Hungarian Coalition, SMK) were very supportive of the Americans.
405
 
In this respect, it was less of a surprise that Slovakia sided clearly with the US-led 
invasion of Iraq. Samson identified five reasons explaining Slovak support of the 
Iraq invasion: firstly, fighting against international terrorism was included in the 
election programmes of the governmental political parties, particularly in the case of 
SDKÚ. Secondly, SDKÚ was the strongest supporter of Slovak-US relations. 
Thirdly, the three most important governmental positions related to foreign affairs 
and security were taken by SDKÚ nominees (Prime Minister – Mikuláš Dzurinda, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – Eduard Kukan and Minister of Defence – Ivan 
Šimko).406 Fourthly, the Slovak President was supportive of US foreign policy;407 
and lastly, during 2002-2004, government representatives never openly opposed the 
US attack in Iraq.
408
 Nevertheless, as with the 1999 NATO intervention, the Slovak 
public was against the war in Iraq. Prior to the war, 77 percent of the public 
considered the intervention very dangerous and 49 percent unjust. After the start of 
the war, 74 percent of Slovaks considered it wrong. Significantly, Slovaks were in 
favour of the French and German anti-war attitude.
409
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Talking in November 2002 at a press conference in Bratislava with the US Secretary 
of Defence Ronald Rumsfeld, Prime Minister Dzurinda openly expressed Slovak 
support of the US policy on Iraq when he said, ‘I would like to convey the main 
political message […] that Slovakia has been and will be a strong ally of the United 
States of America, in any case, under any circumstances’.410 In early 2003, eight 
NATO members expressed their support of the US in an open letter.
411
 Soon after, in 
February 2003, Slovakia together with nine other Central and East European 
countries – the so called Vilnius Group – expressed its support for the US military 
invasion of Iraq.
412
 This was a clear indication of its pro-transatlantic position. 
 
However, it was also evident that the EU was divided over the issue.  As a reaction, a 
clear statement against pro-US support of the EU candidate countries was issued by 
the French President Jacques Chirac. He argued that their positions were ‘dangerous’ 
and should show more loyalty to Europe. In addition, he questioned the upcoming 
enlargement by commenting: ‘If they had tried to decrease their chances for getting 
in Europe, they couldn’t have done a better job’.413  
 
France, supported by Germany, was against a UN resolution approving intervention 
against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, as it did not consider that UN weapons 
inspectors had exhausted all opportunities. The threat of French veto made it clear 
that no UN resolution could be passed. Consequently, on 19 March 2003, the war in 
Iraq started.
414
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3.2.3 Slovak Accession to NATO and the EU 
Slovakia was invited to join the Alliance during the November 2002 NATO summit 
in Prague.
415
 At the end of March 2003, days after the war in Iraq started; it signed in 
Brussels the Protocol of Accession allowing it to join NATO after its ratification by 
the Allies. After a year, on 29 March 2004, Slovakia formally became a member of 
the Alliance.   
 
Soon afterwards, on 1 May, Slovakia also joined the European Union. Initially, 
Slovakia was excluded from the first round of candidate countries for EU 
membership; as a result, it started the accession negotiations two years later than the 
first group. However, it was able to complete the negotiations in 2002 and fulfil its 
target to join the candidates for the first round of EU enlargement. In the end, 
Slovakia fulfilled all Copenhagen criteria – including political, economic and 
legislative (the capacity to adopt the obligations of the EU membership, so called 
acquis) – and in 2004 entered the EU with nine other countries.416 The accession 
agreement was signed in Athens in April 2003, followed by a Slovak referendum on 
EU accession in May where voters confirmed their support for EU membership.
417
 
 
3.3 Slovak Foreign Policy after 2004 
Slovak integration in 2004 represents a crucial turning point in foreign policy-
making. In this respect, Haughton and Malová argue that after the independence of 
Slovakia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was primarily oriented towards integration 
into ‘Western clubs’.418 It can be argued that prior to the Slovak accession to the EU, 
it was about a ‘one-way transfer of EU rules and norms’.419 Significantly, during this 
time, Slovak foreign policy towards countries outside the EU reflected foreign policy 
priorities of the EU.
420
 However, after Slovakia became a member of the EU and 
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NATO, ‘a new agenda was needed’.421 In other words, after the period of 
conditionality leading to accession, the new EU members were given space to 
manoeuvre.
422
  
 
After its accession to the EU, Slovakia passed the Constitutional Act No. 397/2004 
on the cooperation of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of Slovak Republic in EU affairs. As a result of this law, the Slovak 
Parliament has the right to pass resolutions which bind the Government and its 
individuals to concrete positions.
423
 In other words, the Government is obliged to 
inform the Parliament about the current EU agenda and the Parliament has the right 
to approve or change the positions of the Slovak Republic.
424
 The Constitutional Act 
No. 397/2004 also defines the relationship between the executive and legislative 
power in the field of European integration. Among other things, it allows the 
National Council to approve Slovak positions to drafts of legally binding acts or 
other acts of the EU. Parliament may also approve country views on other EU 
matters if requested by the government or members of at least one fifth of the 
National Council. If MPs approve a draft opinion, a member of the Slovak 
government is bound by that opinion in EU institutions.
425
 
 
Despite the relatively strong competencies given to the Parliament in relation to EU 
matters and its control over government positions, the legislative power rarely 
interferes with executive power decisions on foreign policy. In fact, until the 
initiation of the Slovak Parliament’s draft proposal on Kosovo, which will be 
examined in the next chapter, MPs used the law to oblige a member of the 
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government with a specific mandate only once – on the question of EU accession 
negotiations with Turkey.
426
 The Christian Democratic Party, KDH, was against the 
start of negotiations with Ankara.
427
 On 30 November 2004, the Slovak Parliament 
bound the government members ‘to enforce in the EU Council negotiations such an 
approach for the initiation of the negotiations for the Turkish EU membership which 
would respect inevitability of fulfilling criteria and from which the EU would not be 
bound to accept Turkey as a member of the EU’.428 As Világi and Bilčík argue, in 
the case of Turkey, the law was used to express a standpoint of strategic importance 
which received considerable political, media and public interest.
429
 
 
In general, as the aforementioned authors point out in their study, the Slovak 
Parliament – including its committees – is active on EU matters only in questions 
related to internal political discourse or those issues related to key domestic political 
agendas.
430
 In other words, it deals with matters closely linked to political party 
competition. Notably, Világi and Bilčík suggest that in the case of a long term 
minority government, the 2004 law remains a ‘potentially strong instrument in the 
hands of political opposition’, particularly if it disrupts an existing wider political 
consensus on a Slovak position in the EU. Similarly, a coalition or main opposition 
political party with clear ideas about Slovak priorities in the EU has good 
preconditions to use a relatively strong political position of the Parliament on EU 
matters.
431
 In this respect, the Slovak government acts in all external issues; in EU 
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matters however, parliamentary scrutiny can determine the Slovak position. In other 
words, the Parliament has a say in the formulation of Slovak EU policy. In the 
Kosovo case, to be debated in detail later, it meant that MPs were brought into the 
discussion on Slovak foreign policy towards Kosovo’s independence, and to a large 
extent shaped the final Slovak stance as the Parliament issued instructions to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
3.4 The Emergence of Kosovo as a Key Issue and the Policy of Non-Recognition 
Haughton and Malová note that it was primarily the enlargement of the Western 
Balkans region that could be identified as an area of Slovak activity.
432
 As Sláviková 
points out, ‘for Slovakia, the Western Balkans has become one of the few foreign 
policy issues where it has the capacity and potential to shape the EU’s approach and 
policies, as well as participate in key decision-making processes’.433 Following on 
from this, Šagát argues that Slovak diplomats have been influencing the events in the 
Balkan region since the 1990s; for example, through the earlier discussed ‘Bratislava 
Process’.434 What positively contributed towards Slovakia’s good name in the region 
was the activity of Slovak diplomats
435
 and their ‘energy and drive’ in the leading 
roles of the EU’s operations in this area.436 Furthermore, Slovakia’s own experience 
with its transformation process was also positively perceived. However, Haughton 
and Malová also argue that Slovakia’s input in the region was mainly directed 
towards Serbia and Montenegro.
437
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After the 2006 elections, Slovak foreign policy was generally focused on EU and 
NATO issues, Višegrad cooperation and the Eastern dimension.438 Yet, it was 
Kosovo which gained greater prominence and became the primary issue for foreign 
policy. In March 2007, the Slovak Parliament passed a Declaration on Kosovo in 
which it expressed the view that unlimited independence for Kosovo is not in the 
interest of regional stability. It appears that, after the NATO intervention in 1999, 
Kosovo’s independence was the next Balkan topic intensely debated in the Slovak 
Parliament. However, in contrast to 1999, in 2007 all coalition and opposition parties 
(except the Hungarian minority party) were united in rejecting Kosovo’s 
independence.
439
 Lukáč observes that once Slovakia obtained independence, its 
foreign policy did not support disintegration tendencies and was against any attempts 
by minority populations to leave federal entities. He emphasises that this attitude was 
particularly visible in the Slovak position towards Kosovo’s efforts for autonomy or 
later for independence.
440
  
 
According to Šagát, between 2004 and 2006 more attention was given to the Balkan 
region in Slovak foreign policy, but between 2006 and 2008 the Kosovo issue fully 
dominated it.
441
 Weiss argues that for Slovakia as a member of the EU and NATO, 
the Kosovo issue was a ‘test of responsibility, maturity and ability’ in terms of not 
only seeing trends and interests of Slovakia’s EU and NATO allies, but also in 
pursuing its own interests even if they did not conform to its allies, as was the case 
with Kosovo.
442
 In Weiss’s opinion, the position of Slovakia as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2007 increased its international and 
                                                          
438 Milan Šagát, ‘Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans: Potemkin Villages’, International Issues 
& Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 17 (2008), 45-62 (p. 49). In 2009 Slovakia participated in the preparation of the 
Eastern Partnership project that forms a part and is a continuation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
It is also referred to as the Eastern Dimension of the ENP. The initiative represents a new strategic dimension of 
cooperation with the six countries on the Eastern borders of the EU and covers Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaĳan. See ‘Annual Report. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic: 
Foreign Policy in 2009’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2010, p. 40. 
439 In addition to Slovakia, on 18 February 2008, both chambers of the Romanian Parliament adopted a 
Declaration confirming that it would not recognise the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo. 357 MPs 
and senators supported the Declaration; 27 MPs of the Democratic Union of Hungarians voted against. See 
‘Spain, Romania, Cyprus lead countries which refuse to violate international law’, Kosovo Compromise, 19 
February 2008, available at <http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?view=story&id=575 
&sectionId=1> [accessed 15 May 2011]. 
440 Pavol Lukáč, ‘Úvod: Slovenská zahraničná politika k Balkánu v deväťdesiatych rokoch?’, in Kosovo 1999 a 
slovenská spoločnosť, ed. by Pavol Lukáč (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 
2001), pp. 4-6. 
441 Milan Šagát, ‘Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans: Potemkin Villages’, International Issues 
& Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 17 (2008), 45-62 (pp. 49-50). 
442 Peter Weiss, ‘Kosovské dilemy slovenskej diplomacie’, Mezinárodní politika, 7 (2007), 22-25 (p. 23).  
99 
 
political co-responsibility, although Slovakia’s options to influence the final decision 
were rather limited.
443
 As Lörincz states, by 2008, Slovak foreign policy towards the 
Western Balkans region ‘was tied up too much by the Kosovo issue’.444 At the same 
time, as Šagát notes, new foreign political issues had also started to emerge. Slovak-
Hungarian relations again became a source of tension.
445 
Just as discussions about 
Kosovo’s independence intensified, Slovak-Hungarian relations started to worsen. 
 
As a result, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, in 2008, Slovakia 
refused to recognise it and the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely ‘took note’ 
of Kosovo’s act.446 Surprisingly, with the exception of the Hungarian minority party, 
domestic politicians were united on the non-recognition of Kosovo. Lörincz thought it 
‘especially entertaining’ that opposition leaders such as Dzurinda and Hrušovský 
reversed their position. In 1999 they supported the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia by 
pointing to the violation of human rights in Kosovo, but in 2007 they did not agree 
with the recognition of the province.
447
 At the time, and since then, scholars tried to 
explain the Slovak stance in a number of different ways. Five main arguments have 
been put forward to explain Slovakia’s negative stance towards Kosovo’s 
independence, the defining issue of Slovakia’s post-2004 foreign policy. 
 
3.4.1 Slovak-Serbian Relations 
The first argument centres on Slovakia’s relationship with Serbia. Weiss points out 
that, due to historical developments, the Slovak public and political elites have a 
positive connection with ex-Yugoslavia and Serbia.
448
 This dates back to the period 
between the two world wars, when Czechoslovakia, together with Yugoslavia and 
Romania formed the Little Entente,
449
 and later on, when in 1968 Yugoslavia 
condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet and Warsaw Treaty forces. 
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Nevertheless, as Mojžita and Škvarna wrote in 1992, a year before Slovakia’s 
independence, it is essential ‘to maintain bonds with Yugoslavia and countries which 
up until recently belonged to it’.450 They further noted that ‘countries such as 
Romania, Croatia and Serbia were in the past partly or completely together with 
Hungary, Slovakia and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine in the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and today they form a close geographical unit in the Carpathian basin’.451 It is 
understandable that Slovakia’s common history with Serbia’s province Vojvodina 
within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the bonds with its minority living there 
have contributed to strengthening inter-country relations.
452
 
 
Academics such as Kai-Olaf Lang refer to good relations as one of the underlying 
reasons behind Slovakia’s stand on Kosovo’s independence, demonstrated by the 
fact that the Western Balkans were described as a priority for Slovak foreign 
policy.
453
 It is fair to say that the Western Balkans were the focus of Slovak foreign 
policy; however, the argument that Slovakia did not recognise Kosovo because of its 
good relations with Serbia is of limited use. Slovakia’s good relationship with Serbia 
was not continuous; for example Slovakia did not assume a pro-Serb stance earlier 
(in 1991-92 and during the NATO bombing in 1999) despite public sentiment. 
Therefore, one can argue that historic friendships are rarely uppermost in the minds 
of policy makers. However, with regard to the Kosovo case, and as will be shown, 
while there might have been some element of Slavic solidarity towards Serbia, it did 
not play a decisive role. 
 
3.4.2 Regional Stability 
A further argument points towards the destabilising potential of the region and 
security concerns. This is relevant when considering the region’s violent wars and 
ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. As Sláviková argues, ‘the desire to contribute to the 
security and stability of the Western Balkans is natural, considering the proximity of 
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the region to Slovakia’s border, while recognizing that instability in its nearest 
neighbourhood represents a serious security concern’.454 In this respect, as Lang 
emphasised, the ‘Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the 
Solution of the Future Status of the Serbian province Kosovo’ passed by the Slovak 
Parliament in March 2007 addressed this concern.
455
 
 
Weiss notes that the Slovak representatives clearly demonstrated it was unwise to 
take a decision which in the mid- to long-term would lead to increased tension and 
conflict, not only in the Balkans, but also in other related and non-related parts of 
Europe.
456
 The US in particular viewed the situation in a different light, and due to 
fears of a new wave of violence similar to those of 2004, it decided to honour its 
promise to recognise Kosovo’s statehood. Although Slovak officials presented 
regional stability as a relevant factor that impacted on the decision,
457
 the evidence 
presented in this thesis shows that it cannot be considered essential for the non-
recognition of Kosovo; in reality, it did not drive the Slovak stance. As some 
interviewees confirmed, this argument was used as a ‘fig leaf’ to cover up the main 
reasons for the negative attitude towards Kosovo’s statehood. This evidence will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapters. 
 
3.4.3 The Issue of International Law 
The third explanation for the Slovak policy of non-recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence hinges on the argument that independence was contrary to 
international law. As Szilágyi and Strážay state, Slovakia, unlike other Višegrad 
countries,
458
 claimed that the unilateral declaration of independence did not conform 
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to international law.
459
 From the Slovak point of view, being a small state meant that 
respect for international law was important for guaranteeing stability. Szilágyi and 
Strážay conclude that ‘since the EU did not develop a common position in this 
matter, Slovakia’s approach is respected’.460 Many politicians in Slovakia underlined 
the political consequences of Kosovo’s independence and emphasised the 
importance of complying with the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
461
 Perhaps the clearest explanation of the 
Slovak position on Kosovo in relation to respect of international law was given by 
Miroslav Lajčák, the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs who stated: 
 
In our opinion, it [the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo] 
violated several provisions of international law, such as the principle, 
according to which the right to self-determination applies only to nations 
and not to national minorities. We also find it difficult to accept the fact, 
that the independence was not declared by mutual agreement and that the 
decision on the choice of the predominant legal principle was not made 
by the international community, represented by the UN SC, but by 
individual states. For the same reasons, we did not recognise the 
unilaterally declared independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
462
 
 
Importantly, Slovakia was not alone in arguing that Kosovo’s independence violated 
international law. Four other EU member states – Cyprus, Greece, Romania and 
Spain – as well as Russia were of the same opinion.463 Nevertheless, despite this 
official line, the international law argument was not the reason why Slovak 
politicians did not agree to Kosovo’s independence; rather, it was used to validate its 
decision.
464
  
 
3.4.4 The Role of Political Party Opposition 
Another point explaining Slovakia’s stance on Kosovo’s independence relates to the 
role of domestic politics and political party opposition. Yet, from the research 
                                                          
459 Imre Szilágyi and Tomáš Strážay, New Dimensions of Cooperation: Hungary and Slovakia’s Joint 
Involvement in the Western Balkans (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 
2009), p. 22. 
460 Szilágyi and Strážay, New Dimensions of Cooperation, p. 22.  
461 Lörincz, ‘Slovakia and the Western Balkans’, p. 89. 
462 Miroslav Lajčák, ‘Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity: Awkward bed-fellows’, Speech of the Minister 
of Foreign Affaires of the Slovak Republic, Chatham House, London, 20 April 2009. 
463 For a detailed analysis of the Russian position, see Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, particularly pp. 113-17.  
464 For instance, as an anonymous observer put it to the author, ‘the Slovak position was “wrapped” in the 
international law argument’. 
103 
 
conducted for this thesis, none of the international articles tackling the Slovak 
position have considered this a cause for the non-recognition of Kosovo.  
 
The ‘Declaration on the status of Kosovo’ passed by the Slovak Parliament in March 
2007 had a considerable impact on the official Slovak stance. Limited attention has 
been paid to political parties in parliamentary systems’ foreign policy-making and 
very few studies have looked at the role of parliament in foreign political decisions. 
This is largely because parliaments do not generally influence the external behaviour 
of states and rarely challenge governments on foreign political issues.
465
 However, 
Kesgin and Kaarbo argue that parliaments are more powerful than is often 
assumed.
466
  
 
As Sláviková points out Slovak politicians ‘woke up’ at the beginning of February 
2007 when Ahtisaari’s status plan was presented.467 To the surprise of the EU 
representatives, Dzurinda, the leader of Slovak opposition, initiated a discussion in 
Parliament with the aim of expressing a negative stance towards Kosovo’s statehood. 
This came as a surprise to the Prime Minister, Róbert Fico; however, he took this 
challenge in his favour by including Kosovo among his priorities and publicly 
adopting the standpoint of not recognising Kosovo.  
 
Sláviková perceives the debate around Kosovo as one of myths and emotions – not 
about Serbia, Kosovo or the EU – but rather ‘about us [Slovaks]’. She argues that 
this debate was then presented to the wider public as a foreign political discussion 
about Slovak interests.
468
 Her claim is that, in 2005, when the status talks started, the 
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the necessity of the status process, 
as well as the responsibility arising from Slovakia’s membership in the UN Security 
Council (2006-2007) and the EU.
469
 In her view, the debate around Kosovo 
questioned why the opposition raised the declaration on Kosovo by the Slovak 
Parliament and why it did not raise the question earlier when it was in the coalition 
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(between 1998-2006) and had enough space for discussion.
470
 In this respect, 
Sláviková is the only scholar who looked at Kosovo from the domestic politics 
perspective.  
 
The above suggests that the opposition party SDKÚ-DS took the step on the basis of 
domestic political calculations. The opposition changed its position, as during the 
Kosovo conflict in 1999, it had supported the NATO bombing. It would appear that 
these political calculations were simply part of electoral tactics.
471
 Therefore, the 
domestic politics argument related to the political party opposition implies a tactical 
stance requiring further investigation. 
 
3.4.5 The Notion of Kosovo as Precedent 
The final argument presented in the literature is the precedent Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence might set for other regions. Lang argues that, according 
to the Slovak view, the recognition of Kosovo would represent a precedent which 
could be used in the future by other regions or minorities for their own secessionist 
tendencies or autonomous aims.
472
 He states that this Slovak ‘fear’ is connected to 
the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. In other words, the precedent factor 
becomes important precisely because of Slovakia’s own domestic minority. As 
Bugajski states, the Hungarian minority position ‘has proved to be the most 
contentious nationality issue in Slovakia since democratic changes. After the “Velvet 
Revolution”, Hungarian activists began to organize openly and to campaign for their 
collective rights’.473  
 
Vachudova argues that during the 1999 NATO intervention, nationalist parties in 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria considered wide territorial autonomy (possibly even 
independence) for Kosovan Albanians as against their countries’ interests.474 To be 
clear, ‘all three states harbour a single, politically cohesive ethnic minority whose 
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aspirations for greater autonomy are threatening to some part of the majority 
nation’.475 On this note, Vachudova states: ‘While Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary are relatively homogenous, in Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania one 
cohesive ethnic minority forms about 10 percent of the population’.476 In Slovakia 
and Romania, it is the Hungarian minority and, in Bulgaria, the Turkish minority. In 
this respect, Bulgaria remains the exception because, despite its 10 percent Turkish 
ethnic minority, it recognised Kosovo. That said, before Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, Bulgarian president Georgy Parvanov stated that Bulgaria would 
recognise Kosovo only if the EU took a unified stance on the issue. Ivailo Kalfin, the 
Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, further claimed that Kosovo’s independence 
would destabilise the region.
477
  
 
As Brzica and colleagues state, although no Hungarian party in Slovakia has 
articulated overtly secessionist demands, over the years they have repeatedly called 
for autonomy and devolution of power to a local level of government.
478
 However, 
Lörincz argues that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, even its most radical party – 
the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) – was unfairly accused of secessionist 
tendencies.
479
 Since 2006, the politics of the Hungarian minority representatives 
have become more radicalised and the Kosovo issue stirred the domestic political 
scene, even though the representatives of the Hungarian minority parties distanced 
themselves from any similarity with Kosovo in terms of demands. 
 
As Marušiak rightly argues, despite the fact that Slovakia is a member of the EU (the 
same also applies to Romania, where a large Hungarian minority lives)
480
 and the 
Hungarian minority has unlimited options for contacts with Hungary, the importance 
of the ‘minority agenda’ increased in Hungarian political discourse.481 Šagát points 
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out that since 2006 Slovak-Hungarian bilateral relations have once again emerged as 
an important foreign policy issue in Slovakia.
482
 As Szilágyi and Strážay put it, the 
Slovak-Hungarian relationship has consumed a lot of the time and energy of high 
ranking Slovak diplomats in recent years.
483
 
 
The literature has in the main criticised Bratislava’s opposition to Kosovo’s 
independence and considered the role of the ethnic Hungarian minority as decisive in 
its negative position to Kosovo. Lörincz argues that the Slovak view is ‘a bit beyond 
reality’, considering the evolution of the situation in Kosovo; he questions whether 
the stand of the five EU countries does not in fact negatively impact the dynamics of 
Western Balkan integration into the EU.
484
 He further states that the Slovak position 
was based on a one-sided perspective, as it looked at the case through the prism of 
minority issues and did not take into account the tragedy of Albanians in Kosovo.
485
 
In fact, Lörincz dismisses the previously officially presented violation of 
international law as a reason behind the Slovak political elite’s decision. He agrees 
with the view of a social anthropologist, Juraj Buzalka,
486
 who states that the ‘Slovak 
policy on Kosovo is primarily dictated by the fear of acceptance of multi-ethnicity in 
its own state, and so mainly by the fear of the Hungarian minority’.487 Šagát notes 
that the Kosovo issue has overshadowed other foreign political issues in Slovakia, 
arguing that ‘instead of becoming part of the solution, Slovakia became part of the 
problem’.488 In this light, he claims that through this act Slovakia destroyed its 
reputation and chance of shaping international policy in Kosovo.
489
  
 
One of the few authors supportive of the Slovak decision is Weiss, who notes that 
Slovakia faced a dilemma of how to ensure it would not be subject to a domestic and 
foreign territory contest – based on the Kosovo case – sometime in the future.490 
Several other authors highlight that the Slovak decision is based on the ethnic 
question. Dunay emphasises that Spain and some East-Central European states, such 
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as Romania and Slovakia, challenged Kosovo’s independence due to their concerns 
regarding the creation of states based on ethnicity.
 491
 Likewise, MacShane argues 
that it was the fear of ‘the nationalist claims from Budapest over the Hungarian-
speaking areas’ in Romania and Slovakia that prevented these two countries from 
recognising Kosovo’s independence; they demonstrated the EU’s inability ‘to stop 
the vulgar nationalist language of the Hungarian right as they assert claims to 
Slovakian and Romanian territory where Hungarian ethnic groups live’.492  
 
As Ker-Lindsay argues, without UN authorisation, the countries that did not 
recognise Kosovo’s independence were concerned about its implications on 
themselves.
493
 In Judah’s view, some countries remained unconvinced of the merits 
of recognising Kosovo due to their own issues. As he suggests, ‘Slovakia and 
Romania are worried about their Hungarian minorities’.494 Similarly, Perritt notes 
that the European states looked at Kosovo in relation ‘to their own intractable ethnic 
problems’.495 Regarding the challenges to European unity Perritt points out:  
 
Not only the usual suspects – Greece, Slovakia, and perhaps Spain – 
were sceptical about independence, smaller states and individual actors 
also demonstrated an unhelpful naiveté about the Kosovo problem, 
believing they could come up with some idiosyncratic solution that 
should be pursued instead of the Ahtisaari recommendation.
496
 
   
This overview demonstrates that Slovakia’s ethnic minority problem was identified 
as the most relevant argument for the Slovak stand on Kosovo. On this note, two 
points need to be highlighted. First, the impact of ethnic politics on decision-making 
in recognition issues, as was the case with the Slovak non-recognition of Kosovo, 
has not been the focus of a wide debate. For example, Richard Caplan’s book Europe 
and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia looked at the recognition policy 
applied in the 1990s by the EC (now EU) towards the new states in Yugoslavia, but 
did not address the role of states’ own ethnic political issues in decisions to 
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recognise the seceding Yugoslav republics.
497
 On the other hand, Judith Kelley 
looked at ethnic politics but not from the perspective of foreign policy decision-
making, focusing instead on how EU institutions used various norms and incentives 
to shape domestic policies towards ethnic minorities in the candidate countries, 
Slovakia included.
498
 This thesis thus contributes to this literature by examining the 
Slovak position towards Kosovo on the basis of ethnic politics and emphasises its 
impact on the decision-making process. 
 
An analysis of the political context in which Slovakia decided to refuse recognition 
of Kosovo’s statehood is also absent in the literature. The role of Hungarian 
politicians and representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia at that time 
were not taken into account. One should not look at the Kosovo issue as an isolated 
Slovak foreign political issue. To understand how the ethnic minority element could 
have had such a strong influence on the Slovak decision it needs to be put in a 
necessary context.  
 
In comparison to the previous argument about the role of political party opposition, 
which was of a tactical nature, the precedent argument can be characterised as a 
principled stance. However, to appreciate the importance of the precedent argument 
it is necessary to understand the wider political context in which the decision of 
Kosovo’s non-recognition was taken and look at relations between Slovakia, 
Hungary and the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. These factors contributed to 
the Slovak position, but a detailed analysis of this account, as undertaken in this 
thesis, is absent in the literature.  
 
Conclusion 
Since 2004, as a member of the EU and NATO, Slovakia has had a more secure and 
influential standing in terms of stating its opinions on foreign political issues. The 
Slovak minority’s position on the Kosovo issue was ‘accepted’ in the European 
Union, as the EU left it up to individual states to decide.  
                                                          
497 See Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
498 See Judith Green Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: the Power of Norms and Incentives (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
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The literature highlights five arguments that explain the position of the Slovak 
Government on the status of Kosovo. The role of political party opposition, the 
notion of Kosovo as precedent and the issue of international law have more weight 
than arguments on the historical relationship with Serbia and regional stability. 
However, key gaps remain. Although much has been written about the importance of 
the Balkans in Slovak foreign policy, the Slovak position towards Kosovo has not 
been a widely debated topic. Various academic sources identified the importance of 
precedent (the ethnic minority problem) as being decisive in terms of Slovakia’s 
non-recognition of Kosovo, but the political context in which this decision was taken 
has not been examined.  
 
The relationship between Hungary and Slovakia, particularly in terms of the 
Hungarian minority living in the latter, is a legacy of historical developments in this 
area. The evidence examined suggests that the relevance of the precedent argument 
increased through tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations, and for this reason it 
needs to be further explored. In other words, the wider context and the role of 
contingent factors in the Slovak debate on Kosovo’s independence need to be 
understood in regard to the Hungarian minority issue. 
 
Šagát argues that Slovak foreign policy has always been influenced by domestic 
politics
499
 and this seems to have some relevance. However, with the exception of 
the work of Sláviková, there is an absence of any detailed analysis of internal 
dynamics, i.e. the impact of political party opposition on the Slovak stance towards 
Kosovo. 
 
This chapter identified two principal domestic factors that shaped Slovakia’s policy 
on Kosovo: party politics (i.e. the role of political party opposition) and Slovakia’s 
own ethnic Hungarian minority. As these two factors have not been analysed in any 
depth, this thesis seeks to fill this gap and explain how they interplayed to produce 
Slovak opposition towards Kosovo’s independence. The following chapters will 
discuss the two arguments this thesis considers central to understanding Slovak 
policy on Kosovo. Chapter 4 will look at the role of political party opposition and its 
                                                          
499 Šagát, ‘Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans’, p. 50. 
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impact on the Slovak position towards Kosovo. It will also emphasise the fact that 
Kosovo became a key issue for Slovakia in its relations with the EU and other 
powers in the world because at a crucial time, it was a non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council (2006-2007). The role of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia 
and the notion of Kosovo as a precedent will be examined in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 4: Impact of Political Party Opposition on Slovakia’s 
Policy towards Kosovo’s Independence 
 
 
‘Slovakia would be absolutely key to maintaining  
European unity in the UNSC on Kosovo status […]’.500 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reflects on the key period of Slovakia’s two year membership of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006-2007, explores the Slovak 
parliamentary resolution on Kosovo, and shows why the Slovak position on Kosovo 
became a domestic political issue used by political parties – particularly their leaders 
– as a tactical tool to regain or remain in power. At the same time, it demonstrates 
the pressure coming from the external environment, particularly the US and EU, 
illustrating how the decision was taken to resist it on the back of domestic political 
factors. The objective is to show how significant pressure by major external powers 
on a country, particularly a small state, does not always produce the desired, if not 
expected, results. Furthermore, the chapter emphasises that small states, despite their 
size and power, can still pursue an independent policy regardless of external 
pressures. 
 
On 28 March 2007, the Parliament of Slovakia – the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic – surprised the US and EU when it passed a Declaration on Kosovo’s status 
refusing to recognise Kosovo’s independence without Belgrade’s consent. This was 
one of the most significant foreign policy decisions taken by Slovakia since 
independence. The Declaration bound the Slovak government to a reserved position 
towards Kosovo’s statehood that went against the initial policy of the Ministry of 
                                                          
500 US UN Political Minister-Counsellor William Brencick was reported to note during his meeting with the 
Political Coordinator of Slovakia’s Diplomatic Team on the UN Security Council, Michal Mlynár. See ‘Slovakia 
will not discuss status issues during UNSC UNMIK meeting’, US mission UN New York, reference ID 
07USUNNEWYORK, 17 March 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/03/07USUNNEWYORK215.html> 
[accessed 3 May 2012]. 
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Foreign Affairs (MFA), which was supportive of the Ahtisaari plan favouring a 
conditional recognition of Kosovo. As a result, the MFA was left in a very difficult 
position navigating between conflicting pressures from the external and domestic 
environments. 
 
The Slovak Parliament’s decision was puzzling not only because it went against the 
view of the Slovak MFA. Slovakia, as a member of the EU and NATO, was 
traditionally a strong ally of the US and had established a tradition of siding with its 
EU and US partners on foreign political issues.
501
 However, the biggest surprise was 
that the debate on Kosovo was initiated by Mikuláš Dzurinda, the leader of the 
Slovak opposition, who had, during his two terms as Prime Minister (1998-2002, 
2002-2006), always been seen as closely aligned to US positions. For instance, in 
1999, despite strong public opposition, Dzurinda’s government opened Slovak 
airspace for the NATO bombing of Serbia.
502
 Similarly, in 2003, his government 
supported the military action against Iraq; as in 1999, this was not backed by a UN 
mandate. Clearly, on both occasions, Slovakia aligned itself with its Western 
partners despite public sentiments. However, following the unveiling of the Ahtisaari 
plan, Dzurinda took a tactical step and challenged the government by arguing that 
Kosovo should not be granted independence without Belgrade’s consent, and that 
Slovakia should be ready to stand outside the EU mainstream. Thus, Slovakia’s 
resistance to recognise an independent Kosovo came as a surprise. What made this 
resistance not just surprising but also significant was the fact that Slovakia was a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time. It was therefore directly involved 
in the debates on the future status of Kosovo. This fact considerably increased 
Bratislava’s importance.  
 
Analysis of the interactions between the international actors, the Slovak MFA and 
the Slovak Parliament will explain why Slovakia implemented the non-recognition 
policy despite initial, albeit private, indications from the MFA that Slovakia would 
be willing to support Kosovo’s independence.  
                                                          
501 As a Senior European diplomat put it, ‘Slovakia, up to that point [Slovak Parliament’s Declaration on 
Kosovo] had pursued a line of being in the EU mainstream. Slovaks continued to be very anxious and nervous 
about departing from the EU mainstream’. Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. In 
light of this, an anonymous source also noted: ‘We [Slovakia] are strong in collective but not as an individual’. 
502 This point was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
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4.1 The Ahtisaari Process and UNSC Debates on Kosovo  
The end of 2005 marked two important moments. First, on 10 October, Slovakia was 
elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period 2006-2007.
503
 
Secondly, on 10 November, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was approved 
by the UNSC as the Special Envoy for the future status process of Kosovo.
504
 
Significantly, the Slovak membership in the SC coincided with the duration of the 
Kosovo status talks led by Ahtisaari; thus, the Slovak involvement in the Kosovo 
debate was crucial. The then Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Kukan, 
even stated that ‘it is a happy coincidence that exactly during our time in the SC,  
issues where we want to be active […] and where it is expected from us that we will 
be active will be decided. And that is exactly Kosovo’.505 Due to Slovakia’s 
membership in the UNSC and its knowledge about the region, Ahtisaari officially 
travelled twice to Bratislava in 2006 to meet with Slovak MFA representatives – in 
April with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kukan, and later in November with the 
Director of the Political Section at the MFA, Lajčák.506  
 
Indeed, when Slovakia assumed its Security Council seat in January 2006, the 
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that priority attention would be given to 
the Western Balkans, particularly to the issue of Kosovo’s status.507 This emphasis 
                                                          
503 In the UN General Assembly, Slovakia was elected to the UNSC by 185 votes out of 191 cast. This support by 
an overwhelming majority of UN members was considered a considerable success for Slovak diplomacy. ‘Slovak 
candidacy and election to the seat of a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council for the 2006-2007 
term of office’, Press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, accessed 18 March 2007. 
504 See ‘Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-
General’, UN Security Council Document, S/2005/709, 10 November 2005. The Annex of the letter included ten 
guiding principles agreed by the Contact Group that were to be considered as a basis for the final decision on the 
future status of Kosovo. Importantly, Principle 6 stated: ‘The settlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen 
regional security and stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. 
Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. There will be no changes in 
the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of 
any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected’.  
505 ‘Eduard Kukan: Dohoda o rozpočte únie je možná’, Hospodárske Noviny, 26 October 2005. 
506 As Ahtisaari explained in April 2006, it was important for him to visit Bratislava because ‘first of all Slovakia 
is extremely knowledgeable about the region. Secondly, Slovakia is a member of all the important organizations 
European Union, NATO, OSCE, and is at the moment also in the Security Council’. See ‘Statement by Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari during his joint press conference with Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan of Slovakia’, 21 
April 2006, Bratislava, available at <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/pressconf.html> [accessed 5 May 2012]. 
But perhaps one could argue that the Slovak experience in the region was not fully appreciated and used in 
solving the Kosovo question. Also having in mind a comment made in the 2007 Annual Report of the Slovak 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘it is often the small states which are able to offer and mediate solutions where large 
countries have failed to do so’, more could have been done in using the Slovak potential. ‘Annual Report. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic: Foreign Policy in 2007’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2008, p. 11. 
507 ‘Slovakia’s membership in the UN Security Council (2006-2007)’, Press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Slovak Republic, accessed 18 March 2007. Other areas of Slovak interest on the SC included Cyprus, 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Later in June 2006, Slovakia opened a Liaison office in Pristina, as due to 
its SC membership it wanted to be informed and have closer contact with Kosovo. Slovak diplomatic 
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reflected the considerable experience that many Slovak diplomats had with the 
region, which had become a long term Slovak foreign policy priority. In the 1990s, 
Slovakia was involved in the Balkans through the so called ‘Bratislava process’ 
(1999-2002), which organised meetings between the Serbian opposition and non-
governmental organisations on ‘neutral’ territory of Bratislava to facilitate 
discussions about the removal of Milošević’s regime.508 During this time, Eduard 
Kukan, the then Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Envoy to the Balkans (1999-2001). Another key actor was Miroslav Lajčák. 
A former Slovak Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia 
and Montenegro), Albania and Macedonia (2001-2005), as Personal Representative 
of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy he oversaw 
the Montenegrin referendum on independence in 2006; he undertook this task 
together with František Lipka, another Slovak diplomat, who served as the 
Referendum Commission President (Chairman of the Electoral Commission). After 
2006, Slovak diplomatic activity in the Balkans remained high, when Lajčák became 
the High Representative/EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2007-2009). More recently, Lajčák was Managing Director for Russia, Eastern 
Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans in the European External Action Service 
(2010-2012) – a post considered one of the most important within the Service.509 For 
these reasons, Slovakia clearly had considerable experience with the Western 
Balkans, and thus was likely to take a strong position in the debate on Kosovo’s 
status.  
 
Ahtisaari’s main mandate was to resolve Kosovo’s status after a number of years 
under the rule of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), which was established in Kosovo following the 1999 NATO bombing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
representative, comments to the author, 26 October 2009. The Liaison office operates as a branch of the Slovak 
Embassy in Belgrade and is accredited to the UNMIK, established under UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). 
508 For more on the Bratislava Process, see Miroslav Mojžita, Belehrad: Poznámky 1995 - 2001 (Bratislava: 
Dilema, 2003). Mojžita was Slovak Ambassador to Belgrade between 1997 and 2001. Currently, he is 
Ambassador to Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
509 See ‘EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints two Managing Directors for the External Action 
Service’, European Union Press Release, A 258/10, Brussels, 14 December 2010. In April 2012, Lajčák was 
appointed the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs. In any case, Slovakia continues to be actively involved in the 
region; for instance, most recently, since January 2013 the Slovak Embassy in Serbia has served as a contact 
NATO Embassy in Belgrade. However, as Lajčák confirmed, Slovakia has no plans to interfere in Belgrade’s 
relationship with NATO. As for Serbia’s interest in becoming a member of NATO, Serbian President Tomislav 
Nikolić clearly stated that he would never propose it even if Serbs themselves would ever wish so. ‘Slovensko 
preberá úlohu kontaktnej ambasády NATO v Srbsku’, TA3, 6 January 2013.  
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against Serbia.
510
 UNMIK was created under Resolution 1244 (1999) in order to 
oversee Kosovo until its status would be settled. However, the resolution was not 
specific in giving direct time frames or stating what the final settlement should look 
like. More importantly, it confirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
511
 Violent riots in Kosovo in 2004 exposed the 
necessity to deal with Kosovo’s final status. Washington’s message to Pristina was 
that the final result would be independence, so Kosovo Albanians had no intention to 
consider any other alternative than independence. Taking this into consideration, 
negotiations on Kosovo’s status aimed to validate a decision made long before the 
start of the talks and provide a cover for Serbia’s anticipated loss.512  
 
Between February 2006 and March 2007, Ahtisaari led status talks between Belgrade 
and Pristina; however, after a year of negotiations no agreement was reached 
between the parties on the final settlement of the province.
513
 It was evident that 
Kosovo Albanians would not agree to anything other than independence. However, 
this was unacceptable to Serbia. As far as the US was concerned, it openly supported 
Ahtisaari’s efforts for Kosovo’s independence. This had a major impact. As an EU 
Commission official noted, ‘if you have the US behind your back then you don’t 
want anything else, no other alternative’. Significantly, he added, ‘in the middle, it’s 
full of options, but get me a set of politicians from each side [Kosovo and Serbia] 
who would do it, who would compromise, and then go back to their country and get 
re-elected. It would not happen’.514 Despite the existence of these options, Ahtisaari 
was from the very beginning clear on what he considered should be the final 
settlement – there was no alternative to independence.515 This not only raised 
                                                          
510 For a detailed account of NATO’s air campaign, see Michael McCgwire, ‘Why did we bomb Belgrade?’, 
International Affairs, 76 (2000), 1-23. 
511 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999. 
512 Doug Bandow, ‘Washington’s Destabilising Crusade’, in Kosovo: The Score 1999-2009 (Washington D.C: 
The American Council for Kosovo and The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, 2009), pp. 21-30 (p. 24). 
513 For two different views on the Ahtisaari plan, see James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested 
Statehood in the Balkans (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2009) and Henry H. Perritt Jr., The Road to 
Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
514 European Commission official, comments to the author, July 2010. A point raised by this official in order to 
resolve Kosovo’s status was the need for finding some ‘face-saving formula’ for the Serbs. 
515 A Senior Slovak diplomat noted that he was very disappointed about how Ahtisaari led the status talks. ‘The 
destiny of Kosovo was decided during the NATO operation. US then said that Kosovo would become 
independent and the Kosovars did not want to accept anything else’. He also suggested that the status could have 
been solved if some influential world figure would have been involved in it. Comments to the author, July 2010. 
For a comprehensive analysis of Ahtisaari’s role in the negotiations and his perceptions of Kosovo’s 
independence, see James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The Importance of Process in Peacemaking’, Peace Review: A Journal of 
Social Justice, 22 (2010), 57-64; and Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo, particularly pp. 110-13. 
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questions about his impartiality,
516
 it also made the search for consensus within the 
UNSC more difficult. An anonymous observer noted that, from the start, Ahtisaari 
had emphasised that he had a one year mandate for resolving Kosovo’s status and 
was not interested in extending the status talks. As Ahtisaari confirmed, already in 
November 2005 he had told the Serbian Prime Minister Koštunica that he had lost 
Kosovo.
517
 Ahtisaari’s approach to the status talks was perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated by a comment he made on mediation and peace talks: ‘Without 
exception, if you cannot have the US government behind your back, you can go 
home’.518 
 
During the UNSC debates between February 2006 and December 2007, it became 
clear that there were two groups among the permanent members. The first group, 
made up of the US, the UK and France, emphasised that Kosovo was a ‘special 
case’. The status decision was to be reached during 2006 and needed to be accepted 
by the population of Kosovo. For example, during the SC debates, the UK 
representative to the UN noted that ‘independence is an option for Kosovo – some 
would say that it is the only option that will bring lasting peace and security to the 
region’.519 In December 2006, the UK openly stressed the growing likelihood of 
                                                          
516 It is perhaps telling that Ahtisaari even considered himself ‘half American’. Between 1977 and 1991 Ahtisaari 
lived in New York. See ‘Ambassador Barrett meets with former Finnish President Ahtisaari’, US Embassy 
Helsinki, reference ID 08Helsinki270, 24 June 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08HELSINKI 
270.html> [accessed 4 June 2012]. Notably, Ahtisaari himself did not agree that a mediator has to be neutral. He 
asked rhetorically: ‘Neutral from what?’ Rather, he considered that a mediator needs to be ‘an honest broker’. 
‘An afternoon with Martti Ahtisaari’, Public event, London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 
November 2012. 
517 ‘An afternoon with Martti Ahtisaari’, Public event, London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 
November 2012. In fact, Ahtisaari was quite blunt in his message to the Russians. As he noted, he had said to 
them: ‘You better tell the Serbs that if they want to join the EU, they better recognise Kosovo’. In this respect, 
Miroslav Lajčák, the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, commented that unlike the split of Czechoslovakia 
which was ‘good and friendly’, in the cases of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, ‘part of the problem was 
that somebody else wanted to tell you what’s better for you’. Responding to a question from the audience asking 
for ‘advice’ to English people in respect to the planned 2014 referendum on Scottish independence – from the 
perspective of the Slovak experience – Lajčák, emphasising he did not want to give advice, nevertheless made a 
significant comment in relation to England’s view on the issue: ‘Listen to your partners, ask them what makes 
them feeling uncomfortable. Don’t try to answer for them; don’t tell them what’s better for them. You might 
believe in that but everybody should know what’s best for them’. In light of Lajčák’s latter comment, had this 
approach been adopted also with Kosovo, would the status have been solved by now? ‘EU on a Cross-road and 
the Future of Our European Project – a View from Central Europe’, Lecture with Miroslav Lajčák, LSE 
European Institute Perspectives on Europe, London School of Economics and Political Science, 13 February 
2013.   
518 ‘An afternoon with Martti Ahtisaari’, Public event, London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 
November 2012. As one anonymous source told the author, the outcome of the status talks was clear from the 
start and the way Ahtisaari led the talks was ‘an example of how not to do it’. As this source explained, 
‘Ahtisaari didn’t show an indication of compromise; he didn’t understand the situation and the mentality’. As a 
result of this complete lack of understanding, both sides – Belgrade and Pristina – were just fighting over ‘how 
not to agree’.  
519 5522nd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5522, 13 September 2006, p. 
15. 
117 
 
independence.
520
 The second group, consisting of Russia and China, supported ‘no 
strict time frames’, and emphasised the need to respect international law (including 
UN Resolution 1244) and Serbia’s territorial integrity. They also stressed the 
necessity of endorsing any decision on Kosovo’s status through a new SC resolution. 
In contrast to the US, Russia considered 2006 as an artificial target for settling 
Kosovo’s status and argued that a solution could not be imposed on Belgrade.521 For 
Russia, independence of Kosovo without Belgrade’s consent was not acceptable due 
to violation of international law, given that Resolution 1244 recognised Kosovo as 
Serbian territory.
522
 Matters were further complicated by the issue of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, which the West continued to see as inalienable parts of the Republic 
of Georgia.
523
 As Fawn notes, Russia strongly objected to the application of Western 
double standards to Kosovo. While Western governments frequently insisted that 
they respected the inviolability of all state boundaries, they considered Serbia an 
exception.
524
  
 
The differences between Ahtisaari and Moscow became evident during the UNSC 
debates on Kosovo. During a closed meeting in July 2006 Ahtisaari briefed the SC 
on his progress in overseeing the Kosovo status process.
525
 As a leaked US cable 
revealed, at the end of these consultations there was an exchange of arguments 
between Ahtisaari and the Russian representative, Vitaly Churkin. Ahtisaari argued 
that the violence against Kosovars during the Milošević period could not be 
forgotten, whereas Churkin commented that repressions during Milošević should be 
                                                          
520 5588th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5588, 13 December 2006. 
521 5373rd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5373, 14 February 2006. 
522 The US was aware of the legal difficulties presented in the case of Kosovo. A leaked US cable reporting on a 
meeting, held on 25 April 2006 between UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the US Special Representative 
for the Kosovo Final Status Talks, Ambassador Frank Wisner, notes how Wisner confirmed the US believed that 
the status would be completed in 2006 and that Ahtisaari’s report would be approved by the UNSC, making it ‘a 
chapeau under which Kosovo could become independent’. Significantly, Wisner was reported to comment that 
‘one question to be addressed was precedent for the UN disassembling a legally sovereign nation.  It would be 
necessary to study whether there was anything useful in past cases such as East Timor’. However, Annan did not 
consider East Timor or Ethiopia/Eritrea cases applicable as both included referenda and in the case of Kosovo the 
international community would be ‘acting by fiat’. See ‘Ambassador Wisner discusses Kosovo status process 
with Secretary General Annan’, US mission at UN New York, reference ID 06USUNNEWYORK882, 27 April 
2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06USUNNEWYORK882.html> [accessed 6 May 2012]. 
523 James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Between “Pragmatism” and “Constitutionalism”: EU-Russian Dynamics and Differences 
during the Kosovo Status Process’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 7 (2011), 175-94 (p. 184). In 
August 2008, after a military conflict, Russia eventually recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ‘Russia 
recognised Abkhazian & South Ossetian independence’, RT TV, 26 August 2008. For more details on these two 
cases of contested session, see James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the 
Recognition of Contested States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 47-53. 
524 Rick Fawn, ‘The Kosovo-Montenegro-effect’, International Affairs, 84 (2008), 269-94 (p. 292). 
525 ‘Official communiqué of the 5485th (closed) meeting of the Security Council’, UN Security Council 
Document, S/PV.5485, 13 July 2006. 
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dealt with in The Hague and not during the status process. According to this cable, 
Ahtisaari claimed that the status process could not be separated from the history of 
the region.
526
 On a different occasion, in May 2006, when Ahtisaari briefed the 
Contact Group along with Greece, Slovakia and Denmark, he was reported to note 
that his answer to Serbian political leaders’ arguments that Serbia should not be 
punished for Milošević was: ‘nor should you be rewarded’.527  
 
As far as Slovakia was concerned, in the SC in 2006 it occupied middle ground on 
the question of Kosovo’s status and refrained from any direct statements on the 
option of Kosovo’s independence. While it confirmed support for the Ahtisaari 
process, it advocated a compromise between the parties.
528
 Peter Burian, the Slovak 
representative to the UN, highlighted the significance of refraining from any type of 
statements which would give the impression that the outcome of the status talks was 
predetermined.
529
 This point was repeatedly mentioned during the SC meetings. 
Mainly, Burian emphasised that Kosovo’s future status should be disconnected from 
other developments, so that it would not serve as a precedent for other conflict 
situations. In the UNSC Slovakia advocated a solution taking into account both 
Belgrade’s and Pristina’s concerns and expressed belief that all options for the status 
outcome should remain on the table.
530
 Similarly to Russia, Slovakia supported 
longer-lasting negotiations and was not in favour of a quick final settlement.
531
 
However, in general terms, it appeared as though Slovakia was in alignment with its 
key Western partners. As will be discussed in the next section, in private meetings 
with US officials Slovak representatives expressed support for Kosovo’s 
independence.   
 
                                                          
526 ‘Special Envoy Ahtisaari briefs UNSC on Kosovo future status talks’, US mission UN New York, reference 
ID 06USUNNEWYORK1378, 18 July 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06USUNNEWYORK 
1378.html> [accessed 2 May 2012]. 
527 ‘UNMIK/Kosovo: Ahtisaari Briefs Contact Group’, US mission UN New York, reference ID 
USUNNEWYORK1010, 18 May 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06USUNNEWYORK1010.html> 
[accessed 6 May 2012]. 
528 See 5522nd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5522, 13 September 2006, 
p. 16; 5588th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5588, 13 December 2006, 
p. 15. 
529 5373rd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5373, p. 18. Peter Burian was 
Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the UNSC (2006-2007). Following this post he was Slovak Ambassador 
to the US (2008-2012) and since April 2012 has served as the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Slovak Republic.  
530 5373rd Meeting of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document, S/PV.5373, pp. 18-19. 
531 As Eduard Kukan, former Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted, more time was needed for the 
negotiations and more work was required on the final status. Comments to the author, 13 July 2010. 
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As predicted, the status talks led by Ahtisaari brought no progress on the final status. 
In early February 2007, Ahtisaari presented his proposals for a final settlement to 
Pristina and Belgrade. As expected, he appeared to recommend independence. In 
response, and despite the private indications of support for independence from within 
the Slovak MFA, Slovakia now started to voice its reservations about the proposal. 
The key factor for this change was the growing opposition to Kosovo’s 
independence by the Slovak opposition, which had initiated a parliamentary debate 
on the topic, scheduled for the end of March 2007. As a result, Ján Kubiš, the Slovak 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, needed to reflect domestic developments. In February 
2007, at the regular monthly meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) in Brussels, he insisted that a sentence ‘welcoming’ Ahtisaari’s 
proposals was cut from the GAERC conclusions, an initiative supported by Cyprus. 
Ministers expressed support for Ahtisaari in further negotiations but left the status 
question open.
532
 
 
Officially, the impact of the Slovak domestic situation was not mentioned as a reason 
for this decision. After all, the parliamentary debate on Kosovo was scheduled to 
take place the following month. The diplomatic explanation of the Slovak position 
was presented by a member of the Slovak delegation at GAERC who explained that 
the process was still open and that welcoming the proposals at that stage would be 
‘as if we [Slovakia] would say that it has already decided about the independence of 
Kosovo’.533 For its part, Cyprus was reserved towards Kosovo’s independence due to 
its concerns about the implications that Kosovo could have for its efforts to prevent 
the international recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.534 
However, privately Slovak officials were keen to stress that the positions of the two 
countries should not be linked. This became even more evident as 2007 progressed. 
                                                          
532 ‘Kubiš: Kosovo áno. Fico: Nie’, SME, 13 February 2007, p. 2; ‘Ministri zahraničných vecí EÚ v Bruseli 
podporili plán splnomocnenca OSN M. Ahtisaariho o budúcom štatúte Kosova’, STV 2, News and Comments, 13 
February 2007. For the GAERC conclusions on Western Balkans, see ‘General Affairs and External Relations’, 
Council of the European Union, 2780th Council Meeting, Press release 6039/07 (Presse 18), Brussels, 12 
February 2007, p. 13. 
533 ‘Kubiš: Kosovo áno. Fico: Nie’, SME, 13 February 2007, p. 2.  
534 ‘Saying ‘No’ to Kosovo independence’, BBC News, 5 March 2008. For a better understanding and a 
comprehensive account of the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, see James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus 
Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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Slovak representatives believed that it was crucial that Slovakia and Cyprus should 
not be seen to be the only two EU states against Kosovo’s independence.535  
 
In March 2007, following a further round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina, 
Ahtisaari presented the final status proposal. As expected, he announced that 
independence was the only option for Kosovo.
536
 For Serbia this was not acceptable 
and Russia took the same line. In contrast, the US and major EU countries – the UK, 
France and Germany – supported Ahtisaari’s proposal. However, along with 
Slovakia and Cyprus, a number of other EU members – including Romania, Greece 
and Spain – were now also expressing concern about Kosovo’s independence. 
Therefore, the EU Council was not able to support Ahtisaari’s report.537  
 
By now the Slovak Parliament had discussed Kosovo and had passed a declaration 
on Kosovo’s status effectively confirming that Slovakia would not support Kosovo’s 
unlimited independence without Serbia’s consent.538 This was a crucial step as 
parliamentary declarations are binding for the Slovak government. As a result, Kubiš 
could not express strong support for the Ahtisaari plan at the late March 2007 
‘Gymnich’ – the informal meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers – in Bremen. 
Indeed, he found it difficult to explain the Slovak Parliament’s Declaration to other 
ministers, many of whom were surprised by the decision.
539
 However, Slovakia was 
certainly not isolated over Kosovo. In addition, Greece, Romania, Spain, Italy and 
Cyprus also expressed in Bremen their reservations towards Kosovo’s supervised 
independence.
540
 In view of the number of reservations voiced by EU members, the 
EU foreign affairs ministers could not agree on a joint position.
541
 The disunity over 
                                                          
535 See ‘Ambassador’s courtesy call with foreign minister Kubiš’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
08Bratislava1, 2 January 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08BRATISLAVA1.html> [accessed 6 May 
2012]. This was also confirmed by two anonymous sources. 
536 ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, UN Security Council 
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Kosovo’s status. See Spyros Economides, ‘The making of a failed stated: the case of Kosovo’, European View, 
10 (2011), 195-200 (p. 196). 
537 See ‘Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan’, International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 
182, 14 May 2007, p. 10. 
538 The factors that shaped this decision will be explored later in the chapter.  
539 ‘Slovakia’s stance on Kosovo exceptional in EU’, Serbianna.com, 2 April 2007. 
540 Ekrem Krasniqi and Renáta Goldírová, ‘EU ministers to avoid Kosovo question amid ongoing disunity’, 
EUobserver.com, 19 April 2007. 
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Bremen’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 March 2007.  
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Kosovo also meant that the topic of Kosovo’s statehood was taken off the agenda of 
the 23 April 2007 EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Luxembourg.542  
 
It was not only the EU that could not agree on Kosovo’s status. Deep differences had 
emerged in the Security Council. A number of efforts were made by Britain, France 
and the United States to draft a resolution on Kosovo acceptable to all SC members. 
These failed due to strong Russian opposition.
543
 Eventually, in August 2007, in a 
final attempt to broker a deal, it was agreed that a Troika made of three senior US, 
EU and Russian diplomats would lead a final round of talks between Pristina and 
Belgrade. This led to some innovative thinking.
544
 For example, Wolfgang Ischinger, 
the EU representative in the Troika, proposed a solution based on the informal 
relationship that existed between the two Germanys during the Cold War.
545
 Given 
the diametrically opposed views of Belgrade and Pristina, it came as no surprise that 
the final Troika report, forwarded to the UNSC in December 2007, concluded that no 
agreement was reached between the parties on Kosovo’s status.546 Prior to the last 
SC debate on Kosovo in 2007, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian representative, circulated 
among the members a draft SC resolution which supported further negotiations 
between the parties. However, the UK, US and France stated that options for 
dialogue were exhausted and the time had come to solve the Kosovo question.
547
 On 
19 December, the SC met for a closed discussion on the Troika report but, as 
expected, there was no breakthrough.
548
 Considering the deep divisions among SC 
members, no agreement was reached. After two years, status talks ended in deadlock. 
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544 Kubiš told the press after his December 2007 visit of Belgrade that Serbian officials considered the Troika 
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546 ‘Letter dated 10 December 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council’, UN 
Security Council Document, S/2007/723, 10 December 2007. Enclosed was ‘Report of the European 
Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo’, 4 December 2007. 
547 ‘Kosovo: Pred BR OSN vystúpi srbský premiér aj kosovský prezidet‘, SME, 15 December 2007. 
548 ‘Official communiqué of the 5811th (closed) meeting of the Security Council’, UN Security Council 
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For the EU, the disunity within the SC had severe consequences. While it was able to 
reach unity over the deployment of the EU’s largest civilian crisis management 
mission (EULEX), which would eventually take over many of the functions from 
UNMIK following the now expected unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo,
549
 on the crucial question of recognition of Kosovo, there was no joint 
position. Without a UN resolution, it was likely that EU countries would each 
respond in their own way to the expected unilateral declaration of independence by 
Kosovo. Certainly, Slovakia’s position was a key contributing factor to this lack of 
unity. However, Slovakia was by no means alone; four other EU countries were of 
the same opinion. Moreover, as a Slovak representative in Brussels noted, ‘we 
cannot say now that Slovakia is there to be blamed for the non-unity in the EU. We 
could then turn it and say that those 22 countries are to be blamed’.550 
 
The next two sections will look closely at the evolvement of the Slovak 
government’s position on Kosovo throughout 2006-2007 and the parliamentary 
debate leading to the passing of the Slovak Parliament’s Declaration on Kosovo’s 
status. 
 
4.2 Position of the Slovak Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – 
Coping with the Pressure to Align with the US 
In 2006, particularly during the first half of the year, the Slovak political scene did 
not pay much attention to Kosovo’s status. Indeed, one author commented that it was 
‘relatively passive’ on the question of status.551 As Milan Ježovica, former foreign 
                                                          
549 ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Council of the European Union, 16616/07, Brussels, 14 December 2007. See also, 
‘Európski lídri: Postrážime Kosovo’, SME, 15 December 2007. Interestingly, the Council of the EU took joint 
action to establish EULEX before Kosovo’s declaration of independence, on 4 February 2008. See ‘Council Joint 
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Status Talks’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 15 (2010), 495-510.  
550 Peter Mišík, Ambassador, Representative to the Political and Security Committee, Permanent Representation 
of the Slovak Republic to the EU, comments to the author, 14 July 2010. 
551 See Elemír Nečej, ‘Západný Balkán: štiepenie a integrácia’, in Ľubomír Ľupták, Alexander Hersi, Róbert 
Ondrejcsák and Vladimír Tarasovič (eds), Panoráma globálneho bezpečnostného prostredia 2005-2006 
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political advisor to Prime Minister Dzurinda noted, in 2006 there was no wider 
debate on Kosovo and there was ‘no order’ to discuss this topic in Slovakia.552 
Unlike in 1999, when Kosovo became an emotional matter due to Slovak aspirations 
to join NATO, Slovaks were in general virtually uninterested in the topic of 
Kosovo’s independence.553 Significantly, 2006 was a year of parliamentary elections 
in Slovakia, and as Ježovica suggested, there was no reason for Kosovo being a key 
topic in the electoral campaign.
554
  
 
A number of leaked cables from the US Embassy in Bratislava reporting on meetings 
between US diplomats and Slovak officials, including members of the MFA as well 
as political leaders, show that the US was keen to ensure that Bratislava followed 
Washington’s line on Kosovo. During 2006, the chances that this would happen 
appeared to be good. From the wires discussed below it is evident that, throughout 
2006, the Slovak MFA effectively signalled its commitment to support the Ahtisaari 
mission that was evidently designed to lead towards Kosovo’s independence.  
 
Early into its UNSC membership, the US urged Slovakia to become actively 
engaged in SC issues, including one of the Slovak priorities for the Council, namely 
Kosovo. It was expected that a SC resolution on Kosovo would be passed during 
Slovakia’s term on the SC, and the US encouraged Slovaks to engage Serbs on the 
need for a resolution. This was communicated in March 2006 when Kristen 
Silverberg, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations for the 
United States government, visited Bratislava to discuss the UNSC agenda with 
Slovak MFA officials.
555
 At the beginning of the Ahtisaari process, the US could not 
openly state that independence was the only way ahead. However, when in April 
2006, Rosemary DiCarlo, the United States’ Deputy Assistant Secretary in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Bratislava: Odbor bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky, 2006), pp. 197-
216 (p. 214); and Elemír Nečej, ‘Západný Balkán’, in Ľubomír Ľupták and colleagues (ed.), Panoráma 
globálneho bezpečnostného prostredia 2006-2007 (Bratislava: Odbor bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky 
Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky, 2007), pp. 133-45 (p. 142). 
552 Milan Ježovica, comments to the author, 29 June 2012. Ježovica was Dzurinda’s advisor between 2003 and 
2006. 
553 Oľga Gyarfášová, comments to the author, 7 April 2011. As she noted, despite the fact that the ‘awareness’ of 
Slovak public in terms of foreign political issues increased over the recent years it is still not of great interest to 
the people.  
554 Milan Ježovica, comments to the author, 29 June 2012. 
555 ‘A/S Silverberg visit to Bratislava: Slovakia holds middle ground on UNSC issues’, US Embassy Bratislava, 
reference ID 06Bratislava192, 8 March 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06BRATISLAVA192.html> 
[accessed 15 March 2012].  
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Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, visited Bratislava, her message to the 
Slovak MFA officials was very clear. She was reported to have noted that ‘the US 
does not see an option for Kosovo other than independence’. However, as she also 
explained, the US could not publicly state it, for Belgrade needed time to adjust.
556
 
Considering the Slovak membership in the UNSC, the US planned to look to 
Slovakia for support of the resolutions on the final status of Kosovo. For their part, 
Slovak MFA representatives expressed their alignment with the US view. For 
instance, Štefan Rozkopal, the then Director for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the Balkans at the Slovak MFA, commented during the meeting with 
DiCarlo that ‘some kind of conditional independence is inevitable’, however, it was 
not just the final status but rather the process itself that was Slovakia’s priority.557 A 
similar message was conveyed during another meeting with Lawrence R. Silverman, 
then the US Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Bratislava. Slovak MFA officials 
confirmed their support for Ahtisaari’s mission and agreed with US messages to 
Belgrade and Pristina. Marcel Peško, the UNSC Coordinator at the Slovak MFA, 
was reported to have noted during the meeting that ‘Slovakia is “99 percent” in 
accordance with US views, only differing slightly in regard to the desired speed of 
the Ahtisaari process’.558 A wire also reported Peško saying that the Slovak 
government shared the US view ‘that independence was probably the most realistic 
status outcome’.559 Reports from these meetings also indicate that Slovak officials 
were keen to emphasise that they were not ‘pro-Serb’ but were instead concerned 
about the ‘spillover effect’ of Kosovo’s independence.560   
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Following the 17 June 2006 parliamentary elections,
561
 Róbert Fico from SMER-SD 
became the new Prime Minister leading a coalition of three parties: SMER-SD, ĽS-
HZDS and SNS. Direction-Social Democracy (SMER-SD), a centre-left party which 
considers itself ideologically close to the British Labour Party or the German SPD, 
was established in 1999 by Fico who has been its leader since.
562
 The party’s original 
name was SMER (Direction) and it was established as a breakaway from the Party of 
the Democratic Left (SDĽ) in reaction to Fico’s disagreement with SDĽ’s 
governmental cooperation with Dzurinda’s party SDK after the 1998 elections.563 In 
2003, it changed its name to SMER (Tretia cesta) (Direction (Third Way)). Two 
years later, it took over SDĽ and two centre-left parties – Social Democratic 
Alternative and Social Democratic Party of Slovakia – and adopted its current name. 
Its new coalition partner, the People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(ĽS-HZDS), was established in 1991 by Vladimír Mečiar, who led the final talks on 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia with the Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus. The 
party dominated the Slovak political scene between 1994 and 1998. During Mečiar’s 
term as Prime Minister, Slovakia was not invited to be part of the first wave of 
eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO; Mečiar was considered a populist and 
viewed critically from abroad. However, in 2000, in order to overcome its bad 
reputation and change its image, his party supported a fast integration of Slovakia 
into the EU and NATO.
564
 The second coalition partner of SMER-SD was the 
Slovak National Party (SNS) led by Ján Slota. SNS, perceived as a nationalist party, 
was sometimes also considered ultra-nationalist
565
 due to controversial comments 
towards the ethnic Hungarian minority and the Roma, expressed mostly by its leader 
Slota. SNS and the ethnic Hungarian party SMK repeatedly had a number of 
conflicts.  
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As a result of its decision to form an alliance with ‘the extreme nationalist SNS’, 
SMER-SD was criticised at EU level and suspended for two years from membership 
in the Party of European Socialists (PES).
566
 Furthermore, it was frowned upon that 
SMER-SD reached an agreement with the ĽS-HZDS as its leader, Vladimír Mečiar, 
was also viewed negatively in European circles following his term as Prime Minster 
in the 1990s.
567
 Ján Kubiš, the former Secretary General of the OSCE, succeeded 
Eduard Kukan as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
568
 and took the lead on trying to 
explain diplomatically SMER-SD’s choice of coalition partners. 
 
In regards to Kosovo, Kubiš continued to be supportive of the Ahtisaari plan. 
Despite the fact that Fico did not favour Kosovo’s independence, Kubiš had Fico’s 
support. The US Ambassador in Bratislava, Vallee, briefed after his first meeting 
with the new Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs that Kubiš had stressed ‘continuity’ 
as a theme of the Slovak relationship with the EU, NATO and the US.
569
 As a result, 
the US did not expect any changes to the Slovak MFA policy stand taken so far 
towards Kosovo. A dispatch from the US Embassy in Bratislava on a meeting 
between Ambassador Vallee and the Political Director of the MFA, Miroslav Lajčák, 
concerning Kubiš’s August 2006 visit to the Balkans, highlighted the extent to which 
Kubiš’s statements appeared to indicate that the Slovak government would support 
Ahtisaari and the eventual independence of Kosovo. According to the cable, Kubiš 
said to the Serbs that ‘the train had left the station, and the end of the journey was 
independence for Kosovo’.570 The dispatch also reports Lajčák saying that Serbs 
were surprised by this kind of message and that the former MFA Kukan never spoke 
so openly. However, as he also noted, Slovakia could be direct because it had 
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Serbia’s trust.571 In any case, as these statements demonstrate, in 2006 the Slovak 
MFA’s view on Kosovo appeared to be clear, and was communicated to Belgrade 
and Pristina. 
 
The question was the degree to which the views expressed by the MFA represented 
the views of the government as a whole. Under usual circumstances, it would be 
expected that the MFA speaks for the government. Moreover, Prime Minister Fico 
was primarily focused on Slovak domestic politics and as such left the foreign policy 
agenda to Kubiš. However, there were certain indications that Prime Minister Fico 
and President Gašparovič did not agree with the MFA policy.572 In the absence of 
overall agreement on the Kosovo case, the MFA had a difficult time coordinating the 
government representatives’ views. The split was most evident in October 2006 
when the Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, visited Bratislava. During 
Koštunica’s visit, Kubiš voiced support for Ahtisaari’s activities. However, Fico 
expressed support for a Kosovo solution that could be revised in the future if 
necessary. For his part, President Gašparovič remarked that Kosovo should remain 
part of Serbia.
573
 These statements went against the official MFA line and principally 
against the statements delivered to the US officials.
574
  
 
A US dispatch revealed that Lajčák was ‘furious’ about the situation that had been 
created.
575
 Although he had been particularly disappointed that the final conclusions 
of the Ahtisaari process were written before the negotiations finished,
576
 Lajčák 
nevertheless supported Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile, according to a US wire, 
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the Slovak MFA assured US diplomats and other ambassadors that despite the 
October press headlines there was no change in the Slovak position – it supported 
Ahtisaari and saw no alternative to independence for Kosovo.
577
 Clearly, MFA – 
represented by Kubiš and Lajčák in particular – were behind Ahtisaari, but the Prime 
Minister and President had their own personal opinions on Kosovo’s status which 
did not always match the view of the MFA.
578
 Despite their statements, it was 
understood that the Prime Minister and President were both concerned about EU 
unity and wanted to see Slovakia in the mainstream. To this extent, it was expected 
that the MFA’s approach towards Kosovo would eventually be accepted by the 
government as a whole. However, the US was disturbed by the situation and in a 
dispatch US Ambassador Vallee questioned the steps necessary in order to eliminate 
future contrasting policy messages by Kubiš and Fico on one of Slovakia’s key 
priority regions.
579
  
 
Nevertheless, soon after, on 30 October 2006, Fico met in Bratislava with the 
Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Talking to the journalists after 
the meeting, Fico repeated his recently stated personal view which was not in line 
with the MFA position:  
 
In relation to Kosovo our opinion, the opinion of the Government of the 
Slovak Republic, is clear – we are of course for adoption of such a 
solution which would secure stability in the region. On the other side, I 
personally endorse a solution that could be revised. I do not think that at 
the moment it is correct to adopt a decision which would permanently 
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solve the status of Kosovo and then it would not be possible to adopt any 
further corrections. I told Mr Secretary General that I am afraid if it 
would come to an immediate decision on the independence of Kosovo, 
the role of NATO military mission in this region would be considerably 
more demanding as some expect because this decision could cause great 
tension in the region and at the same time, it would not be a good 
example for other countries which would like to solve their internal 
problems this way.
580
   
 
 
Talking to the Quint embassies at the end of 2006, Lajčák expressed concern about 
Moscow’s standpoint towards Kosovo.581 In a leaked cable, the US Ambassador in 
Slovakia, Vallee, reported Lajčák’s pessimistic outlook of the situation. In contrast to 
the view of the US government, Lajčák, on the basis of his talk with the Russian 
Ambassador to Belgrade, estimated that Russia would veto a UNSC resolution. 
Stressing that the international community needed to ‘wake up’, as this was not the 
same Russia the West dealt with in the past,
582
 the cable also reported that Lajčák 
believed that Russia wanted to show that without its input no global issue could be 
solved and that Moscow ‘believes that the lack of solution sets a helpful precedent 
for other frozen conflicts’. For this reason, he was also reported to have said that the 
US needed to think about alternative options. The Slovak position would not change, 
but Bratislava nevertheless wondered ‘whether alterations to the plan for instruments 
of sovereignty could provide for greater international involvement, thereby 
improving prospects for broader acceptance’.583 With these statements, the Slovak 
side was signalling its perception that Russia would take a stronger stance than in 
1999, but this was not taken seriously into consideration, mainly because the US 
remained convinced that in the end Russia would comply. Crucially, at least 
according to Slovak diplomats, Slovak support for Kosovo’s independence seemed 
clear. 
 
At the end of the first year of Slovak membership in the UNSC, it appeared that 
Kosovo would not be an issue for Slovakia in 2007. Indeed, until February 2007, it 
looked like the US aim to bring Slovakia closer to the American view on Kosovo 
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had been achieved, and that the Slovak MFA was willing to assist with the 
realisation of American interests. As a US cable reveals, in early 2007 the US 
mission in the UN surveyed SC members on their views on the future process of 
Kosovo’s status.584 This survey was clearly done with an aim to identify countries 
that had reservations towards Kosovo’s independence and take steps to persuade 
these countries to reconsider their view. The cable reported Dušan Matulay, the 
Slovak Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, as having said that Kosovo’s 
recent history makes independence its only reasonable final status. In his view, any 
resolution on Kosovo should explicitly call for independence and differentiate it 
from other cases by pointing to unique reasons. However, like Lajčák’s earlier 
statements, he also warned about disagreements on Kosovo’s status in the SC, noting 
that we are ‘now dealing with a very different Russia than the one we dealt with on 
Balkan issues in the 1990’s’. Matulay also claimed that Russia is ‘much more 
confident and ready to assert its national interests’.585 
 
This statement demonstrated clearly that, at the beginning of 2007, Slovakia was 
prepared to support Kosovo’s independence, but was concerned about possible veto 
by Russia at the SC. This was further illustrated by Lajčák’s comment during an 
early January meeting with US Ambassador Vallee saying that Slovakia, as a 
responsible ally of the EU and NATO, would help the EU to be united on the 
Kosovo issue and that ‘its obligations dictate the proper role on Kosovo’.586 This was 
a significant statement. Crucially, Lajčák also said that Prime Minister Fico and 
President Gašparovič should be in line with the view of the MFA. Another notable 
piece of information reported in the cable was that leaders of the Slovak National 
Party (SNS) had told US officials that, despite being principally against Kosovo’s 
statehood, they would accept ‘what they view as inevitable’. The cable also noted 
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that Prime Minister Fico had told the UK Ambassador that although his personal 
view is different, he would support the MFA position on Kosovo.
587
  
 
4.3 Understanding Slovakia’s Position   
Talking to the Slovak Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs on 6 February, 
prior to the 12-13 February GAERC meeting, Foreign Minister Kubiš stressed that 
Kosovo’s independence was inevitable. ‘It is a process which goes only in one 
direction. We cannot stop it’, said Kubiš.588 As far as the MFA was concerned, there 
was no practical alternative to Kosovo’s independence. Significantly, all eight 
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including representatives of the 
governing SMER and SNS, voted to support Ahtisaari’s plan eventually leading to 
independence and agreed for Slovakia to welcome the plan at the EU level.
589
 In 
addition, Kubiš mentioned to the Committee that the Serbian public was indifferent 
to Kosovo’s independence. He reported that the Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk 
Drašković, told him during an informal meeting that the real turnout in the Serbian 
constitutional referendum in October 2006 was only 42 percent, instead of the 
officially presented 53 percent.
590
 This comment sparked criticism from opposition 
MPs who accused Kubiš of a diplomatic faux pas. More to the point, in an official 
statement, Drašković denied that he said anything of the kind. Thereafter, Kubiš 
argued that he never questioned the integrity of the Serbian referendum and it was 
only a ‘hyperbole’ – he only wanted to make a point about the importance of this 
issue for Serbian voters.
591
 
 
On the same day as Kubiš’s talk in Parliament, Dzurinda, the previous Prime 
Minister, and now the leader of the Slovak opposition, visited Belgrade, where he 
met with the Serbian Prime Minister Koštunica. Significantly, the initiative for this 
meeting came from the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
592
 On 30 January 2007, 
the SDKÚ-DS leader Dzurinda met in Berlin with Merkel and the Kosovo question 
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was one of the main topics of their discussion.
593
 As Dzurinda noted, Merkel asked 
him to meet with Koštunica because she ‘felt that if somebody could influence 
Serbia, it is Slovakia’.594 However, Dzurinda explained to her that he could not do as 
she wanted: ‘I remember the impression from this meeting – a fixed belief that if 
someone will ever have a chance to contribute to a sustainable relationship between 
Belgrade and Pristina, it will be Slovakia, but it [Serbia] cannot consider us as 
traitors’.595 Asked by journalists why he went only to Belgrade and was not 
interested also in the view of Pristina, Dzurinda argued that it was not Belgrade who 
wanted to be separate from Pristina, but the other way round.
596
 The fact that Merkel 
initiated Dzurinda’s meeting with Koštunica is significant insofar as it shows that 
Dzurinda was seen as pro-Western and it was expected that he would assist the 
Western partners with Kosovo. However, it turned out that the opposite was the case. 
 
Soon after, doubts about Slovakia’s position on Kosovo crept in. While up to early 
February 2007, when Ahtisaari presented his future status solution for Kosovo, the 
Slovak MFA considered independence inevitable, Ahtisaari’s report sparked a heated 
debate in Slovakia. Dzurinda took a tactical step and challenged the government by 
arguing that Kosovo should not be granted independence without Belgrade’s consent 
and that Slovakia should be ready to stand outside the EU mainstream.
597
  
 
Dzurinda’s sudden reaction surprised not only international but also domestic 
partners, particularly in view of his very pro-American orientation in the past. As 
one Senior European diplomat put it, ‘no one expected Mr Dzurinda to come up with 
this, to be the catalyst of this change, because after all it had been Mr Dzurinda who 
had done pretty much everything the EU had asked of him’. However, the observer 
added, it appeared as though he was looking for something with which to embarrass 
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Fico.
598
 As the diplomat explained, Dzurinda had by now been out of ‘power for 
about eight-nine months and it was about the time that the main opposition leader 
did something to cause Fico a headache’.599 Indeed, the question of Kosovo’s 
independence appeared to be a suitable topic to stir the situation and challenge Fico.  
 
At the time of Dzurinda’s public statements towards Kosovo’s status, Fico was on an 
official visit to China. As a result, Dzurinda had enough time to challenge Kubiš and 
criticise the coalition without a direct response from the Prime Minister. Crucially, at 
this stage Dzurinda’s stand was not the official position of the SDKÚ-DS; it was his 
personal view.
600
 This was confirmed by Eduard Kukan, a member of the SDKÚ-DS 
and the former Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, who told the US Ambassador in 
Bratislava that Dzurinda’s harsh statements opposing Kosovo’s independence were 
of his own initiative and not inspired by the party.
601
 Vallee briefed in a cable that 
Kukan explained to him that ‘sometimes Dzurinda gets an idea in his head that is 
hard to dislodge’. Nevertheless, Kukan believed that it would be possible to bring 
Dzurinda closer to the US view on Kosovo.
602
 Meanwhile, the KDH, SDKÚ-DS’s 
opposition partner, would not itself initiate steps against international partners on 
Kosovo’s status or lead the idea of a binding resolution on Kosovo. However, its 
leader, Pavol Hrušovský, nonetheless noted that when Dzurinda spoke against a 
parliamentary resolution that did not include Serbia’s agreement, the KDH felt the 
need to come up with statements similar to Dzurinda’s.603 Importantly, Hrušovský 
was also reported to have noted that while Dzurinda was Prime Minister his stance 
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was very different and he never supported any claim that would be against the views 
of the US or the international community.
604
 
 
On 8 February, two days after his meeting with Koštunica, Dzurinda announced that 
Kosovo should not be granted independence without the support of Serbia. 
Importantly, he declared that within the next two weeks SDKÚ-DS would introduce 
a parliamentary resolution on how the Slovak government should vote on Kosovo in 
the UNSC.
605
 This was crucial inasmuch as the prime actors involved in Slovak 
foreign policy-making are the President, the Government and the National Council. 
Dzurinda stated that Kubiš’s earlier statement referring to the inevitability of 
Kosovo’s independence was a big mistake.606 In his view, the Foreign Minister had 
even harmed Serbia’s negotiating position.607 For the US Embassy officials in 
Bratislava, Dzurinda’s open criticism of Kubiš and of the Slovak government’s 
position on Kosovo was a ‘big surprise and disappointment’.608 Meanwhile, reacting 
to Kubiš’s statements on the inevitability of Kosovo’s independence and the Serbian 
referendum, the KDH leader, Pavol Hrušovský, even requested Kubiš’s resignation 
for damaging the trustworthiness of Slovakia.
609
 This was the starting point of a 
heated debate on the province’s future. Kosovo’s status captured the attention of 
Slovak politicians like few foreign political topics had before and came to dominate 
media reports. 
 
Initially, SMER-SD supported Kosovo’s independence, as proposed by Ahtisaari.610 
Boris Zala, Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and MP for 
SMER-SD, despite having reservations towards the proposed model for Kosovo due 
to the precedent it would create, considered that even if it would not come to an 
agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, Slovakia would support the Ahtisaari 
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plan. In addition, he saw no reason for a parliamentary declaration.
611
 The SMK, a 
Hungarian minority party, was clearly for the Ahtisaari plan. However, according to 
its representative Gyula Bárdos, it was not reasonable to adopt any declaration by the 
Slovak Parliament in support of Serbia or Kosovo’s independence.612  
 
Other parties were strongly opposed. Ján Slota, leader of SNS and a coalition 
partner, compared the status proposal to the 1938 Munich agreement,
613
 stating that 
his party was against Kosovo’s independence. Importantly, and in a move that 
surprised his coalition partners, Slota expressed his party’s support for Dzurinda’s 
plan to draft a parliamentary declaration emphasising the non-changeability of 
Serbia’s borders.614 He argued that it would be unthinkable for a national minority to 
get the right to create its own state.
615
 Meanwhile, although Slota’s coalition partners 
from SMER and ĽS-HZDS did not support the idea of a declaration, there were 
nevertheless some signs that even SMER-SD was not united on the issue.
616
 The ĽS-
HZDS appeared to be more reserved on the matter and Zdenka Kramplová, MP of 
the party, did not expect the initiative to succeed.
617
  
 
On 12 February, Dzurinda announced during a press conference that the SDKÚ-DS 
had presented to the Parliament a draft for the Slovak Parliament’s declaration on 
Kosovo. He stressed that Ahtisaari’s status proposal could not be imposed on any of 
the two sides, but should be considered as a basis for negotiations. An independent 
Kosovo should not be created without the consent of Serbia. Explaining that 
‘Kosovo is the most sensitive and most painful problem of Europe’,618 he criticised 
Prime Minister Fico and the Slovak government for not expressing a clear and strict 
stance on the issue from an early stage. Behind the lack of a principled position 
towards the sensitive and complicated issue of Kosovo’s status, he saw ‘chaos in the 
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head of Robert Fico’.619 In addition to the SDKÚ-DS proposal, which aimed at 
binding Slovak government with an exact mandate, on 12 February the SNS also 
prepared a resolution supporting Serbia’s territorial integrity – the first party in fact 
to do so.
620
 However, in contrast to the SDKÚ-DS proposal, it would be non-
binding. Despite being initially against any parliamentary declaration, once it was 
clear that the Slovak Parliament would discuss Kosovo, the Hungarian minority 
party SMK decided to present its own proposal.
621
  
 
On his return from China, Prime Minister Fico told journalists that he considered 
attempts to speed up Kosovo’s independence absolutely irresponsible. ‘Efforts to 
grant Kosovo independence could lead to uncontrolled actions in other countries and 
have enormous consequences’, he said. Furthermore, he emphasised that the ‘role of 
the international community, including Slovakia as a member of the UNSC, is to 
also take into account Serbia’s legitimate interests and create all preconditions for an 
agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo as an integral part 
of Serbia. This is a position that I will present in the government’.622  
 
Responding to Dzurinda’s criticism that the government did not take a clear stance 
on Kosovo, Fico argued that he had already been very clear in his statements on this 
question during his meeting with the Secretary General of NATO in 2006 in 
Bratislava. ‘I clearly said, and since then I hold my position, that it would be very 
irresponsible to give an independent state status to Kosovo and that I prefer a 
solution which could be revised. And so, I expect that we will negotiate in the 
government in this spirit’.623 Furthermore, Fico stated that Dzurinda should not have 
been allowed to open Slovak airspace in 1999 for NATO.
624
 Emphasising how many 
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civilians died during the operation, he noted that at the time Greece, a member of 
NATO, did not allow NATO to use its own space whereas Slovakia, which was not a 
member, had. As he told the press, it was ‘hypocritical’ that the same people who 
opened the Slovak airspace were now suddenly big protectors of Serbian interests. 
More to the point, Fico also argued that he had not changed position on Kosovo, 
despite Kubiš’s recent statements.625 As for whether he would support the 
declaration that had been prepared by the SNS, Fico noted that as the next 
parliamentary meeting would not be held until March, there would be enough time to 
discuss the issue.
626
  
 
Seizing the opportunity to attack the government, Dzurinda now turned the debate on 
Kosovo into an issue of great national importance.
627
 In a move that was clearly 
designed to increase his political visibility, Dzurinda was helped by the fact that 
there was obviously no official and unified position amongst the members of the 
government on the issue. Having been taken by surprise by the issue, meanwhile, 
Fico appeared to conclude that he had no option to raise Kosovo in his list of 
priorities and announced that his administration’s position was that it would not 
recognise Kosovo. Significantly, after Dzurinda’s attack, Fico’s earlier intentions to 
leave foreign policy to Kubiš now changed; this left Kubiš, who was obviously in 
favour of recognising Kosovo, in a very difficult situation. As a diplomat explained, 
Fico’s reaction surprised Dzurinda, who wanted to embarrass Fico. However, ‘Fico 
being a master tactician for years picked it up and used it to his advantage’.628 
 
US Ambassador Vallee considered Fico’s assertions to push through his stance in the 
government as an ‘indirect slap’ to Kubiš. More to the point, Vallee stated that ‘Fico 
seems to have been provoked into this emotional response by his political rival 
Dzurinda’.629 Interestingly, Vallee further noted that some of this outburst might 
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have been just for show, as earlier on 9 February, Kubiš met with Fico and 
Gašparovič to coordinate the policy. Kubiš’s Chief of Staff reported that Fico did not 
give Kubiš any instructions to change the official MFA stance and that Kubiš still 
felt in control of the situation. However, Kubiš considered the binding draft proposal 
by the SDKÚ a threat, and asked the US Ambassador Vallee to ‘prevent parliament 
from tying my hands at the UNSC’.630 This was significant inasmuch as it shows that 
the MFA sought help from the US Embassy to influence domestic politicians’ 
decision on Kosovo. As a result, the US’s main aim was to influence MPs to 
withdraw the plan for a binding parliamentary resolution,
631
 so that Kubiš would 
have space to manoeuvre; additionally, the US sought public support from NGOs 
active in Kosovo.
632
 In the meantime, on 13 February, the president met with 
political leaders to calm the situation and discuss Kosovo, for he considered the 
turmoil created domestically around Kosovo unnecessary.
633
 Importantly, it was 
agreed that no extraordinary session on Kosovo would be called, but MPs would 
wait until the Parliament resumed session on 20 March. 
 
‘Slovakia is the only country in the world, except of course Serbia, where the 
question of Kosovo became from one day to another an important topic in domestic 
politics’, commented Kubiš on the latest developments.634 In an interview for the 
daily Pravda, he also explained the recent Slovak position at GAERC.
635
 He 
diplomatically clarified the standpoint, no longer mentioning the inevitability of 
Kosovo’s independence but highlighting the need for negotiations between Belgrade 
and Pristina. He criticised politicians in the opposition, who – since they were not in 
the government – would not consider Slovakia’s real interests. Furthermore, Kubiš 
warned about a binding resolution, as that could lead to Slovak isolation in the 
international community and Slovakia could become ‘a factor that would block the 
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solution’.636 In essence, this was Kubiš’s main concern. Slovak cooperation on 
Kosovo was crucial for him, as he considered that this situation could adversely 
affect Slovak relations with the US and key EU partners, and thus Slovakia’s 
standing in the EU.  
 
In an effort to influence Dzurinda, a US cable reported, the US Ambassador met him 
on 14 February and argued that a binding parliamentary resolution would alienate 
Slovakia from its transatlantic partners. Despite Dzurinda’s acknowledgement that 
the language of the draft could be altered he refused to withdraw it. As Ambassador 
Vallee noted in the cable, ‘Dzurinda clearly relished an upcoming fight in Parliament 
that would give him the chance to take on the Fico government’.637 The dispatch 
further reported a meeting between Dzurinda and Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, where Dzurinda expressed concern about 
the ‘use of Kosovo as a precedent in other conflicts, humiliating treatment of Serbia, 
and implications for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia’.638 
 
As a cable exposed, while the MFA’s message to SDKÚ was not to tie the hands of 
the MFA with a binding resolution, to concerned diplomats it was reported that the 
situation was under control; however, Lajčák disclosed to the US Embassy that 
Kubiš underestimated domestic difficulties and the MFA could not expect what 
would happen next. In addition, Lajčák expressed frustration over the domestic 
situation as in his view, nobody took into account Slovak interests and 
responsibilities as a member of the EU, NATO and UNSC.
639
  
 
It was becoming clearer that despite his commitment to coordinate the views of 
Slovak political representatives, Kubiš did not have the situation under control. In 
February 2007, during a meeting in New York between Kubiš and Kristen 
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Silverberg, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations for the 
United States government, which was also attended by the acting US Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Alejandro Wolff, Silverberg advised Kubiš that ‘the US 
would not look favourably on any Slovak action that undermined UN Special Envoy 
Martti Ahtisaari’s proposals on Kosovo in the Security Council’. Kubiš reportedly 
noted that he was ‘working hard to ensure that the Slovak MFA has the “diplomatic 
flexibility” to play a constructive role on Kosovo in the UNSC’.640 His position at 
that time was best illustrated by a comment made by Slovak MFA representative 
Rozkopal, who was reported to note to the US Ambassador that Kubiš has two full-
time jobs: first, to present Slovak foreign policy to the world and second, to Slovakia 
itself and the government in particular.
641
   
 
4.3.1 Opposing Europe? The Slovak Parliament’s Declaration on Kosovo and 
‘Europe’s big test’ 
Considering that only one month was left until the Slovak Parliament would debate a 
draft resolution on Kosovo, international diplomats increased their efforts to 
persuade Slovakia to stay in the mainstream on Kosovo. Notably, most active was 
the Quint – Ambassadors of the UK, the US, France, Germany and Italy – who 
regularly met in Bratislava to exchange views on how to influence the Slovak 
position on Kosovo. They agreed that a demarche to the MFA would be counter-
productive. As reported in a US dispatch, they would continue engaging with their 
contacts in the Slovak government and political parties. Importantly, it was agreed 
that on the side of the 16 March EU Presidency lunch at the German Embassy they 
would approach Fico. Furthermore, the Italians were encouraged to talk about 
Kosovo during President Gašparovič’s official visit to Italy planned for 27-28 
February.
642
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In the meantime, prior to the Parliament’s debate on Kosovo, Lajčák was very active 
in organising meetings between Slovak politicians and EU/US representatives in 
order to influence the parliamentary debate on Kosovo and convince coalition and 
opposition representatives not to tie the MFA’s hands.643 For instance, according to a 
US cable, Lajčák co-organised a meeting on 26 February 2007 in Berlin between 
Ahtisaari and Zala, the Chairman of the Slovak Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee – Zala also met with Javier Solana and German Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier – and Kubiš’s early March 2007 meeting with 
Ahtisaari in Vienna. Furthermore, at the end of February 2007, Rosemary DiCarlo 
met in Bratislava with Zala and other Slovak MPs from coalition and opposition 
parties.
644
 A US dispatch commented that despite Zala’s reservations towards 
Kosovo’s independence, he told DiCarlo that ‘Slovakia was realistic and understood 
there was no other way’, but emphasised Kosovo as a unique case.645 DiCarlo also 
met with SMK representatives who expressed their support for the Ahtisaari plan and 
a united EU on the issue. They were reported to note that minority rights guarantees 
in the plan were more important for them than ethnically-based requests for 
independence.
646
 The SNS representative confirmed opposition to Kosovo’s 
statehood. However, a KDH official, despite resistance to Kosovo’s independence, 
stated that the party had no wish to contradict international partners and would not 
take a lead in the debate. As the dispatch further briefed, representatives of SDKÚ 
had told the US Embassy that they wanted to go ahead with the resolution but were 
aware that there would not be enough votes in the Parliament to support it.
647
 
 
Fico was convinced that Dzurinda was trying to push him into isolation within the 
EU on Kosovo. This was revealed during his meeting with the US Ambassador on 2 
March. A cable reported that Fico was grateful for the US support to Kubiš and for 
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stressing to Dzurinda that Slovakia should not go against Europe in regard to the 
Ahtisaari plan. More to the point, Fico confirmed his support of Kubiš.648 After an 
early March meeting with Ahtisaari in Vienna, Kubiš criticised the SDKÚ-DS draft 
proposal related to Slovakia’s disagreement with Kosovo’s independence without 
Serbia’s consent. He argued that this position could lead to Slovak isolation within 
the EU and NATO and even obstruct the UNSC resolution.
649
 Indeed, he told the 
press that the SDKÚ-DS initiative ‘took our partners aback’ and Ahtisaari was 
interested if SDKÚ-DS really wanted to tie the government’s hands on Kosovo.650  
 
Prior to the passage of the Slovak Parliament’s declaration, the US Ambassador in 
Bratislava, Vallee, commented in a leaked cable: ‘Intense US diplomatic efforts to 
convince Slovakia to adhere to “European unity” on Kosovo have started to turn 
political opinion, but […] the battle is not yet won. It is necessary to keep pressure 
on our European partners to carry water on the issue as well’.651 Considering the 
approaching parliamentary debate on Kosovo, it was quite clear that attempts to 
persuade Slovak officials to change the course of action would intensify. 
 
Meanwhile, on 13 March 2007, another incident arose that appeared to show the 
continuing divisions between the MFA and other parts of the government. This time 
the catalyst for the disagreement was the visit of Zoran Stanković, the Serbian 
Minister of Defence, to Bratislava. During a joint press conference, his Slovak 
counterpart, Fratišek Kašický, stated that ‘it is not possible to support any degree of 
Kosovo’s independence without the consent of Belgrade. It is not possible to support 
a development resulting in a national minority, which has its own mother state, 
claiming to create another state’.652 This stood in stark contrast to the message Kubiš 
had delivered in Belgrade and Pristina. The MFA’s attempt to present a single 
position on Kosovo had once again been obstructed. Crucially, the failure of the 
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government to generate a united position on the issue created a favourable situation 
for the opposition to attack the government on its position towards Kosovo’s status. 
This was especially the case given that a March 2007 survey revealed that Fico’s 
party SMER increased its popularity; 40 percent of voters now said that they would 
support him.
653
  
 
On 16 March, Fico met with EU Ambassadors; a US dispatch reported he had 
confirmed that Slovakia would stand with the EU on Kosovo, and at the UNSC it 
would vote for the Ahtisaari plan.
654
 Returning from a Moscow visit, Lajčák briefed 
the US Ambassador that Russia signalled a very firm position on Kosovo. 
Furthermore, Foreign Minister Titov and Kosovo envoy Botsan-Kharchenko said 
that the Ahtisaari plan would require alteration and that Ahtisaari was not considered 
the best person to continue with the talks, but rather a new envoy should be 
named.
655
 
 
Kubiš did not want to comment on the Kosovo debate in Slovakia. However, he 
argued that the way Slovakia dealt with this topic was not standard, pointing out the 
recent note by the Serbian Prime Minister Koštunica who had felt as if Kosovo was a 
part of Slovakia.
656
  
 
As Tonra suggests, governments depend on ‘their domestic base to underpin the 
strength of their international position’ but also they may ‘rely upon their 
international responsibilities to shield them from domestic political pressures’.657 In 
this respect, pointing to the need for a joint EU position on Kosovo was a means for 
the Slovak government, and the MFA in particular, to resist the pressure by MPs and 
justify its aim to stay with the mainstream on Kosovo. However, despite the effort, it 
did not bring the desired result. 
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Considering the Slovakian reservations and increasing opposition towards Kosovo’s 
independence on the domestic political scene, US Ambassador Vallee pressed Kubiš 
to either support Ahtisaari or not to comment at all during the 19 March UNSC 
closed discussions. Kubiš confirmed that Slovakia would not comment on the final 
status negotiations.
658
 He considered the Slovak stance towards the question of 
Kosovo’s status as crucial and advocated unity among EU members. This position 
was clearly demonstrated when he disclosed to the US Ambassador Vallee that if he 
was forced into a position opposing the international community he would resign.
659
 
This only highlighted how vital it was for Kubiš not to be bound by a parliamentary 
resolution to vote against the Ahtisaari plan at the UNSC and what a high price he 
was prepared to pay, for he believed that Kosovo was ‘Europe’s big test’.660 
Although Kubiš was under domestic pressure, he still had some space to manoeuvre 
and was able to comply with US requests.  
 
During March, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee met several times to 
discuss draft resolutions on Kosovo.
661
 In addition to the SDKÚ-DS proposal,
662
 
draft resolutions were also tabled by the SNS, SMK and eventually SMER. Of the 
four, only the SMK’s proposal supported Ahtisaari’s plan and Kosovo’s 
independence. Dzurinda accused SMER of having come up with their own resolution 
in order to split the Committee’s votes with the aim of preventing any resolution 
from being passed.
663
 As he saw it, SMER wanted to have ‘free hands’ to join the 
majority on Kosovo. In the end, on the basis of a political agreement between the 
coalition party SNS and opposition parties SDKÚ-DS and KDH, Jozef Rydlo (SNS) 
presented a new SNS draft text. As a result of this cooperation, Dzurinda withdrew 
the SDKÚ-DS proposal from the Committee debate. On 23 March, the Committee 
failed to pass any of the draft resolutions, which meant that the proposals would be 
referred to Parliament and debated on 27 March.
664
 As Kosovo now became an 
                                                          
658 ‘Rhetoric in Bratislava overshadows Kubiš in Belgrade’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava154, 15 March 2007. 
659 ‘Kubiš looking for domestic agreement on Kosovo in the fine print’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava117, 26 February 2007. This was confirmed to the author by an anonymous source who explained 
that for Kubiš it was a ‘question of Slovak prestige’ and he did not want to harm his country. 
660 ‘Kubiš looking for domestic agreement on Kosovo in the fine print’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava117, 26 February 2007.  
661 Lörincz who in 2007 participated at the debates of the Foreign Affairs Committee noted that in fact, some 
MPs did not even know where Kosovo lies. Július Lörincz, comments to the author, 20 April 2010.  
662 On 2 March, SDKÚ-DS replaced its initial draft proposal from February 2007 by a new draft text. 
663 ‘Téma Kosovo láme parlamentné rekordy’, STV1, News STV, 20 March 2007. 
664 ‘Včera doma‘, Slovenský rozhlas, 23 March 2007. 
145 
 
‘absolute phenomenon’ in the Slovak parliament,665 it was nevertheless widely 
believed that there would not be enough votes to pass any of the declarations by the 
Parliament as a whole.  
 
In the meantime, because Fico disliked the idea that previously SNS had cooperated 
with the opposition parties – SDKÚ and KDH – on the draft resolution, one day 
prior to the parliamentary debate on Kosovo, he met with his coalition partners and 
they agreed on an additional joint coalition draft text.
666
 As a result, there were now 
five drafts before the Parliament. In the end SNS and SMER withdrew their texts,
667
 
thereby leaving the joint coalition text, as well as the draft resolution by the SDKÚ-
DS and the pro-independence resolution of the SMK.
668
 
 
At the end of March 2007, the Slovak Parliament finally started to discuss Kosovo’s 
status and the position that Slovakia should take. MPs recalled history, religion, 
moral duty and long-term relations with Serbia as factors that should contribute to 
the Slovak position. Present at the debate was also Foreign Minister Kubiš. On 27 
March, he presented to the Parliament the ‘Report on the Fulfilment of Foreign 
Policy Tasks of the Slovak Republic in 2006’ and ‘Slovakia’s Foreign Policy 
Orientation for 2007’.669 Eduard Kukan, SDKÚ-DS MP and former Foreign 
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Minister, noted that Slovakia should not be passive to the solution of the Kosovo 
problem; he criticised Kubiš because the MFA Orientation for 2007 supported 
Ahtisaari’s mission without mentioning that border changes in Europe should 
depend on the consent of both parties.
670
 Kubiš responded that Dzurinda’s previous 
two governments were passive, as they accepted development of the situation. He 
added that responsibility for the existing situation had lain with the previous 
government – which was there for eight years – because development around 
Kosovo had already been initiated in 1999.
671
 Importantly, during his presentation of 
the Orientation of Slovak foreign policy in 2007, Kubiš argued that the government’s 
position on Kosovo was very clear. The MFA – responding to the published 
Ahtisaari plan – officially expressed its stance on 26 March 2007: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted publication of recommendations 
by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the process of 
determining the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, in regards to 
his proposal for future arrangements in Kosovo, as well as the fact that 
the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, presented on 26 March 2007 a 
proposal and recommendations of the Special Envoy Ahtisaari to the 
members of the Security Council and expressed his full support for them.  
 
The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects the start of informal 
discussions on Ahtisaari’s proposals recommended in the UN Security 
Council, as well as on the preparation of a new UN Security Council 
Resolution. 
 
In accordance with current opinions, during these discussions, the Slovak 
Republic will promote proposals and ideas that will respect the objective 
reality in the Kosovo question and ultimately lead to consolidation of 
peace and security. 
At the same time, the Slovak Republic will seek to fulfil the main 
objective of its policy towards the Western Balkans, which is to 
strengthen the stability and European perspective of the whole region on 
the basis of a united EU action. 
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In this respect, the Slovak Republic will support all proposals that could 
bring the process of determining Kosovo’s future status to a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
The Slovak Republic will also enforce the UN Security Council 
Resolution affirming that any solution to the issue of Kosovo is a sui 
generis solution and does not represent a precedent for any other 
situations and cases. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs fully supports controlling and 
determining the role of the Contact Group in the process of finding the 
future status of Kosovo. 
We are convinced that the significance of the Contact Group work, for a 
successful solution of Kosovo’s status, will intensify in the upcoming 
debate in the UN Security Council. For this reason, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs believes that members of the Contact Group will make 
every effort necessary to restore its unity of opinion, which is an 
important prerequisite for a successful adoption of a decision on the 
future status of Kosovo and its implementation. 
 
In its opinions in the UN Security Council, as well as later in the process, 
the Slovak Republic will support EU unity of opinion and demonstrate 
that – in this issue so important for the future fate of a common Europe – 
it can assume its responsibilities as a member of the EU, NATO and the 
UN Security Council.
672
  
 
It was evident that Kubiš’s main emphasis was on Slovakia’s duty to act as a 
responsible member of these international organisations. Referring to the MFA 
statement, he noted that Ahtisaari’s proposals and recommendations were fully 
supported by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of 
NATO and the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Javier Solana. ‘We often refer to these people, so let’s refer to them consistently’, he 
added. On the united course of the EU action, he made a clear statement: 
 
We cannot afford and do not want to afford to compromise our position, 
our state interests, by playing the kind of policy that would absolutely 
discredit us and would undermine our international standing in a way 
that would actually lead to our considerably obstructed functioning both 
within the European Union or NATO. This is our natural environment; in 
this lies continuity of our foreign policy, continuity of our existence and 
this is our state interest, not any further statements. Therefore, we will 
pursue this also in the UN Security Council during discussions on a new 
UN Security Council resolution on the basis of a united EU process. We 
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could elaborate at length on what the European Union states’ disunity 
within the framework of the SC discussion and development of the 
overall situation in Kosovo would mean. I guarantee that it would be a 
great misfortune and the Security Council, in case it came to any tragic 
developments, would have to deal in turn with this issue, but in terms of 
finding solutions to strengthen peace and security that would be a 
completely different operation. We don’t want that. We want controlled 
development, guided discussions, no matter how difficult they would 
be.
673
  
 
Explaining the significance of unity on the part of the Contact Group members in the 
context of Kosovo, Kubiš noted:  
Why unity of opinion? Because it appears that in the last phase of 
negotiations there is no absolute unity of opinion; one member of the 
Contact Group, namely the Russian Federation, simply opens a whole 
range of questions. And our European Union and NATO partners’ 
question is clear – on which side in this debate do we stand? And I have 
only one answer: on the side of the European Union, on the side of 
NATO; as a responsible member of the Security Council, as a part of the 
Alliance, part of the European Union. I will not accept any other answer 
in these situations; not even in these discussions.
674
 
 
Referring to Kubiš’s talk, Dzurinda noted that he was captivated by the strong 
inclination towards unity in Kubiš’s speech which he found ‘sympathetic’. However, 
in relation to unity, Dzurinda saw a contradiction in the coalition draft text; on one 
hand, the text supported unity and expected that the government would look for a 
common solution with other EU members, but on the other, it was also a reminder of 
mistakes made in 1999 in relation to the destabilisation of the Western Balkans.
675
 
Likewise, Dzurinda did not understand Kubiš’s criticism of the opposition expressed 
to international partners. He quoted Fico’s statement on his return from China and 
added, ‘we [SDKÚ-DS] are in an absolute agreement with Prime Minister Fico. So 
why are you attacking us? Vote for our declaration’.676 Later on, referring to 
Koštunica’s visit in 2006, he questioned the government’s contrasting messages on 
Kosovo. Furthermore, Dzurinda probed that on one hand, the coalition draft text 
included statements such as Parliament believed that ‘the future status of Kosovo 
would not set a precedent in international law’ and on the other, Prime Minister Fico 
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had noted that ‘efforts to grant Kosovo independence could lead to uncontrolled 
moves in other countries and have enormous consequences’. Therefore, he argued 
that while the coalition MP’s text did not consider it a precedent, Fico did.677 From 
this early exchange of arguments it was clear that considerable differences in 
opinions existed.  
 
The debates were very heated. MPs frequently referred to the events of 1999 when 
Slovakia opened its airspace for the NATO intervention. Referring to the text of the 
resolution that the Slovak Parliament passed on 14 April 1999 in relation to the 
situation in Kosovo, Dzurinda stressed that the resolution had called all interested 
parties to find a solution that would ‘keep the territorial integrity of FRY’.678 In this 
respect, he claimed that there was continuity in their opinion. Arguing that a solid 
discussion on Kosovo was missing in Europe, Dzurinda added that ‘we do not need 
to rely on the Americans and we should not’.679 He also noted that Europe should be 
more devoted to the question of Kosovo than to any other issue. ‘It is our 
responsibility to alert our allies that they are mistaken’, stressed Dzurinda. Despite 
acknowledging that he was in general a strong supporter of the US, in this case, he 
felt that they were wrong.
680
 
 
Dzurinda criticised the new coalition draft, arguing that it indirectly supported 
Kosovo’s independence and that the withdrawn draft by the SNS was actually in 
Slovak national and state interest. Moreover, he stressed that unlike the SNS draft, 
which had had the support of both opposition parties – SDKÚ-DS and KDH – the 
new coalition text failed to address the question of Serbia’s territorial integrity and 
left enough room for the government’s eventual approval of Kosovo’s 
independence.
681
 By expressing support for the withdrawn SNS draft, Dzurinda 
                                                          
677 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 80. 
678 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 91. For a full text 
of the resolution, see ‘Vyhlásenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky k situácii v Kosove schválené Národnou 
radou Slovenskej republiky uznesením zo 14. apríla 1999’, Nr 262, Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 14 April 
1999. Prior to this declaration, on 23 March 1999, the Slovak Government passed the controversial resolution 
which opened Slovak airspace for the NATO intervention in FRY.  
679 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 92. 
680 See Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 123. 
681 See Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] pp. 123-24. 
150 
 
evidently attempted to cause a split in the coalition.
682
 Dzurinda also argued that he 
did not insist on voting for the SDKÚ-DS draft and that the Parliament could vote 
for the SNS proposal, which in his words was ‘good, balanced and truthful’, as it 
included the principle of territorial integrity.
683
 Nevertheless, during the first day of 
debate, Anna Belousovová, the Vice-Chairman of SNS, expressed her satisfaction 
that the coalition had prepared a single joint declaration and was prepared to support 
it. In light of this, it appeared that the coalition would remain united over their 
declaration text. 
 
Prime Minister Fico, who was also present at the debate, stressed that a similar 
discussion on other important domestic political issues, not only on Kosovo, would 
be welcome. He noted that Slovakia was probably the only country in Europe 
dealing with the issue of Kosovo’s future as if it were a domestic political topic. 
Furthermore, he emphasised that the coalition draft text had a very clear 
interpretation and refused all accusations that it supported independence. More to the 
point, he expressed his belief that if Dzurinda were Prime Minister, he would be ‘the 
first one to stand with banners and shouting “independence to Kosovo, grant it an 
independent state!”’684  
 
Boris Zala, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee and 
SMER MP, was the only one during this debate who referred also to collective 
rights, for he argued that for Slovakia it was important that any solution for Kosovo 
– be it international protectorate, limited independence, ‘more than autonomy’ 
solution or autonomy based on collective minority rights – should not set a precedent 
for other countries. He considered it a challenge for Slovak foreign policy to 
minimise the option of a precedent.
685
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Responding to Fico’s statement, KDH representative Vladimír Palko argued that 
Kosovo was a foreign political topic and it was Fico who had made it a domestic 
one. He noted that both opposition and coalition MPs were aware that ‘the topic of 
Kosovo touches upon Slovak national interests’. He further stressed that the 
Parliament could have reached a position – with a considerable majority – that would 
have expressed the state interest of the Slovak Republic; however, by referring to the 
1999 events, coalition MPs blocked this chance.
686
 Enquiring about the coalition 
meeting – taking place a day before the parliamentary debate and resulting in the 
coalition draft text on Kosovo – opposition MPs frequently questioned SNS’s 
standpoint and the sudden change leading to the withdrawal of the SNS proposal.   
 
In general, the first day of parliamentary debates on Kosovo was characterised by 
numerous attempts to apportion blame for the current situation. Opposition MPs 
repeatedly accused the coalition representatives that their draft text opened the way 
to Kosovo’s independence and that SNS did not stand its ground, whereas coalition 
MPs claimed the opposite. Kubiš’s speech was significant. It was evident that he was 
concerned about non-unity on Kosovo among the EU members and the effects of the 
parliamentary resolution on relations with Slovakia’s partners in the EU and NATO. 
Given the very clear differences in the views of coalition and opposition MPs, by the 
end of the day there was no consensus on the horizon.  
 
On the second day of debates, Pavol Hrušovský from KDH asked Kubiš – who was 
absent at that point of the debate – how the Slovak representative in the SC would 
vote if the coalition draft text would pass.
687
 Similar questions on Kubiš’s 
instructions for the Slovak vote in the SC were addressed several times by opposition 
MPs. Daniel Lipšic (KDH) expressed belief that the Parliament’s declaration would 
be an important factor for how Slovakia would vote in the UNSC: ‘I believe that our 
government and minister will respect the decision of the Parliament’.688 However, 
Kubiš did not directly respond to these types of queries. Palko (KDH) argued that the 
reason for SMER preventing a consensus in the Parliament was that the Prime 
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Minister, Foreign Minister and the party itself would need to advocate this 
agreement against the Ahtisaari plan and in favour of Serbia, but Fico would not be 
able to do so.
689
 
 
Religion, particularly Christianity, was also one of the themes that were addressed 
during the debates. For instance, MP Peter Gabura (KDH) noted that ‘recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence is not in the interest of Slovak Republic and the EU, also 
because it is not right to support Islamic positions in Europe’.690 Similarly, Jozef 
Halecký (ĽS-HZDS) noted, ‘I think that the creation of an Islamic state in Europe is 
something we are not prepared for, neither mentally nor, as we can see, via 
statements […]’.691 
 
Significantly, Rafaj from SNS made some important comments. He noted that 
international law did not grant minorities’ right to self-determination. ‘Neither full, 
nor partial – no sovereignty for the minority’, he added.692 His main point, however, 
was to stress that SNS did not support the Ahtisaari plan and was against any 
precedent. He emphasised that he did not want to play the Hungarian card, but 
Slovakia had a large minority too. Most notably, in order to find unity in the 
Parliament on Kosovo, he offered to make some adjustments to the coalition text.
693
 
In the end, it was František Mikloško, a KDH MP, who in order to reach an 
agreement between coalition and opposition parties, proposed some changes to the 
coalition draft text. Specifically, he suggested cutting from the original coalition draft 
text a section recalling the decisions of the Slovak Government in 1999 that had, it 
was argued, contributed to destabilising the Western Balkans region. Furthermore, a 
proposal was made to cut a part mentioning that the future status of Kosovo would 
not set a precedent in international law and to add that the future status of Kosovo 
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should be based on Serbia’s legitimate needs.694 Coalition MPs Zala (SMER) and 
Rydlo (SNS) agreed with the proposed changes.  
 
Crucially, and surprisingly, Belousovová, despite her earlier statements endorsing the 
coalition text, now announced that the SNS was prepared, despite insults from the 
opposition towards the party, to support amendments proposed by Mikloško. She 
added that if the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a strong mandate – support of 150 
MPs – then Slovakia could really say ‘no’ in the SC and it would be noticed that 
Slovakia was a sovereign country.
695
 Opposition representatives from KDH and 
SDKÚ-DS were of a similar opinion. For instance, Lipšic (KDH) argued that if the 
Parliament decides against Kosovo’s independence it would considerably strengthen 
Kubiš’s mandate in the EU and the SC.696 In this respect, Pavol Frešo (SDKÚ-DS) 
said, ‘I think that Slovakia, as a non-permanent member of the SC, has a unique 
opportunity as a country from the region which is immediately concerned with it 
[Kosovo], to convey the opinion of the Slovak citizens but also of some other 
countries in relation to the problem of Kosovo. I think that it has a unique 
opportunity to show what we think and to point out to the rest of the world, or those 
who are for an independent Kosovo, how very mistaken they are’.697 Referring to the 
coalition draft, Zala (SMER) argued that from the text it was very clear that the 
Slovak representative in the SC would not vote for Kosovo’s independence. Due to 
this, he argued, all MPs could, with a peaceful conscience, vote for it.
698
 From 
Horváth’s perspective (SMER), it was Dzurinda who misused the topic of Kosovo 
for an opposition fight and SDKÚ-DS’s aim to bind Kubiš’s hands.699 Halecký (ĽS-
HZDS) opined that it would not be a happy decision to bind Kubiš’s hands as the 
upcoming weeks’ development could be ‘surprising, dynamic’.700 These statements 
indicated that most of the coalition and opposition MPs now expected that Slovakia 
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would not vote for Kosovo’s independence in the SC, putting Kubiš in an extremely 
difficult position. 
 
Commenting on the two days of debates, Kubiš, at the end of the parliamentary 
session, made some concluding remarks. He stressed that the government had had a 
position on Kosovo which reflected the current development and was available on 
the MFA website. ‘However, if you don’t like it that’s not my fault, that’s a different 
matter’, he added. Referring to the comments that Slovakia should stand with the 
minority on Kosovo, he stressed that the vast majority of governments adopting a 
position on Kosovo decided for full support of Ahtisaari.
701
 Therefore, he refused 
that Slovakia would be in ‘some kind of’ minority on Kosovo. To this extent, Kubiš 
saw only one way ahead: 
 
For me here is one or two questions which I would like to ask when 
considering the whole situation. How is it possible that (…) 26 EU 
member states see something and we don’t? How is it possible that we 
are here so perfect? And all others don’t see it, don’t want to reflect on 
it? So that for them it is irrelevant, that they close their eyes? I don’t 
know. That’s a question. I am asking it. I don’t want to answer it and I 
won’t. We, the Slovak diplomacy, see some challenges and big risks. We 
talk about these risks, also with our partners by the way, very openly 
during all our activity and my activity in the government.
702
 
 
Touching on the question of national interests, Kubiš said that there was nothing 
better than defending the national interests of Slovakia, and therefore he would do so 
also in the case of Kosovo. In fact, he specified: ‘The state interest of the Slovak 
Republic is as a member of the EU, as a member of NATO, as a member of the SC. 
With all my respect, sympathy and empathy, which I could have for any other state 
and in the first place in this case to Serbia, I will protect the state interests of the 
Slovak Republic and not those of Serbia if they are in conflict’.703  
 
Referring to the position that the Slovak Parliament would pass, he noted that it 
would be a significant factor for the Slovak standpoint and not just expression of the 
                                                          
701 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 6th day of proceedings, 8th session, 28 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 81. 
702 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 6th day of proceedings, 8th session, 28 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 83. 
703 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 6th day of proceedings, 8th session, 28 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] pp. 83-84. 
155 
 
Parliament’s will. But at the same time, he expected that the Parliament’s view 
would respect that the Government would, with full seriousness, fulfil its 
responsibility. He clarified that he ‘will act in this way in any case’. More to the 
point, Kubiš stressed the necessity for a SC resolution: ‘Because if we don’t achieve 
it, we risk too much. Indeed, from my point of view, we risk a destabilising 
development. And that is not in our interest’.704 
 
Vladimír Palko, an opposition MP from KDH, was surprised by Kubiš’s question on 
why 26 EU countries did not see the situation in the same light as Slovakia. He 
pointed out the views of Kubiš’s coalition partner SNS and the Prime Minister who 
said – unlike any of the other 26 Prime Ministers – that he did not consider Kosovo’s 
independence to be in the Slovak interest.
705
 On this note, Dzurinda rhetorically 
asked: ‘Who of all EU member states should understand Serbia more if not us?’ 
Furthermore, Dzurinda said to Kubiš, ‘I think that you personally are clear [on 
Kosovo]. But the government is not’. He referred to the constitution by saying that in 
principal matters of foreign policy, the government should decide as one body, 
which was not the case on Kosovo.
706
 While Kubiš argued that there was a united 
position among the government members, in essence, this line of reasoning raised 
the most significant issue he had to face. 
 
In response to Kubiš, Lipšic (KDH) noted that it would be right to vote according to 
Slovak state interests; however, the question was: what are Slovak state interests? He 
considered that based on the parliamentary debate, an absolute majority of MPs 
opined that an independent Kosovo would go against Slovak state interests. As a 
result, Lipšic asked if the executive would in this way respect expressed Slovak state 
interests supported by a declaration.
707
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As a result of two days of heated debates, on 28 March 2007, Parliament eventually 
approved the ‘Declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the 
Solution of the Future Status of the Serbian province Kosovo’, stating the following: 
 
The National Council of the Slovak Republic expressing its belief that 
full and unlimited independence of the province of Kosovo is not in the 
interest of the stability of the region which was exposed to long years of 
tragedies and crisis; that not all possibilities of dialogue aimed at reaching 
an agreement have been exhausted; that the future status solution of 
Kosovo should be based on Serbia’s legitimate needs as well as on respect 
for the UN Charter and other international legal standards;  
expects that the Slovak Government will search for a common solution 
regarding the future settlement of relations in the Western Balkans in co-
operation with other EU member countries, with a clear perspective of 
integrating the Western Balkan countries into the European Union;  
believes that the will of the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
expressed in this way will contribute to the stabilisation of the relations in 
the region.
708
  
 
 
The Declaration was supported by 123 MPs out of 142 in attendance, with no 
opposing votes. Abstaining from the vote were 18 MPs from the Hungarian minority 
party, SMK, and one from the KDH, Martin Fronc.
709
 The passed resolution was the 
draft text proposed by the coalition SMER-SNS-HZDS, with amendments by KDH 
representative Mikloško, which had been the most moderate out of all non-recognition 
texts. After this draft version was passed, Dzurinda withdrew the SDKÚ version, 
stating that his party believed that their proposals had now been incorporated into the 
declaration that had been passed.
710
 As he noted, he was ‘quite happy’ that the 
declaration passed.
711
 The SMK’s draft version was supported only by 18 SMK 
MPs.
712
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4.3.2 The Slovak Position after the Parliamentary Debate  
For the Slovak MFA, the crucial element of the Declaration text was the section 
mentioning Slovak cooperation with the EU on Kosovo’s status. This ‘saved’ the 
situation as it did not tie the government’s hands in the Security Council, as would 
have been the case under the first SDKÚ-DS draft.
713
 In real terms, this now meant 
that Kubiš had some space to manoeuvre. Nevertheless, he needed to be careful about 
his next statements; he thus avoided any direct public ones. However, the number of 
meetings between US officials and the MFA representatives now increased. Cables 
from the US Embassy in Bratislava show that Kosovo was now placed high on the 
US Embassy programme. A Senior European diplomat confirmed that for a number 
of months Kosovo was very high on the agenda of any bilateral meeting in Slovakia 
with EU or US diplomats. The instruction put to ambassadors by the US and various 
EU countries that supported Kosovo’s independence was to ‘persuade Slovaks to 
change their position on Kosovo independence’. This would require ‘a lot of 
lobbying by ambassadors’.714  
 
Although considerable effort was made to persuade Slovakia to change its mind over 
the course of the rest of 2007, Bratislava resisted the pressure, despite the unease this 
created for the Slovak government and in particular the MFA. However, some 
observers believe that despite the declaration, more could have been done to change 
the position of the Slovakian government. As a Senior EU diplomat stated, 
‘personally, I think we should have applied much more pressure earlier on, because 
ultimately I think it was a position with which many Slovak diplomats were very 
uncomfortable until they got used to it’.715  
 
Significantly, on 2 April 2007 Lajčák delivered a speech at the Annual Review 
Conference on the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic organised by the Slovak 
Foreign Policy Association (SFPA). As one attendee at the conference confirmed, in 
his contribution Lajčák noted that Slovakia should recognise Kosovo. ‘He was 
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clearly for Kosovo’s independence’, the research fellow added.716 This shows that 
after the parliamentary debate, Lajčák still tried to convey a message; however, 
considering the parliamentary declaration, Kubiš could not issue a strong statement to 
support the Ahtisaari plan at the upcoming 3 April UNSC meeting. He told the US 
Ambassador that he would try to avoid a joint EU statement on Kosovo at the next 
GAERC meeting – which as Vallee noted, would be disappointing for the Germans – 
and rather would focus on consensus in the SC. Significantly, Kubiš briefed the US 
that he had already informed Tadić and Koštunica, as well as the Indonesian Foreign 
minister, that Slovakia would vote with other EU members on the SC.
717
 In public, 
however, Kubiš avoided commenting on how Slovakia would vote.718 But as noted in 
a US cable, he expected a no-confidence vote in the Parliament after the SC vote, 
confirming that Slovakia would be with the EU. In addition, the US asked Kubiš to 
speak to other non-permanent members, such as South Africa and Indonesia, to make 
sure that they understood the difference between the position of the Parliament and the 
standpoint the Government would take in the SC.
719
 This signalled the importance of 
the Slovak position in the SC as well as the fact that despite the parliamentary 
declaration, Kubiš was prepared to stay in line with the EU in the SC.   
 
When the SC met in April for a closed discussion on Kosovo, the Slovak 
representative, Burian, confirmed that Slovakia would support the EU’s line towards 
determining the future status of Kosovo.
720
 The Slovak speaking points at the SC 
delivered by Burian were described in a leaked US cable. The cable reported that 
Slovakia would welcome the opening of the negotiations at the SC and UNSC 
resolution, taking into account the interest of Belgrade and Pristina, and would be 
against any unilateral action. Furthermore, it stated that the Kosovo solution should be 
considered as sui generis, not constituting a legal precedent. It also said that Slovakia 
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would support all proposals for a UNSC resolution that would be ‘closer to a mutually 
acceptable solution’; however, significantly it stated that ‘there is no reason to believe 
that future direct negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina could lead to a mutually 
acceptable solution’.721 This was a crucial statement showing that already in early 
April 2007, Slovak diplomacy did not count on any consensus between the parties.  
 
The UNSC vote on Kosovo was highly important for the US, and as a cable 
revealed, in the case of bad signs from the Slovak side, even a call from the US 
President to Fico was considered.
722
 Privately, Fico did not want Slovakia to be 
isolated on Kosovo, and confirmed to the US Ambassador that Slovakia would vote 
with the EU on the SC.
723
   
 
Kosovo was one of the topics Kubiš discussed with other SC members during 
informal talks at the UNSC on 17 April. He confirmed the official Slovak standpoint 
but personally, he was not comfortable with it. Talking after the meeting, Kubiš 
stated:  
 
Our partners from the EU in particular assess our stance as one that is not 
quite in accordance with the stance of the EU, and in a way this already 
contributes to the feeling that the unity of the EU is being disrupted. I 
have perceived this signal, and I have to say that I was not pleased to 
hear such an assessment, not only from the EU, but also from some of its 
member countries, and naturally, also from some other countries in the 
Security Council. We have to think about the impact of certain political 
discussions in Slovakia.
724
 
 
On 23 April at the GAERC meeting in Luxembourg, Kubiš requested that the future 
status of Kosovo be decided by the SC. Significantly, Kosovo was not on the agenda 
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of the meeting but the Slovak initiative was appreciated by the EU diplomats.
725
 The 
following day, Serbia’s President Tadić visited Slovakia. As a cable informed, 
President Gašparovič said during the meeting that Slovakia would be with the EU on 
the SC and expressed a hope that this would not negatively affect relations between 
Serbia and Slovakia. Prime Minister Fico and Speaker of the Slovak Parliament 
Paška were in line with the President. Notably, Tadić had claimed that Serbia did not 
expect Slovakia to be ‘more Serb than the Serbs’.726 
 
In early May, Fico and Kubiš visited Moscow, where Fico met with President Putin 
and Prime Minister Fradkov. The press reports indicated that Fico agreed with Putin 
that the Ahtisaari plan needed changes. After the meeting, Fico commented that as 
far as Russia was concerned, the Ahtisaari plan was not acceptable and it would 
never support it in the UNSC.
727
 As a US dispatch revealed, the US got alarmed at 
these remarks. However, Kubiš, who went to Moscow with Fico, informed that 
privately, the Prime Minister confirmed to Putin that Slovakia would vote with the 
EU in the UNSC; however, in public, the message was different.
728
 This explanation 
notwithstanding, it was clear that Kubiš needed to constantly balance and clarify 
statements by Slovak government members. Indeed, they started to pose a significant 
challenge. 
 
Meeting the US Ambassador soon after the Moscow visit, Kubiš said that there 
would definitely be a way to bring Russia around. According to a US cable, Kubiš 
argued that Russia was looking for a way out, but it would never accept endorsement 
of the Ahtisaari plan or anything against Serbia’s will. Once again, Kubiš confirmed 
that Slovakia would vote with the EU in the UNSC, but, still making the outcome 
clear, it would like to adjust the language of the resolution to omit direct 
endorsement of the Ahtisaari plan. Considering political circumstances in Slovakia, 
it could not co-sponsor the drafting of the UN resolution.
729
 
                                                          
725 ‘Kubiš: O Kosove musí rozhodnúť OSN’, Aktualne.sk, 23 April 2007. 
726 ‘Serbian president Tadić’s visit to Slovakia’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 07Bratislava250, 26 April 
2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07BRATISLAVA250.html> [accessed 2 May 2012]. 
727 ‘Putin: Ak bude radar, namierime rakety’, Pravda, 4 May 2007. 
728 ‘PM Fico in Moscow on Kosovo, MD and Energy’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 07Bratislava269, 7 
May 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07BRATISLAVA269.html> [accessed 3 May 2012]. 
729 ‘FM Kubiš on Kosovo, Russia, Serbia, missile defence, and visas’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava275, 10 May 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07BRATISLAVA275.html> [accessed 3 
May 2012]. 
161 
 
On 11 May, Kubiš informed the US Ambassador Vallee that he was satisfied with 
the first draft of the UNSC resolution and supported its content, but due to the 
domestic political situation could not sign it yet. As stated in a US wire, he also 
expressed interest to contain non-precedent language in the operative paragraph of 
the resolution and not just in the preamble.
730
 Meeting Vallee again on 20 June to 
discuss another draft of the resolution, as a US dispatch informs, Kubiš noted that he 
was pleased with the text from 20 June and that Slovakia was prepared to give up on 
the ‘sui generis’ language if that would mean that Russians would not veto the 
resolution.
731
 Significantly, considering the view of the Slovak Parliament, Kubiš 
stressed that a SC resolution on Kosovo was necessary for eventual Slovak 
recognition of Kosovo. Furthermore, he warned that unilateral action would be the 
worst option. ‘We need Russia for a Security Council Resolution – and we 
(Slovakia) need a resolution’, Kubiš added.732  
 
Similarly, Prime Minister Fico and President Gašparovič during separate meetings 
confirmed to Vallee that as far as Slovakia was concerned, bilateral recognition of 
Kosovo, without a UNSC resolution, would be impossible. Most notably, Fico was 
confident that the EU would be in a position to reach a common stance on Kosovo 
regardless of the concern expressed by Cyprus, Romania, Spain and other 
members.
733
 This statement shows that ultimately Fico did not see Slovakia breaking 
the unity. 
 
In contrast to private views of the Slovaks, the Russians opposed the first draft of the 
resolution presented on 11 May as well as other versions that followed, arguing that 
despite the amended language, the text led to Kosovo’s independence, which was 
unacceptable for Russia.
734
 As a result, the SC withdrew the latest proposal for a 
resolution on Kosovo. Despite the reassurances voiced by Kubiš and Fico, one could 
only speculate whether Slovakia would have voted in favour of the SC resolution, 
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what consequences it would have had on the domestic political scene and whether 
Kubiš would have had to resign. 
 
Five days after the stalemate at the UN, Kubiš, during his meeting with Vallee, noted 
that given the failure to pass the UN resolution, the EU could develop a joint 
position within the 120 days’ negotiating period that ‘could be blessed by the Troika’ 
and presented to the UNSC, although he was uncertain about Russian support. 
Interestingly, he noted that demands by some EU members for further negotiations 
were in reality undercutting the EU’s standpoint supporting Ahtisaari. Kubiš said 
that he conveyed the same message at the recent GAERC meeting, on 23 July in 
Brussels. He also added that Kosovo Albanians would not accept anything less than 
‘supervised independence’ and as a result, all proposals needed to be made in view 
of that. Notably, Kubiš noted that Slovakia would support a new UNSC resolution if 
it would have full EU support, but could not participate at the co-sponsoring due to 
the Slovak Parliament’s view.735 
 
In September, the new Political Director at the Slovak MFA, Roman Bužek, 
confirmed to US Ambassador Vallee that without a UNSC resolution, Slovakia 
would not recognise Kosovo’s independence and could not participate at the planned 
ESDP Mission. But at the same time, Bužek noted that Slovakia would not stand in 
the way of the mission.
736
  
 
On 18 September, Ambassador Vallee urged Kubiš to plan discreetly with EU 
partners how to deal with the post-December 10 possible state of affairs. Kubiš noted 
that the EU agreed on the need to support Troika and EU representative Ischinger. 
He added that the EU would not stake out a joint position which could bias the result 
of Troika negotiations, and that after Troika presented its report to the UN Secretary 
General in December, the Kosovo issue should come back to the UNSC. He 
repeated, once again, that Slovakia would not recognise unilaterally declared 
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independence of Kosovo. Furthermore, Kubiš noted that he started to work on the 
possibility of ‘decoupling […] the issue of an EU mission from the results of the 
Troika process’ to enable the EU to prepare for action and ‘create reality’ on the 
ground.
737
 As a cable from the US Embassy informed, prior to the October 15 
GAERC meeting in Luxembourg, Kubiš had demanded an analysis from the 
European Council’s legal service with the objective to clarify the legal basis of an 
ESDP mission.
738
 Indeed, as Kubiš indicated earlier, during GAERC the ministers 
expressed support for Troika and urged Belgrade and Pristina to actively engage in 
the remaining negotiations.
739
 
 
Prior to a November farewell lunch hosted for the US Ambassador Vallee, Kubiš 
expressed his pessimism over any Troika results. As a cable briefed, Kubiš repeated 
his intention to create conditions for an ESDP mission as soon as possible and delink 
the mission from a unilateral declaration of independence. Kubiš argued that the EU 
needed a ‘legal fig leaf’ confirming that existing UNSC resolutions authorised the 
ESDP mission. He also assured Vallee that despite strong domestic opposition to a 
unilateral declaration of independence, the Slovak government ‘would not create 
problems within the EU for the 20 or so countries’ which would probably recognise 
Kosovo. In addition, Kubiš strongly believed that Slovakia would – even after the 
unilateral declaration of independence – continue its commitment to ESDP and 
KFOR missions.
740
 A week later, Bužek, the Political Director at the Slovak MFA, 
confirmed to Silverman, the US Chargé d’Affaires in Bratislava that Slovakia was 
prepared to support the ESDP mission deployed under Resolution 1244. In this 
sense, Bužek emphasised that acceptance of the ESDP mission and the unilateral 
declaration of independence were two different things. In this way, the Slovak 
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Parliament would not oppose the participation. However, he expressed irritation that 
some states wanted to push Slovakia to interpret the participation in the mission as 
acceptance of Kosovo’s independence.741 Despite the home situation, Slovakia 
aimed to remain constructive on Kosovo through involvement in the ESDP mission – 
EULEX.  
 
Meanwhile, at the end of November, Rosemary DiCarlo, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State, visited 
Bratislava to discuss Kosovo. Separately she met with Foreign Minister Kubiš, MFA 
Political Director Bužek, Head of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Zala 
and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kukan. A dispatch informed that Kubiš had 
confirmed the unlikelihood of the Slovak recognition of Kosovo; however, he had 
stressed its commitment to participate in KFOR and the ESDP mission. Kubiš had 
emphasised the necessity for preparing the mission before Kosovo declared 
independence and having a clear statement indicating its deployment under UNSC 
Resolution 1244. This was considered particularly important for the Slovak 
Parliament. Kubiš had also noted that with this kind of legal basis, ‘we can walk 
together and work together’ on everything except the recognition.742 In this respect, 
Kubiš had stressed that the Kosovars need to treat all participating states equally, 
regardless of the recognition. Speaking to DiCarlo, Kukan, Kubiš’s predecessor, had 
acknowledged Kubiš’s careful position in order to balance his government’s wish to 
be with the EU on Kosovo and the strong domestic feelings against independence. 
Furthermore, as the new US Ambassador to Bratislava, Vincent Obsitnik, briefed, 
Zala and Kukan had expressed their disappointment about the outcome of the talks. 
All three Slovak politicians had opined that the process ‘was stacked heavily against 
the Serbs, whom they argued had made genuine, albeit not major, attempts to bridge 
the gap between the two parties’.743  
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Despite the unease at the prospect of an independent Kosovo, the message was that 
Slovakia would remain constructive on the ground. DiCarlo stressed that after 
endorsing the Ahtisaari plan the previous spring, it ‘would have been hard for the 
European Union and the United States to walk back from some sort of independence 
for Kosovo’. Kubiš highlighted his preference for a ‘supervised interim phase’ 
during which Kosovars would first comply with the Ahtisaari settlement; on the 
basis of progress, the international community could then ‘bless independence’. 
Despite DiCarlo’s opposition to this scenario – based on the internal dynamics in 
Kosovo – Kubiš said, ‘I know they [Albanians] are impatient, but I don’t buy it. Let 
them wait’.744 During the meeting, Bužek confirmed that Slovakia would cooperate 
during the December UNSC debate on Kosovo. He said that it would prefer a UNSC 
resolution but noted that ‘we [Slovaks] are realists’.745 
 
As December arrived, the number of high-level meetings scheduled on Kosovo 
indicated how crucial the decision on Kosovo was, particularly for the EU.
746
 On 2 
December, during a farewell dinner for the US Ambassador Vallee hosted by Fico, 
the Slovak Prime Minister confirmed the standpoint that Slovakia would not 
recognise a unilateral declaration of independence, and further noted that ‘the EU 
heads of government felt enormous pressure to reach a unified position (including 
recognition) on Kosovo’.747 As a US wire described, Micovčin, EU Correspondent at 
the Slovak MFA, briefed that preparations for the 10 December GAERC meeting 
and 14 December EU summit were ‘chaotic’. For the Slovak Government, Kosovo 
was top of the agenda during both meetings. This confirmed the fact that Kubiš was 
drafting his Kosovo talking points himself. Micovčin expected the debate to be 
‘quite tough’ as the EU had not resolved how to define ‘unity’ on Kosovo.748 The 
cable also briefed the UK Ambassador, informing that the EU could not agree on the 
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happening now […] but I don’t think any of this amounts to an argument against doing what we did – sellotaping 
an independence for Kosovo’. Senior European diplomat, April 2011. 
747 ‘Slovakia: Ambassador’s farewell dinner with Prime Minister Fico’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava638, 4 December 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07BRATISLAVA638.html> [accessed 
6 May 2012]. 
748 ‘Slovakia: Ambassador’s farewell dinner with Prime Minister Fico’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava638, 4 December 2007. As an EU official noted, whenever Kosovo was debated in the EU there was 
a problem. European Union official, comments to the author, July 2010. 
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draft Kosovo conclusions for the EU summit and as a result, during the GAERC, 
ministers would need to settle the dissimilarities. More concretely, Slovakia 
disagreed with the language, noting the necessity at that time of taking steps forward 
toward a settlement. Romania was reported to object to the draft’s description of the 
situation in Kosovo as ‘unsustainable’, and the Dutch opposed the characterisation of 
the EU’s role in Kosovo as ‘leading’. In addition, Cyprus also disagreed with some 
elements.
749
 The cable concluded with a note by the US Embassy confirming the US 
attempts to navigate Slovakia towards a constructive course on Kosovo.
750
 
 
In the meantime, the Slovak Prime Minister confirmed that Slovakia would have big 
problems recognising the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo. Fico also 
argued that if the Kosovar politicians would not consider Serbian interests and 
reservations within the EU, they could ‘forget’ that Slovakia would recognise 
them.
751
 
 
The ‘happy coincidence’ that Kukan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had referred to 
when he stated that the issue of Kosovo would be on the UN Security Council 
agenda during Slovakia’s membership had, by the end of 2007, turned into relief that 
Slovakia had concluded its SC membership and would now come under less 
pressure.
752
 As a Senior European diplomat said, ‘I could feel a sigh of relief in 
Bratislava when Slovakia got to the end of its UNSC tenure at the end of 2007’. This 
diplomat’s impression of the Slovaks was as if ‘we [Slovaks] are off the hook now, 
                                                          
749 ‘Slovakia: Stance on Kosovo, response to GAERC demarche’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava651, 7 December 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07BRATISLAVA651.html> [accessed 
6 May 2012]. 
750 ‘Slovakia: Stance on Kosovo, response to GAERC demarche’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
07Bratislava651, 7 December 2007. However, the US was active in pushing for their Kosovo agenda also with 
other EU member states. For instance, a leaked report on a meeting held on 24 December 2007 between the 
Slovenian representatives – the Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mitja Drobnič and the 
Ambassador to the US Samuel Žbogar – and the US officials – Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, his deputy and Judy Ansley, NSA Senior Director for 
European affairs clearly shows the US looking for assistance with their interests over Kosovo, and Slovenia 
being willing to comply. As Fried openly noted, ‘it is beyond doubt that the solution of the status is a fact, which 
will happen under the leadership of Slovenia’. Slovenia’s role was crucial particularly due to its EU presidency in 
the first half of 2008 – a period when the declaration of Kosovo’s independence was expected. See Mastnak, 
‘Kosovo: A New Versailles?’, Foreign Policy In Focus, 7 March 2008. Notably, Samuel Žbogar is currently the 
EU Special Representative to Kosovo; a position he has held since January 2012.   
751 ‘Fico: Ak nebude Kosovo brať ohľad, nech zabudne, že ho uznáme‘, SME, 14 December 2007. 
752 As Palokaj noted, crucially, during Kubiš’s time in the office, Slovakia was the only EU member in the UNSC 
that was against Kosovo’s independence. ‘This was a bad situation for Slovakia’, he added. Augustin Palokaj, 
comments to the author, 16 July 2010. 
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we can do what we want without fear of being castigated by our UNSC or EU 
colleagues’.753 
 
Nevertheless, as Kosovo prepared to declare its independence, privately it appeared 
as though Slovakia would eventually be willing to change its position on recognition. 
As a US wire showed, in December 2007, Kubiš, during a discussion with the US 
Ambassador to Bratislava, Vincent Obsitnik, estimated that Slovakia would 
recognise Kosovo around June 2008 after coordination with Romania and Greece, as 
Prime Minister Fico did not want Slovakia to stand alone with Cyprus.
754
 As a 
Senior European diplomat noted, the message Slovak representatives were giving 
was ‘don’t worry, we won’t be the last EU member state to hold out against an 
independent Kosovo’.755 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to show how internal domestic politics impacted on the 
Slovak position towards Kosovo’s independence. Reconstruction of events after the 
parliamentary elections in June 2006 demonstrated that the Slovak MFA was willing 
to support the Ahtisaari plan and eventual independence of Kosovo in order to 
maintain EU unity. Slovak diplomacy’s priority was to remain in line with other EU 
states in the crucial question of Kosovo’s statehood, for it considered the matter an 
issue of Slovak reputation. 
  
However, rather unexpectedly and principally to the surprise of the US partners, the 
situation became complicated when Dzurinda, the opposition leader, initiated a 
debate on Kosovo in the Slovak Parliament, claiming that without Serbia’s consent 
Kosovo should not be granted statehood. Eventually, the Slovak Parliament passed a 
Declaration on Kosovo effectively restraining the MFA’s next steps and making 
Slovak diplomatic support for Kosovo’s independence impossible. For the MFA, this 
created a problem because its hands were tied; the Slovak Minister of Foreign 
                                                          
753 Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. 
754 ‘Ambassador’s courtesy call with foreign minister Kubiš’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
08Bratislava1, 2 January 2008. As for Greece, an official noted, ‘Among the 5 EU members that are against 
Kosovo’s independence we have no direct consequence from Kosovo’s independence’. The Greek position, he 
added, is ‘out of solidarity with Cyprus not because of home problems’. Senior Greek political representative, 
comments to the author, February 2012. 
755 Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. 
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Affairs, Kubiš, could not express full support for the Ahtisaari plan as the Parliament 
gave him different instructions. In light of the passed parliamentary declaration, 
Kubiš’s main concern remained the UNSC vote. The significance of the vote was 
highlighted by the fact that Kubiš was prepared to vote for a UNSC resolution even 
if it meant he would face a no-confidence vote at home after. It never came to this 
scenario due to the Russian objection to the SC resolution and its indication of veto.  
 
By the end of 2007, it was clear that Slovakia would remain opposed to Kosovo’s 
independence. Indeed, all efforts aimed at influencing the Slovak view on Kosovo – 
primarily by US officials – were unsuccessful. This shows that a small state was able 
to resist pressure from external actors and, in view of its domestic political situation, 
would not and could not recognise Kosovo as an independent state. In the end, the 
EU was not able to show unity over Kosovo as five EU member states were against 
Kosovo’s statehood. However, crucially, it was able to stand united at least over the 
deployment of the EULEX mission based on Resolution 1244.  
 
In the meantime, another factor emerged that was to influence the evolution of the 
Slovak standpoint towards Kosovo. The rights of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia 
were, once again, at the focus of political discussions. As the next chapter illustrates, 
the dynamics created between representatives of the ethnic Hungarian party, officials 
from Hungary and Slovak politicians impacted on the Slovak foreign policy towards 
Kosovo’s independence. Not only did they reinforce the non-recognition of Kosovo 
but they also prevented any changes of the policy in the foreseeable future.  
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CHAPTER 5: The Notion of Kosovo as Precedent: Impact of the 
Hungarian Minority Issue on Slovakia’s Policy towards Kosovo’s 
Independence 
 
‘We are destined to live together with the Hungarians’.756 
 
Introduction  
This chapter proceeds to analyse the argument about precedent, i.e. the role of the 
Hungarian minority issue in the Slovak stance on Kosovo. This argument has been 
specifically highlighted in the scholarship as being the most influential in the Slovak 
position. The chapter examines its importance and explains how this factor and its 
perception in the political arena worked together to cultivate Slovak opposition 
towards Kosovo’s independence. It also deals with concerns that the Kosovo case 
could be used to support demands for secession or autonomy on the part of the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia. 
  
Looking at Slovakia’s position from the perspective of the Hungarian minority is 
complex, and many factors need to be taken into consideration. History and politics 
have contributed to the tensions between Slovakia and Hungary: different 
interpretations of the past and recent tensions both impact on the relationship.
757
 This 
chapter aims to show the connection between the developments of the Kosovo issue 
and matters related to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It should be stressed that 
the aim is not to go back in time and analyse the history of the Slovak-Hungarian 
relationship; rather, this chapter’s main focus will be recent events, although 
occasionally relevant history is included. However, to give a full picture, one needs 
to look beyond the year 2008 when Kosovo declared independence. 
                                                          
756 Štefan Markuš, Slovak Ambassador to Hungary (1998-2002). See Vladimír Jancura, ‘Štefan Markuš: Sme 
odsúdení žiť spolu s Maďarmi’, Pravda, 14 September 2006, p. 1 and p. 6. 
757 One of the most debated issues is the peace Treaty of Trianon signed after the First World War in June 1920 
between the Allied Powers and Hungary. By the terms of the treaty Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory 
and two-thirds of its inhabitants. This territory was divided between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Romania and 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. For the online text of the Treaty, see ‘Trianon Treaty’, WWI 
Document Archive, Conventions and Treaties, Brigham Young University Library, <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/ 
index.php/Treaty_of_Trianon> [accessed 20 May 2011]. 
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To understand the issue, it is necessary to examine the context in which Slovak 
policy towards Kosovo was formed. Kosovo’s status process and eventual 
independence were highly debated in Slovakia’s media and government. These 
discussions eventually led to the Slovak Parliament articulating its official stand in 
the ‘Declaration on the future status of the Serbian province Kosovo’ mentioned in 
the previous chapter.  
 
As shown by the arguments against Kosovo’s independence reviewed in Chapter 3, 
international scholars in particular have identified the Hungarian minority issue as 
the decisive motive for Slovak foreign policy on Kosovo. In the media, domestic 
secessionist issues and concerns about Slovakia’s territorial integrity were 
particularly highlighted as the reasons for the refusal to recognise Kosovo.
758
 
However, what the literature fails to account for is the political context in which 
Slovakia took its decision. The role of Hungarian politicians and representatives of 
the Hungarian minority in Slovakia at that time were not taken into account. 
Therefore, one can not look at the Kosovo issue as an isolated Slovak foreign policy 
issue; it must be placed in the necessary domestic and bilateral political context. To 
appreciate the Slovak position on Kosovo, it is important to understand the role of 
and interaction between Slovakia, Hungary and the Hungarian minority living in 
Slovakia.
759  
 
Furthermore, as part of the analysis, this chapter discusses the Ahtisaari plan 
presented at the beginning of 2007, with special attention given particularly to the 
section on collective rights, in order to highlight the largely neglected role it played 
in the Slovak political context. 
 
This chapter shows that the Slovak view was not only a product of its relations with 
the Hungarian minority but rather a response to a combination of activities by the 
representatives of Hungary and the ethnic Hungarian party SMK (intensifying 
                                                          
758 See for instance, ‘Abchasien bis Zypern: Das Kosovo als Präzedenzfall’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 
February 2008, online version at <http://www.faz.net/artikel/C31325/abchasien-bis-zypern-das-kosovo-als-
praezedenzfall-30070568.html> [accessed 27 May 2011]; ‘Kosovo/EU: Pressure eases on anti-independence 
five’, Oxford Analytica, 4 January 2010; ‘Jubilant Kosovo, chastened Serbia’, The Economist, 29 July 2010, 
online version at <http://www.economist.com/node/16693751> [accessed 8 November 2010]. 
759 For a detailed analysis of the dynamics created between these three actors in an earlier period (1989-1999), 
see Stefan Wolff, ‘“Bilateral” Ethnopolitics after the Cold War: The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia, 1989-
1999’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2 (2001), 159-95. 
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particularly after the change of the SMK leadership in 2007). Statements by ethnic 
Hungarian MPs in Slovakia supporting Kosovo and debates initiated by 
representatives in Hungary about the position of the Hungarian ethnic minority in 
Slovakia only served to fuel the tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations. This 
explains Slovakia’s reluctance to recognise the independence of Kosovo without 
prior agreement between Belgrade and Pristina.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first focuses on showing how 
relations between the three aforementioned actors evolved across the 1990s leading 
up to 2006. It then examines the period of 2007-2011, providing the necessary 
political context in which Kosovo’s independence was debated. The final section 
draws links between the three focal actors and the debates on Kosovo in Slovakia.  
 
5.1 Evolution of Slovak-Hungarian Relations and the Ethnic Hungarian 
Minority Issue (1990-2006) 
After the fall of communism, in 1990, the first freely elected right-wing Hungarian 
government was led by Prime Minister József Antall. Kiss and Zahorán describe 
Hungarian foreign policy under Antall’s leadership: 
 
In a strong representation of national interests, which during the 
communist era had been damped, practically encoded were the conflicts 
with neighbouring countries, mainly if we take into consideration the 
revival of nationalist emotions in the region. When the Antall 
government openly – however, sometimes without proper sensitivity and 
tact – stood up for the representation of the Hungarian ethnic minorities 
living abroad, it came into conflict with the Slovak […] efforts to build a 
nation state […].760 
 
                                                          
760 Balázs Kiss and Csaba Zahorán, ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, International Issues and 
Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 16 (2007), 46-64 (p. 47). See also Csaba Zahorán, ‘Dvadsať rokov zmeny systému 
v Maďarsku: úvaha na úvod’, in Neznámy sused: Dvadsať rokov Maďarska 1990 – 2010, ed. by Csaba Zahorán, 
István Kollai and Slávka Otčenášová (Bratislava: Talentum, 2011), pp. 9-20 (p. 13). In this context, problems 
with the Hungarian minority issue in the region at that time were indicated by Richard Holbrooke. In relation to 
his first year as the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (1994-1996), he stated that there were some notable 
achievements done, ‘including American-sponsored solutions or breakthroughs on several second-tier issues that 
could have escalated into first-class crises. These included […] problems between Hungary and its two neighbors 
Slovakia and Romania over the treatment of their Hungarian minorities’. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War 
(New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 60-61.  
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Indeed, Antall stated that although according to the constitution he is the Prime 
Minister of 10 million Hungarian citizens, he would in fact like to be the Prime 
Minister of 15 million Hungarian people.
761
  
 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, once Slovakia achieved its independence in 1993, the 
issue of the Hungarian minority started to be more intensely debated between 
Slovakia and Hungary. Overall, the first two Slovak governments’ policies (1993-
1994, 1994-1998) led by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar from the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) were criticised from abroad and his leadership was 
considered nationalistic.
762
 In contrast to Antall, the socialist Gyula Horn, his 
successor as Hungarian Prime Minister,
763
 considered himself only to have power 
over the 10 million domestic Hungarian citizens, thus giving a clear signal about the 
change of foreign policy direction. During his government (1994-1998) Hungarian 
national policy was focused on its integration into the EU and NATO. In 1995, 
Mečiar and Horn, the Prime Ministers of Slovakia and Hungary respectively, signed 
the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty.
764
 Its aim was to stabilise bilateral relations and 
establish a framework for cooperation between the two countries. It set up an 
intergovernmental joint commission to deal with sensitive bilateral issues. The treaty 
also confirmed the inviolability of both countries’ common state border and respect 
for territorial integrity.
765
 However, after the ratification of the treaty, its elements 
were differently interpreted by the parties. In respect to autonomy, for Slovakia it 
                                                          
761 József Antall, Modell és valóság. Politikai beszédek Magyarországon (1989-1993) (Budapest: Athaneum, 
1994) as cited by Kiss and Zahorán, in ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, p. 47. 
762 Between 15 March 1994 and 13 December 1994 there was a temporary government led by Jozef Moravčík as 
a result of the collapse of the first Mečiar government. In 2000, HZDS was renamed Ľudová strana – Hnutie za 
demokratické Slovensko (People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, ĽS-HZDS). 
763 Prime Minister Antall died before the end of his term. He was succeeded by Péter Boross who held the office 
from December 1993 to July 1994. 
764 Kiss and Zahorán, ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, pp. 48-50. 
765 For an English translation of the Treaty see ‘Treaty on Good-neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation 
between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic’, Rechtsbestimmungen, Bilaterale Verträge, 
Bibliothek für Autonomien und Sprachminderheiten, Autonome Region Trentino-Südtirol, available at 
<http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/normativa/bilaterali/slovak-magyar%20english.pdf> [accessed 21 June 
2011]. Miroslav Lajčák, the then Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2010), reflected on the treaty on the 
occasion of the 15th anniversary of its signature: ‘[…] both countries defined their jointly acceptable principles 
and standards of mutual behaviour […] Apart from reflecting the time in which it was adopted, the Basic Treaty 
also mirrors all the sensitivities and asymmetries of the Slovak-Hungarian relationship. […] The treaty has 
proven its worth throughout the fifteen years of its existence as a basic framework of reference in our bilateral 
relations’. See ‘The Basic Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia after Fifteen Years – Past and Future’, Slovak 
Foreign Policy Association Conference, Address by the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, 
Bratislava, 25 March 2010. 
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was clear that the treaty does not imply any rights to territorial autonomy; in 
contrast, ethnic Hungarians had their hopes for cultural autonomy.
766
 
 
In November 1995, under Mečiar’s government, a new Act on the State Language of 
the Slovak Republic was passed regulating the usage of the Slovak language and 
confirming its status as the only official language in Slovakia. The law also 
introduced fines for not complying with the regulations.
767
 This act was criticised by 
the opposition and international actors, such as the European Council and the OSCE.  
 
As for the ethnic Hungarian parties, prior to 1998, one can speak about ethnic 
Hungarian party pluralism in Slovakia. In order to have an increased influence on 
political affairs in Slovakia, particularly in reference to the status of the ethnic 
Hungarians, in June 1998, the three main ethnic Hungarian parties in Slovakia
768
 
merged into one and established the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK). One of the 
common aspects of the political programmes of all these parties was that the 
Hungarian language would become a second official language in the regions 
populated by ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia.
769
 However, this aim has never been 
fulfilled. Furthermore, autonomy for ethnic Hungarians was another topic raised by 
political ethnic Hungarian representatives. For instance, Duray, considered one of 
the most active and radical SMK members in regard to demands for autonomy, 
already in 1997 argued that although Slovaks considered Hungarians to be a national 
minority, the Hungarian community did not perceive itself as such, but on the 
contrary was ‘aware that they live in their ancient homeland’.770  
 
                                                          
766 For more details, see Wolff, ‘“Bilateral” Ethnopolitics after the Cold War: The Hungarian Minority in 
Slovakia, 1989-1999’, pp. 159-95.   
767 See ‘Zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky z 15. novembra 1995 o štátnom jazyku Slovenskej 
republiky’, Zbierka zákonov č. 270/1995, part 89, pp. 1999-2002, available at <http://www.zbierka.sk/ 
zz/predpisy/default.aspx?PredpisID=13423&FileName=95-z270&Rocnik=1995> [accessed 19 June 2011]. 
768 Hungarian Civic Party (MOS), Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) and Coexistence. Two 
other Hungarian minority parties existed, Hungarian People’s Party (MNP) and Hungarian People’s 
Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity, but these were not considered as ‘relevant’ due to the low 
percentage of votes they received in each election they participated in. See László Öllös, ‘Programy maďarských 
strán’, in Maďari na Slovensku (1989-2004): Súhrnná správa od zmeny režimu po vstup do Európskej únie, ed. 
by József Fazekas and Péter Hunčík (Šamorín: Fórum inšitút pre výskum menšín, 2008), pp. 59-87 (p. 64). 
769 László Öllös, ‘Programy maďarských strán’, p. 84. 
770 Miklós Duray, ‘The Hungarian Nationality in Slovakia’, April 1997, available at 
<http://www.hhrf.org/egyutt/A-MERANO.HTM> [accessed 20 June 2011]. This article was published on the 
website of the ethnic Hungarian party Coexistence which existed in Slovakia between 1990 and 1998.  
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Significantly, in 1998, the Hungarian Prime Minister Horn was replaced by a centre-
right coalition led by Viktor Orbán (1998-2002) from FIDESZ.
771
 Prior to the 
elections, Orbán demanded that the Czech Republic and Slovakia repeal the post-
World War II Beneš Decrees as a precondition for their EU membership. The Beneš 
Decrees provided a legal basis for the removal of the Czechoslovak citizenship of 
German and Hungarian minorities and expropriation of their property after 1945.
772
 
Rupnik considered Orbán’s activities as ‘an upsurge in pre-electoral nationalist fever 
that does not hesitate to compromise future cooperation in the name of settling past 
scores’.773 Nevertheless, these demands were not fulfilled. 
 
Regional stability and relative economic growth were good conditions for the 
Hungarian government’s active role ‘in contributing to designing instruments of 
linking minorities across frontiers to their kin-states’.774 The Hungarian minorities’ 
failure to create autonomies abroad and the institutionalisation of the relations 
between Hungary and its kin minority were most frequently discussed by the 
representatives of FIDESZ.
775
 The cabinet’s approach to the Hungarian minorities 
living abroad was demonstrated by its adoption of the Act on Hungarians Living in 
Neighbouring Countries (the so-called Status Law) in June 2001.
776
 This law was 
seriously criticised by Slovakia and Romania, the homes of the two most numerous 
Hungarian minority communities, as they saw Hungarian nationalism as the reason 
behind it. The law’s aim was to support Hungarian minorities living abroad in 
maintaining their identity, provide them with aid and secure them the right to vote on 
Hungarian territory. However, the agreements of these most affected countries, 
                                                          
771 Kiss and Zahorán, ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, pp. 48-50. 
772 See ‘The Beneš Decrees: implications for EU enlargement’, Euractiv.com, 26 June 2002, available at 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/benes-decrees-implications-eu-enlargement/article-110130> [accessed 
21 May 2011]. For a detailed analysis of the impacts of the Beneš Decrees, see Štefan Šutaj (ed.), Dekréty 
Edvarda Beneša v povojnovom období (Prešov: Universum, 2004). The Decrees will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
773 Jacques Rupnik, ‘The Other Central Europe’, East European Constitutional Review, 11 (2002), 68-70 (p. 68).  
774 Anca Popa, ‘In The Grey Zone: The Status of Hungarians Living Outside Their Countries. An Assessment of 
Hungarian Kin-State Policies in the Post-Communist Era’ (unpublished Master’s thesis, Central European 
University, 2006), p. 49. 
775 Nándor Bárdi, ‘The History of Relations between Hungarian Governments and Ethnic Hungarians Living 
Beyond the Borders of Hungary’, in The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection, ed. 
by Zoltán Kántor and others (Hokkaido University: Slavic Research Center, 2004), pp. 58-84 (p. 72). 
776 For a variety of perspectives and an in depth analysis of the Status Law, see, The Hungarian Status Law: 
Nation Building and/or Minority Protection, ed. by Zoltán Kántor and others (Hokkaido University: Slavic 
Research Center, 2004). 
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Slovakia and Romania, were essential to the Act. During FIDESZ’s leadership a 
compromise was secured only with Romania.
777
 
 
As for Slovakia, after the elections in 1998, critical comments from abroad on the 
Slovak government subsided and the Hungarian minority issue received less 
coverage. A new government was elected, led by Prime Minister Dzurinda (1998-
2002) from the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). Importantly, the broad right/left 
coalition of parties included also the Hungarian minority party, the Party of 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK).
778
 The main goal of this government was Slovak 
integration into the EU and NATO. In July 1999, the Slovak Parliament adopted the 
Act on National Minority Languages essential for Slovakia’s membership in the EU. 
The bill stated that an ethnic minority can use its mother tongue in official contact if, 
according to the last census, at least 20 percent of a municipality’s population belong 
to an ethnic minority.
779
 Fines introduced by the previous government in 1995 were 
abolished. This led to strong criticism by the opposition, the nationalist HZDS and 
SNS party.
780
 In 2002, Dzurinda won a second term and remained in office until 
2006. In addition, the ethnic Hungarian minority party, SMK, succeeded in staying 
in government. Indeed, SMK was most active during its two terms in the Slovak 
government, in 1998-2002 and 2002-2006.  
  
In Hungary, despite protests by FIDESZ, the aforementioned Status Law from 2001 
was amended under the socialist-liberal coalition led by Prime Minister Medgyessy 
(2002-2004), and definition of the controversial ‘united Hungarian nation’ was left 
out from the law.
781
 In autumn 2004, Ferenc Gyurcsány took over the government 
with the foreign policy aim of avoiding conflicts with neighbours.
782
 Yet, the 
atmosphere was stirred in December 2004, when the opposition party FIDESZ 
                                                          
777 Kiss and Zahorán, ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, pp. 50-58. The privileges for ethnic 
Hungarians abroad included areas such as education, culture, travel expenses, health care services, access to the 
labour market and financial support. For a detailed account on the privileges, see Herbert Küpper, ‘Hungary’s 
Controversial Status Law’, in The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection, ed. by 
Zoltán Kántor and others (Hokkaido University: Slavic Research Center, 2004), pp. 313-27 (pp. 317-19). 
778 Henderson, ‘Slovak Political Parties and the EU’, p. 152. 
779 See ‘Zákon z 10. júla 1999 o používaní jazykov národnostných menšín’, Zbierka zákonov č. 184/1999, part 
81, pp. 1418-19, available at <http://www.zbierka.sk/Default.aspx?sid=15&PredpisID=14861&FileName=99-
z184&Rocnik=1999& AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1> [accessed 21 June 2011]. 
780 Jakub Groszkowski and Mariusz Bocian, ‘The Slovak-Hungarian dispute over Slovakia’s language law’, 
Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW Commnetary, Issue 30, 16 October 2009, 1-5 (p. 1). 
781 This term will be discussed in depth in the next section. 
782 Kiss and Zahorán, ‘Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy’, p. 52. However, as these authors note, 
between 2002 and 2007 there was no meeting of Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia. 
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initiated an unsuccessful referendum on dual citizenship for Hungarians living 
abroad. It was considered ‘a hot political issue’.783 The leader of FIDESZ, Viktor 
Orbán, increased the confrontational character of the referendum when he 
emphasised that Hungarians living abroad would not be given citizenship but would 
have it ‘returned’ to them.784 Expectations that this topic would be on the agenda in 
the near future were fulfilled after the Hungarian elections in 2010. Gyurcsány 
stayed in office for his second term, but then resigned in 2009 due to a decrease in 
his government’s popularity caused by the economic crisis. He was succeeded by 
Gordon Bajnai (2009-2010).
785
 
In Slovakia, in 2006, the left wing party SMER-SD, led by Róbert Fico, won the 
elections. The new government consisted also of Mečiar’s ĽS-HZDS and the Slovak 
National Party (SNS). SMER-SD was criticised at the EU level for its choice of 
coalition partners. For ‘entering a government coalition with the extreme nationalist 
SNS’, SMER was suspended for two years from membership in the Party of 
European Socialists (PES).
786
 In contrast to the previous two Slovak governments, 
the constellation of this cabinet indicated that Slovak-Hungarian issues would be 
dealt with more often. Indeed, during Fico’s government, relations between Slovakia 
and Hungary were considered to be ‘at the lowest point for many years’.787 
Significantly, in 2006, the ethnic Hungarian minority party representative, 
Miklós Duray, during the ‘European models of autonomy’ conference in Budapest 
stated that the international community denied Slovak Hungarians the right to self-
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and Wiebke Sievers (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), pp. 275-304 (p. 291). 
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785 See ‘“Obstacle” Hungary PM to resign’, BBC News, 21 March 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/ europe/7956610.stm> [accessed 23 June 2011]; and Edith Balasz and Charles Forelle, ‘Hungary’s 
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787 ‘Protests over Slovak language law’, BBC News, 2 September 2009.  
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determination and added: ‘Kosovo Albanians will maybe have it earlier, fingers 
crossed’.788 This and similar statements started to resonate in Slovakia.789 
 
Overall, from the developments in Hungarian foreign policy since the 1990s, it has 
become clear that the main difference between the left-wing and right-wing parties in 
the ruling government was in their national policies, including their approach to the 
issue of the Hungarian minorities living abroad. For the left-wing parties the issue of 
the Hungarian minorities was secondary to the cultivation and preservation of good 
neighborhood relations.
790 
On the other hand, for the right-wing party FIDESZ the 
status of ethnic Hungarians living abroad was a central issue, and as such was clearly 
reflected in its foreign political actions.
791
  
 
5.2 The Political Context: Slovak-Hungarian Relations (2007-2011) 
On the basis of the previous section – serving as a brief explanation of relations 
between Slovakia and Hungary until 2006 – this part will examine Slovak-Hungarian 
relations in the 2007-2011 period, which provides the political context in which 
Kosovo’s independence was debated. This background is essential for understanding 
the Slovak standpoint on Kosovo. Debate about the future of Kosovo was in fact, to 
a great extent, a discussion about Slovak-Hungarian relations on both a national and 
bilateral level.
792 
  
 
As Peter Weiss, the current Slovak Ambassador to Hungary, stated, ‘regarding 
Slovak-Hungarian relations, about 95 percent is a positive agenda and 5 percent is, 
by my guess, an agenda which is connected to two points: a different perception of 
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history and historical experience and secondly, a different perception of the status 
and rights of ethnic minority members. These two points usually dominate’.793 This 
remark highlights the significance of the ethnic minority issues in the political 
discourse between the two countries. 
 
5.2.1 The New Leader of SMK 
On 31 March 2007 the SMK assembly elected a new leader, Pál Csáky, replacing 
Béla Bugár, who had led the party since its establishment in 1998.
794
 However, after 
the elections, conflicts between Bugár and Csáky and their respective supporters 
became tense.
795
 Bugár had earlier tried to eliminate the influence of Miklós Duray, 
which had been undermined by Csáky, who offered him the position of Deputy 
Chairman for Strategy. Duray’s position was noteworthy inasmuch as he was a well-
known supporter of autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Soon, the new 
methods of policy implementation by SMK entered into a dispute with its former 
coalition allies, SDKÚ-DS and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).
796
 The 
Chairman of KDH stated that if SMK’s policy ‘would lead to a threat to the national 
and state interests of the Slovak Republic and jeopardise the sovereignty of the 
territory of Slovakia’ it would reconsider its cooperation with SMK. This ‘threat’ 
was understood to be a strategy for autonomy in the Southern part of Slovakia.
797 
The internal disagreements on SMK’s direction ultimately split the party, with Bugár 
leaving in June 2009 to create a new political party, Most-Híd. The election of Csáky 
and Duray’s new position was significant as it indicated that party policies and the 
resulting decisions would become more radical. Likewise, it was expected that 
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[accessed 20 May 2011]. It is interesting to note that the initiator of this stance towards SMK was Vladimír Palko 
who was about to be a candidate for the chairmanship elections in KDH. Hrušovský who was the Chairman 
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various aspects regarding the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia would be 
raised.  
 
During 2007, particularly in the second half of the year, the relationship between 
Slovakia and Hungary was on a sensitive footing.
798
 Of note was an unofficial visit 
of the Hungarian president Sólyom in August to Slovakia. It was on the occasion of 
the Hungarian national day – the day of St. Stephen. Sólyom laid a wreath on the 
statue of St. Stephen in Diakovce, where he had been invited by SMK. However, he 
did not meet with the Slovak President or any other political representatives, except 
SMK.
799
  
 
Soon after, SMK devised a requirement to compensate citizens of Hungarian 
nationality for the events after the Second World War, in reference to the so called 
Beneš Decrees.800 The first attempts to open the Beneš Decrees took place after 
November 1989 and in 2002, before Slovakia became an EU member, when the 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, claimed that they had been annulled. The 
initiation of this discussion united MPs in the Parliament and led, on 20 September 
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800 Štefan Šutaj and Zlatica Sáposová, ‘Národnostné menšiny 2007’, in Slovensko 2007: Súhrnná správa o stave 
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otázky, 2008), p. 180. The decrees of the post-war Czechoslovak president, Edvard Beneš, legitimised the 
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Beneš decrees: implications for EU enlargement’, Euractiv.com, 26 June 2002, available at 
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2007, to the adoption of a resolution by the Slovak Parliament confirming that 
Slovakia would not revoke the Beneš Decrees.801 Significantly, the resolution was 
drafted by the Slovak National Party (SNS) and supported by 120 MPs. Against 
were only 20 representatives of SMK.
802
 The Slovak representatives stated that ‘to 
open up this problem would mean to call into question the results of the Second 
World War’ (Čaplovič, SMER-SD) and that ‘it’s not needed to revive the past’ 
(Kukan, SDKÚ-DS).
803
 Furthermore, the announcement that in September 2007 the 
chairman of SMK wanted to put to the Slovak Parliament a compensation proposal 
led to further discussion. In fact, SMK stopped this initiative due to the unexpectedly 
increased tensions it created in Slovak-Hungarian relations.
804
 
 
Attempts at passing a declaration on historical reconciliation between Slovakia and 
Hungary had been a topic for discussion since 1989. The notion of a reciprocal 
apology was brought up again by the SMK in September 2007. However, Slovak 
politicians’ reactions were very clear and they refused to apologise to the 
Hungarians.
805 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kubiš, argued that the whole 
initiative of the SMK was not discussed with the Slovak side and that although the 
aim should be reconciliation, ‘it engenders confrontation’.806 
 
Importantly, in September, tensions between SNS and SMK increased considerably. 
The Slovak Parliament’s resolution, confirming that a renouncement of the Beneš 
Decrees was not going to happen, received criticism from both the SMK and 
Hungarian politicians. Pál Csáky, the SMK leader, even sent a letter to the European 
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Parliament about the alarming situation in Slovakia.
807
 For Slota, the leader of SNS, 
the resolution was a reaction towards tensions created by Hungarians. However, he 
also noted that the violence by Germans during the war was comparable to the 
violence committed by Hungarian fascists in southern Slovakia.
 
In return, Csáky 
argued that Slota was ‘damaging the good name of the Slovak Republic in the whole 
democratic world’.808 Among others, Slota addressed several negative statements 
towards Csáky, including vulgar language. Prime Minister Fico disagreed with 
Slota’s comments, but claimed that he had been provoked by Csáky. Urbáni (ĽS-
HZDS) from the Parliamentary Committee for European Affairs noted that the 
comments of both politicians ‘are not worth commenting on and do damage to 
Slovakia’.809 Significantly, after the SMER-SD’s suspension from the Party of 
European Socialists (PES) in 2006 related to forming a coalition with SNS, during 
2007, SMER lobbied for their return to PES. Yet, comments by its coalition partner 
Slota, did not positively impact on the situation. In this respect, Hannes Swoboda 
from PES had noted that Slota needed to become aware that his vulgar comments 
were harming Slovakia.
810
 
 
As for the Foreign Minister Kubiš, he criticised both politicians’ behaviour. He 
condemned Slota’s vulgar statements addressed to Csáky, arguing that they were 
indecent and damaged the good name of Slovakia abroad. However, he considered 
Csáky’s attempts to repay victims of the Beneš Decrees as a planned provocation.811 
‘Unfortunately in Slovakia, either on the side of the Hungarian minority or among 
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September 2007. 
809 ‘O konflikte P. Csákyho s J. Slotom vedia už aj v Európskom parlamente’, STV 2, Správy a komentáre, 26 
September 2007. Slota referred to Csáky as a ‘vomit’ and ‘manure’. 
810 ‘Fico má pre Slotove nadávky pochopenie’, Pravda, 28 September 2007, p. 4. Indeed, on 4 October, PES 
decided that SMER’s membership would not be reinstated as yet.  
811 ‘Slota a Csáky škodia Slovensku, tvrdí Kubiš’, Pravda, 2 October 2007. 
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some Slovak political powers, we have politicians who very easily slide to a 
nationalistic form’, added Kubiš.812 
 
Nevertheless, in October, during another unofficial visit to Slovakia, the Hungarian 
President Sólyom made some critical statements towards the financing of the 
Hungarian minority and resolution of the Slovak National Council on the 
inviolability of post Second World War legislation, the Beneš Decrees. The Slovak 
official representatives argued that by making these comments he exceeded the 
scope of a private visit.
813
 Sólyom was invited by the representatives of the South 
Slovak town Komárno and civic association Palatinus. Apart from his meeting with 
the representatives of the town he met with the leaders of SMK. The Beneš Decrees 
remained high on the agenda and were strongly criticised by the Hungarian 
representatives.
814
 Notably, for Sólyom, the unofficial meetings served to strengthen 
the relationship between the Hungarian President and the Hungarian community 
living behind the borders of Hungary.
815
 Prime Minister Fico argued that Sólyom 
had abused his visit for political purposes, stating during a press conference: ‘The 
Government of the Slovak Republic is a government of a sovereign country. And 
simply, we cannot allow highest representatives of other countries, particularly from 
Hungary, to behave in Southern Slovakia as if they would be in North Hungary’.816 
Kubiš argued that Sólyom was not a private person and that a ‘private visit does not 
serve for expression of political or public opinions’.817 
 
In addition, Katalin Szili, chairman of the Hungarian Parliament, cancelled her 
official visit to Slovakia on account of disagreeing with the Beneš Decrees. 
However, on 6 October 2007, she unofficially visited Slovakia for an event to 
commemorate the Hungarian families displaced from Slovakia under the Beneš 
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Decrees 60 years ago.
818
 These events only further worsened relations between both 
countries. 
 
As a leaked cable revealed, the US Embassy observed with concern the latest 
Slovak-Hungarian developments. In this sense, the US Ambassador Vallee reported: 
 
Csaky, who took over the leadership of the party in March, is a savvy 
pol. He undoubtedly knew that his sop to a shrinking electoral base – 
especially his comments on reparation – would set in motion a divisive 
debate that would resonate beyond Slovakia’s borders. Indeed, it seems 
clear that was his intent. Csaky’s predecessor, Bela Bugar, likely would 
not have pushed the issue as hard and recently softly criticized the visit 
of President Sólyom in the press. The Smer-led government has been 
embarrassed and put on the defensive by Slota’s crude rhetoric […] and, 
despite its earlier attempts to remain above the fray, has joined the tit-
for-tat following the Csaky-engineered visit of Hungarian President 
Sólyom to Slovakia.
819
 
 
The unofficial visits by President Sólyom and chairman Szili, together with tensions 
created after the Beneš Decrees debate, contributed to the deterioration of relations 
between Slovakia and Hungary and led to a bilateral crisis.
820
  
 
5.2.2 The Issue of Autonomy 
Soon after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in March 2008, representatives of 
the Hungarian Autonomous Council of the Carpathian Basin, Kárpát-Medencei 
Magyar Autonómia Tanács (KMAT), stated that they would ask for the support of 
NATO and the EU in their efforts to secure Hungarian minority groups’ right to self-
determination.
821
 The SMK representative, Duray, participated at the Council’s 
meeting on 19 March 2008 in Budapest. Tökés, the Romanian MEP representing the 
Hungarian minority who was elected chairman of KMAT, expressed his plans to 
bring up this topic during the NATO summit in Bucharest and ask NATO members 
                                                          
818 See ‘Sziliová: Neprišla som rozprávať’, Pravda, 6 October 2007, available at <http://spravy.pravda.sk/ 
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07Bratislava560, 10 October 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07BRATISLAVA560.html> [accessed 
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to consider support for democratic autonomy efforts in accordance with Ahtisaari’s 
plan for Kosovo within the security policy of the Alliance.
822
 
 
In September, SMK was present at the Forum of Hungarian MPs of the Carpathian 
Basin held in Budapest. The Forum was established in 2004 but since March 2008 it 
has been an institutional part of the Hungarian Parliament.
823
 Later in October, the 
chairman of SMK, Pál Csáky met with the Romanian MEP representing the 
Hungarian minority, Tökés, to discuss questions regarding autonomy. The Slovak 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kubiš, expressed his concerns over the topics of their 
debates and said that they were very dangerous. He stated in a press conference that 
‘any steps taken on the Slovak political scene which stir passions and contribute to 
radicalism and extremism are unacceptable’.824 The Hungarian Foreign Minister, 
Kinga Gönz, accused the Slovak government of not fulfilling promises related to the 
Hungarian minority and discrimination of the ethnic Hungarian population in 
Southern Slovakia. She also criticised verbal attacks on Csáky related to his contacts 
with KMAT.
825
  
 
On 10 October, as a reaction to Csáky’s recent actions and the criticism from the 
Hungarian government, the Slovak Foreign Ministry circulated a document on 
Slovak-Hungarian relations to NATO and EU missions in Bratislava. A US dispatch 
revealed it stating that ‘since the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, there have 
evidently been intensified efforts by the political representatives of Hungarian 
minorities in states neighbouring Hungary, including Slovakia, to open the issue of 
the creation of ethnically autonomous areas on the territories of these countries. The 
attitudes of several political actors in Hungary contribute to the growth of this trend’. 
Furthermore, it also denounced support of the Hungarian Parliament for the Forum 
of Hungarian MPs in the Carpathian Basin and the forum’s decision to ‘establish a 
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Székely Land in the Romanian region of Transylvania mainly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. See Áron 
Buzogány, ‘Rumäniens Kosovo-Komplex zwischen doppeltem Präzedenzfall und EU-Verpflichtungen: 
Siebenbürgen, die Republik Moldau, Transnistrien’, Südosteuropa, 56 (2008), 441-48 (p. 442). 
823 ‘Slovensko-maďarské vzťahy’, Euractiv.sk, 31 January 2010, available at <http://www.euractiv.sk/ 
rozsirovanie/ zoznam_liniek/slovensko-madarske-vztahy-000240> [accessed 7 September 2012]. This effectively 
means that the Forum is financed from the budget of the Hungarian Parliament.  
824 ‘Politika: Ministra Kubiša znepokojil obsah rozhovorov Csákyho a Tökésa’, TASR, 2 October 2008. 
825 ‘Die Slowakei und Ungarn auf Kollisionskurs: Minderheitenpolitik als Quelle ständiger Irritation’, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 5 October 2008.  
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lobbying office in Brussels, whose main goal is the promotion of the idea of 
autonomy’.826 
 
Relations between Hungary and Slovakia further deteriorated after Slovak police 
intervened prior to a football match in the southern town of Slovakia, Dunajská 
Streda. According to the press, Slovak police was alerted by its Hungarian 
colleagues that Hungarian extremists planned to attend the match. In SMK’s view 
the police force was not adequate and the Hungarian government requested 
investigation of the intervention.
827
  
 
In response to SMK’s earlier activity in the Forum of Hungarian MPs of the 
Carpathian Basin, on 4 November 2008, the Slovak Parliament passed a resolution 
expressing concern that members of the Slovak Parliament for SMK participated in 
the Forum. It criticised the fact that earlier in March the Hungarian Parliament 
passed a resolution stating that the Forum was institutionally part of the Hungarian 
Parliament, which created concern that the Hungarian Parliament ‘interferes in the 
affairs of sovereign Slovak Republic’.828  
 
Meanwhile, the US attentively observed development of the situation in Slovakia in 
relation to the Hungarian minority and it remained focused on moving Slovakia to 
accept Kosovo’s independence. Evidence for this comes from a cable from the end 
of October 2008 revealing the necessity to take a number of steps in order to change 
the Slovak view on Kosovo. The US Ambassador Obsitnik had briefed that he 
planned ‘to use recent key recognitions, i.e., by Montenegro, Portugal and 
Macedonia, to press the Slovaks toward a more flexible stance’.829 Furthermore, 
Obsitnik stated: 
                                                          
826 ‘Slovak-Hungarian tensions risk damaging majority-minority relations within Slovakia’, US Embassy 
Bratislava, reference ID 08Bratislava507, 4 November 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08 
BRATISLAVA507.html> [accessed 19 August 2012]. 
827 ‘SMK: Zásah nebol adekvátny’, SME, 3 November 2008. Police arrested 35 persons: 15 fans of the football 
team Slovan Bratislava, 3 fans of DAC Dunajská Streda and 17 citizens of Hungary. 
828 See ‘Uznesenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky zo 4. novembra 2008 k informácii o vzťahoch a možných 
negatívnych dopadoch inštitucionalizácie Fóra maďarských poslancov Karpatskej kotliny pri maďarskom 
parlamente na politický a spoločenský vývoj strednej Európy‘, Nr. 1780/2008, Národná rada Slovenskej 
republiky, 4 November 2008. 
829 ‘Moving Slovakia closer to “yes” on Kosovo’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 08Bratislava487, 24 
October 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BRATISLAVA487.html> [accessed 4 April 2012]. This 
cable was addressed to Stuart Jones who was Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the Balkan 
region in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 
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I ask for Washington’s support for a concerted effort to help shift Slovak 
official and public opinion. The two key pillars of the argument would be 
that Kosovo’s independence is consistent with international law and that 
acceptance of Kosovo’s independence by all EU members will help 
Serbia move forward and closer to the European Union. We will also 
seek to knock down flawed comparisons between Slovakia’s ethnic 
Hungarians and Kosovo Albanians.
830
  
 
In fact, Obsitnik noted that the Slovak public and elite were ‘ill-informed’ about the 
history of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo and Kosovo’s advancement 
towards a multi-ethnic society. With this in mind, Ambassador Obsitnik in detail 
described the strategy and steps that the Embassy aimed to take:  
 
Using the resources and contacts we have, Embassy Bratislava will 
intensify our outreach on Kosovo, making the case that moving forward 
on the basis of an independent Kosovo is best not only for Kosovo, but 
also for Serbia. Given a lack of regular personal contact with PM Fico, I 
will utilize other levers of influence, e.g., close colleagues of Fico such 
as Culture Minister Madaric and key ‘influentials,’ such as former 
Ambassador Kacer, to convey our messages. I will also use the goodwill 
gained from President Gasparovic’s recent visit to the U.S. to press him 
to take a more pragmatic stance. I hope to initiate a mini ‘contact group’ 
of diplomats in Bratislava to strategize about how to encourage 
constructive Slovak policy.  We will press Hungarian politicians and 
intellectuals to repeat/amplify the message that Kosovo is not a 
precedent for ethnic Hungarians in Kosovo, and will host roundtables 
and events aimed at strengthening Slovak-Hungarian relations.  In an 
effort to build broader and more accurate public understanding of the 
Balkans, particularly the Serbian-Kosovo conflict, post is considering a 
multi-city ‘film festival,’ which could foster greater objectivity and 
understanding of the Balkan conflicts. We would then seek to place films 
in schools, libraries and offer them to Slovak TV stations.
831
 
                                                          
830 ‘Moving Slovakia closer to “yes” on Kosovo’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 08Bratislava487, 24 
October 2008. 
831 ‘Moving Slovakia closer to “yes” on Kosovo’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 08Bratislava487, 24 
October 2008. Obsitnik also suggested sending respected US government officials (as Stuart Jones) and lawyers 
to Slovakia to discuss the Balkan policy and legality of Kosovo respectively. Likewise, he recommended for the 
US to sponsor an exchange program for Slovaks to travel to Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians to Slovakia. In 
addition, he proposed frequent briefing about positive developments in Kosovo. In regards to the cooperation 
with the EU on the recognition of Kosovo, Obsitnik noted, ‘I believe that more consultation with the EU and 
activism by Brussels could help move the ball forward. Perhaps Washington and key European capitals, e.g., 
Paris and Berlin, could craft a more closely-coordinated effort aimed at securing recognition by all EU members 
by a date certain, e.g., the anniversary of Kosovo’s independence. I know such results would be very tough to 
achieve, but I often have the sense that the Slovaks are hearing about Kosovo from this Embassy, but not very 
much from their EU colleagues either here or in Brussels. Based on my discussions with a wide range of Slovaks 
during the past 10 months, I believe that it is essential that we intensify our efforts precisely now, because of 
positive developments in Kosovo and Serbia and because this is the period in which we, the U.S. and the EU 
have maximum leverage on Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaders. Delays or setbacks in progress in either 
Belgrade or Pristina will only harden Slovak attitudes’. 
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In June 2009, the Slovak Parliament passed amendments to the Act on the State 
Language of the Slovak Republic. The law stated that Slovak must be used in all 
official contacts but minorities had the right to use their native language in those 
municipalities where the minority forms at least 20 percent of the population. 
Furthermore, the act introduced fines for natural and legal persons offending the law 
after a written notice.
832
 The law was strongly criticised by the representatives of the 
Hungarian minority party, Hungary and some representatives of the EU. Michael 
Gahler, the Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, 
argued that the law did not conform to EU standards.
833
 The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated that the new law respected 
the rights of minorities, but expressed concerns over its enforcement.
834
 
 
In August 2009, the autonomy issue was again raised in Slovakia. The vice-chairman 
of SMK, Duray, stated several times that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia fulfils 
all conditions for rights of personal autonomy to be fully afforded. However, he 
noted that he saw some fear in his party colleagues over agreeing a concrete proposal 
on autonomy as each of their proposals was met with great resistance.
835
 In Duray’s 
own words, ‘without taking into consideration political will in Slovakia, personal or 
so-called cultural autonomy is possible. I can hardly imagine a territorial autonomy, 
because the territory where Hungarians live is not very suitable for it. Personal 
autonomy does not require a change of the territorial system’. Duray further argued 
that parallel bodies could be established in municipalities and higher territorial units, 
as this does not require changes. ‘But even for this, there is no political willingness. 
There is constantly this justification that autonomy [in Slovakia] is the last step 
before independence’, he explained.836  
 
                                                          
832 See ‘Zákon z 30. júna 2009, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 270/1995 
Z. z. o štátnom jazyku Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých 
zákonov’, Zbierka zákonov č. 318/2009, part 113, pp. 2362-67, available at <http://www.zbierka.sk/ 
zz/predpisy/default.aspx?PredpisID=209137&FileName=zz2009-00318-0209137&Rocnik=2009> [accessed 18 
June 2011]. 
833 ‘German MEP slams Slovak language law’, Euractiv.com, 10 July 2009, available at 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/culture/german-mep-slams-slovak-language-law/article-183982> [accessed on 20 
June 2011]. 
834 ‘Protests over Slovak language law’, BBC News, 2 September 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/8232878.stm> [accessed 22 June 2011]. 
835 ‘Duray: Autonómia je cieľ, Veľké Maďarsko iba sen’, Aktualne.sk, 5 August 2009. 
836 Miklós Duray, comments to the author, 1 April 2011. Duray further added that at that moment, none of the 
political parties was inclined to do so and Most-Híd, in his perspective, was not succeeding in retaining the 
Hungarian voters. 
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In the same month, another unofficial visit by president Sólyom received the 
attention of the media. However, this time, he was denied entry into Slovakia. 
Sólyom was coming to unveil a statue of St. Stephen, the founder and first king of 
the Hungarian state, in Komárno where he was supposed to hold a public speech.
837
 
His visit was perceived as a provocation due to the fact that the day of his visit, 21 
August, was an anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by most of the 
Warsaw Pact countries in 1968, including Hungarian troops. Furthermore, Slovak 
officials stated that the Hungarian President breached diplomatic standards and 
practice; for instance he planned to have a public speech during his private visit and 
did not intend to meet any Slovak officials.
838
 This incident further increased the 
tensions between Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarian side saw this issue from 
a different perspective and Hungarian officials strongly condemned it, commenting 
that they would take this incident to the EU level. Slovakia’s new Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, argued that the Hungarian President ignored the 
rules for organising visits by state leaders. He further noted: ‘We are patiently trying 
to explain to our Hungarian friends that rather than sending letters (of protest) all 
over the planet, it would be better to sit down with us and discuss these issues’.839 
Indeed, Hungary took Slovakia to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
However, on 16 October 2012, the Court decided that ‘Slovakia did not breach EU 
law by refusing entry into its territory to the President of Hungary’. Slovakia had the 
right to block the Hungarian President’s entry and the Court dismissed Hungary’s 
complaint entirely.
840
 
 
                                                          
837 As Jan Puhl put it, ‘Stephen I (969-1038) is seen as not only the founder of the Hungarian empire but also the 
conqueror of Great Moravia, the entity nationally conscious Slovaks consider the medieval precursor to modern-
day Slovakia.’ See Jan Puhl, ‘Slowakei: Unerschütterliche Treue’, Der Spiegel, 38 (2009), p. 85. 
838 Michaela Terenzani-Stanková, ‘Hungarian president denied entry to Slovakia’, The Slovak Spectator, 31 
August 2009 <http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36337/2/hungarian_president_denied_entry_to 
_slovakia.html> [accessed 12 November 2010]. See also ‘Maďarsko: O nevpustení Sólyoma sa dozvie Európa’, 
Aktualne.sk, 22 August 2009, <http://aktualne.centrum.sk/zahranicie/europa/clanek.phtml?id=1189015> 
[accessed 15 May 2011]. 
839 Mohit Joshi, ‘Slovak foreign minister says Hungary ignored “rules” on visit’, TopNews.in, 27 August 2009, 
available at <http://www.topnews.in/slovak-foreign-minister-says-hungary-ignored-rules-visit-2207236> 
[accessed 21 May 2011]. 
840 Furthermore, the Court noted that ‘the fact that an EU citizen performs the duties of Head of State is such as 
to justify a limitation, based on international law, on the exercise of the right of movement conferred on that 
person by EU law. The Court finds that EU law did not oblige Sovakia to guarantee access to its territory to the 
President of Hungary’. See ‘Judgment in Case C-364/10: Hungary v Slovakia’, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, Press and Information, Press release No 131/12, Luxembourg, 16 October 2012. See also Ľuboš 
Kostelanský, ‘Vyhrali sme vážny spor nad Maďarskom’, Hospodárske Noviny, 17 October 2012, p. 5; Dag 
Daniš, ‘Maďari a Ficova čiara’, Hospodárske Noviny, 17 October 2012, p. 9. 
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SMK’s broad view on autonomy was presented in their programme for the 2010 
elections. It stated that ‘in order to increase the chances of minority communities in 
Slovakia it is important to extend the self-governance in the areas of culture, 
education and regional self-governance.’841 If a drive towards autonomy was behind 
this, it was not stated directly by the then Vice-Chairman, Jozef Berényi, who simply 
said: ‘We want to analyse all possibilities’.842 Nor did SMK representatives explain 
what they understood by cultural and school autonomy, though Miklós Duray did 
say ‘it is premature to talk about it at length’. In the past, there were several disputes 
between Duray and the former chairman of SMK, Béla Bugár, who distanced 
himself from Duray’s words.843 The chairman of SDKÚ, Mikuláš Dzurinda, 
commented on tendencies towards autonomy: ‘Everybody who dreams about 
territorial autonomy in Slovakia will once awake from a dream that is stupid and 
ridiculous’.844 The term ‘autonomy’ was avoided by SMK but other synonyms, such 
as self-governance, were often used.  From these developments one cannot deny that 
a split existed within the SMK. There was also a division between supporters of the 
new chairman, Csáky, and the former, Bugár. However, it also started to become 
clear that the preferences of SMK were decreasing in number.  
 
As for Slovakia, the subject of autonomy for a region populated by the ethnic 
Hungarian minority was a constantly contested issue engendering tensions in the 
relationship.  The subject was nevertheless raised again, this time by a representative 
of Hungary from FIDESZ, Viktor Orbán. During his visit to the congress of SMK in 
October 2009 he openly discussed autonomy and among other things noted that 
‘every national community has the right to autonomy’. His statements were, 
repeatedly and as usual, criticised by Ján Slota, chairman of the Slovak National 
Party (SNS).
845
  
 
 
                                                          
841 ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zreteľnejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009, available at  
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843 ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zreteľnejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009. 
844 ‘Slovo autonómia počuť z SMK čoraz zreteľnejšie’, Pravda, 20 October 2009. 
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5.2.3 2010 and Beyond: Elections in Hungary and Slovakia  
In 2010 interactions between Slovakia and Hungary intensified. After two terms of 
left-wing leadership in Hungary, in April, the right-wing party FIDESZ was elected 
to the Hungarian government. The following month, the newly elected Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party, FIDESZ, initiated amendments to the 
Hungarian citizenship law, allowing the 2.5 million ethnic Hungarians living abroad 
to apply for citizenship.
846
 The law came into effect in January 2011.  
 
The amended Hungarian citizenship law includes the term which has been 
previously a source of criticism from Slovak representatives, namely the ‘united 
Hungarian nation’. This term is contentious due to its different meanings. The 
Hungarian philosopher János Kis explained in great detail that the ‘united Hungarian 
nation’ can refer not only to a cultural and linguistic community but also to a 
political entity. Kis noted that when referring to a cultural community, one refers to 
the totality of those who regard Hungarian language, culture and history as their own 
and who in this respect define themselves and one another as Hungarians.
 847
 In this 
formulation, the broad aim is to maintain the cultural nation, or in other words, ‘to 
slow down outwards assimilation and to strengthen loyalty of individual Hungarians 
to the entire Hungarian population whose ethnic homeland is the territory of the 
historic Hungarian state’.848 However, if one understands under the ‘united 
Hungarian nation’ a political entity, its interpretation and implications differ 
considerably. Under this condition, Kis states, ‘the task of the law is to be 
understood as set by the political separation of the various geographic parts of the 
Hungarian nation. And the fact of political separation does not set this task 
indirectly, via the disadvantaged position of the minority parts of the Hungarian 
nation, but directly, as a consequence of the inseparability of the nation and its 
                                                          
846 Miklós Duray argued that FIDESZ initiated the amendments this early because of Jobbik. He explained that 
‘Jobbik got into the parliament and FIDESZ needed to hurry up to initiate the dual citizenship law, so that they 
won’t be overtaken by Jobbik’. Miklós Duray, comments to the author, 1 April 2011. Similarly, a Senior 
diplomat stated, ‘FIDESZ’s nationalist agenda […] is boosted not by its coalition partners but by a party outside 
the government. Jobbik is a threat to FIDESZ and FIDESZ’s responses are to become nationalist like Jobbik’. 
Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. Jobbik (Movement for a better Hungary) is a 
radical nationalist party, currently the third largest in Hungary with representatives also in the European 
Parliament. 
847 János Kis, ‘The Status Law: Hungary at the Crossroads’, in The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building 
and/or Minority Protection, ed. by Zoltán Kántor and others (Hokkaido University: Slavic Research Center, 
2004), pp. 152-76 (p. 161). 
848 Kis, ‘The Status Law’, p. 162. 
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state’.849 In this sense, Kis understands the task as being the unification of a political 
nation.
850
 The main issue that arises here is that a legal tie between Hungary and 
people living in and having citizenship of a neighbouring country has an effect on 
that country’s sovereign authority, in this case Slovakia’s. In this situation, no legal 
link can be established without the agreement of that particular state.
851
 Here it must 
be noted that the term ‘united Hungarian nation’ is also included in another 
Hungarian document, the amended Hungarian constitution passed in 2011, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Importantly, the Hungarian side did not discuss amendments to the Hungarian 
citizenship law with its neighbours, and Slovakia’s ruling coalition led by Prime 
Minister Fico considered it to be a threat. What followed was a retaliatory measure: 
Slovakia amended its own citizenship law, so that it contained the following new 
provision: if Slovak citizens opt for dual nationality, in most cases, except if they 
would acquire it through marriage or birth, they would lose their citizenship.
852
 
These amendments to Slovak citizenship law were passed just shortly before the 
latest Slovak elections in 2010, by the then coalition led by Fico. As the Economist 
put it, ‘Relations used to be icy [before the change of the Hungarian citizenship law]. 
Now they smell sulphurous’.853 
 
                                                          
849 Kis, ‘The Status Law’, p. 162. 
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851 Kis, ‘The Status Law’, p. 164. Significantly, the term ‘united Hungarian nation’ was an issue already in 2001 
as it was included also in the earlier mentioned Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. This term 
was back then not only an issue for Slovakia but also for Romania. When the Romanian Prime Minister 
demanded of Viktor Orbán to remove it from this Act, Orbán argued that it is based on a cultural concept of 
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rhetoric: ‘We have been waiting for eighty years for a bond, in a legal sense as well, to be formed between the 
parts of the Hungarian nation torn from each other, so that links may emerge that go beyond the existing spiritual 
ties’. Kossuth Rádió, Reggeli Krónika, 9 January 2002, as cited in Kiss, ‘The Status Law’, p. 163. 
852 See ‘Zákon z 26. mája 2010, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 
Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov’, Zbierka zákonov č. 250/2010, 
part 100, p. 2078, available at <http://www.zbierka.sk/Default.aspx?sid=15&PredpisID=209720&FileName 
=zz2010-00250-0209720&Rocnik=2010&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1> [accessed 10 June 2011]. See also 
‘Slovaks retaliate over Hungarian citizenship law’, BBC News Europe, 26 May 2010; ‘Slovak cabinet approves 
legislation in response to Hungary's Citizenship Act’, The Slovak Spectator, 26 May 2010, available at 
<http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/39016/10/slovak_cabinet_approves_legislation_in_response_to_hungarys 
_citizenship_act.html> [accessed 12 June 2011]. 
853 ‘Pandora’s passport’, The Economist, 3 June 2010, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/16283329> 
[accessed 6 November 2010]. 
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Despite SMER-SD’s victory in the 2010 elections, Fico was not able to build a 
coalition.
854
 Instead, SDKÚ-DS became the leading party of the new government. 
Iveta Radičová took the office of the Slovak Prime Minister while Dzurinda became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
855
 More importantly, SMK did not pass the five percent 
threshold necessary for getting into Parliament. Instead, the newly established ethnic 
Hungarian party, Most-Híd, became part of the government.
856
 As a result, it was 
expected that tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations would subside. However, 
interaction between Slovakia and Hungary impacted on the evolution of the 
situation. 
 
The new government, with Prime Minister Radičová, stated its aim to cancel the 
latest Slovak citizenship law as it did not agree with Fico’s amendments. However, 
Radičová also noted that based on the bilateral treaty between Slovakia and Hungary 
(passed in 1995), Hungary should have discussed changes in their citizenship law in 
a joint committee. Radičová argued that ‘unfortunately, that did not happen and 
therefore the [Hungarian] law is not acceptable for us’.857 On 15 February 2011, the 
Slovak side put forward a proposal on an agreement with Hungary in regard to the 
questions that arose through the Hungarian citizenship law and presented it to the 
Hungarian side via the earlier mentioned joint committee. In May 2011, the 
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, János Mártonyi, refused it, with the 
statement: ‘We don’t consider the proposal as a good starting point for 
                                                          
854 SMER-SD won the elections with 34.79 percent, however, excepting SNS there was no other party interested 
to build a coalition with SMER-SD. SNS just made it to the parliament with 5.07 percent of votes. ĽS-HZDS and 
the ethnic Hungarian party, SMK, failed to get into the parliament as they did not pass the 5 percent threshold 
and got 4.32 percent and 4.33 percent respectively. Despite the differences in their political ideologies, the 
government was formed by SDKÚ-DS (15.42 percent), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) (12.14 percent), KDH 
(8.52 percent) and Most-Híd (8.12 percent). See Statistical Office of the Slovak republic, ‘Elections to the Slovak 
Parliament in the year 2010’, Number of valid votes for political parties in SR available at 
<http://app.statistics.sk/ nrsr_2010/graf/graf1sr.jsp?lang=en> [accessed 15 March 2011]. For an analysis of the 
election results see also Tim Haughton, Tereza Novotná and Kevin Deegan-Krause, ‘The 2010 Czech and Slovak 
Parliamentary Elections: Red Cards to the ‘Winners’’, West European Politics, 34 (2011), 394-402. 
855 In the after-Mečiar period, Dzurinda was the first politician and chairman of a political party who became 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former ministers – Eduard Kukan, Ján Kubiš and Miroslav Lajčák – were all 
career diplomats. See Igor Stupňan, ‘Analýza: Z ohnivého premiéra zakríknutý minister zahraničia’, Pravda, 12 
June 2011. 
856 Due to early parliamentary elections, this government lasted only for two years – until March 2012. The term 
most/híd means ‘bridge’ in Slovakian and Hungarian, respectively. In addition, the party has in its subtitle ‘party 
of cooperation’. This indicates its aim to connect the Slovak majority and the ethnic Hungarians. With the 
formation of the moderate Most-Híd, the ethnic identity of SMK strengthened. After the elections it was clear 
that the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia opted for Most-Híd rather than SMK. For a detailed analysis and a 
comparison of both ethnic Hungarian parties, see Oľga Gyarfášová, ‘The 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: 
National Agenda on Retreat?’, Central European Political Studies Review, 8 (2011), 65-84. 
857 ‘Slovakia-Hungary row over citizenship law’, EuroActive.com, 27 January 2011, available at 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/central-europe/slovakia-hungary-row-citizenship-law-news-501640> [accessed 23 
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negotiations’.858 In November 2011, at a meeting of the Joint Slovak-Hungarian 
Commission on Minority Issues, Milan Ježovica, the State Secretary, called the 
Hungarian side to accelerate the timing of negotiations on an agreement related to 
the citizenship question.
859
 Despite the efforts and wishes of Radičová’s cabinet to 
make some changes to the law, discussions were postponed due to differing opinions 
in the coalition.
860
  
 
One of the first Slovaks to apply for Hungarian citizenship under the new law was 
the chairman of SMK, Jozef Berényi. He counted on the fact that the Slovak 
citizenship law would be amended, thus allowing him to keep Slovak citizenship too. 
However, when it became clear that no change was forthcoming he stated that he 
would not comment or publish any further statements on the progression of his 
application for Hungarian citizenship.
861
 Berényi’s step was significant as it was 
supposed to serve as an example to be followed by other ethnic Hungarians in 
Slovakia.
862
 
 
After the change of the Slovak government, in 2010, it was expected that the 
tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations would calm down. However, some argued 
that in fact the situation would not ease. Ján Čarnogurský claimed that the ‘goal and 
dream’ of Hungarian foreign policy was autonomy for the Hungarian minority in 
                                                          
858 ‘Maďarsko odmieta slovenské riešenie dvojakého občianstva’, Aktualne.sk, 12 May 2011, available at 
<http://aktualne.centrum.sk/domov/politika/clanek.phtml?id=1232976&tro5312_0_1> [accessed 28 May 2011]. 
See also Daniela Jancová, ‘Martonyi odpoveď nepriniesol’, Pravda, 13 May 2011, p. 4. 
859 ‘Spoločné zasadnutie Zmiešanej slovensko-maďarskej komisie v Budapešti’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Slovak Republic, 11 November 2011. 
860 In fact, as of May 2013, no changes were made to the law. It is worth noting that in March 2012, after early 
parliamentary elections, Fico returned to the government as Prime Minister. 
861 Duray expected that Berényi would withdraw his application for Hungarian citizenship and commented that it 
is not only about the citizenship; there is also a law about political parties that does not allow a non-Slovak 
citizen to be a member of a political party. Miklós Duray, comments to the author, 1 April 2011. In other words, 
if Berényi would get Hungarian citizenship he would automatically lose Slovak citizenship, and as a result he 
could no longer be the Chairman of SMK. 
862 In light of this, Prime Minister Fico stated in June 2012 that he did not have any information about Berényi 
having Hungarian citizenship. ‘3 Otázky pre: predsedu vlády Roberta Fica’, Slovenské národné noviny, 25 June 
2012. Notably, most recently, the European Court of Human Rights dealt with a complaint of two applicants – 
belonging to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia – who acquired Hungarian citizenship in 2011 and as a result of 
the current Slovak domestic law lost their Slovak citizenship. However, the Court unanimously rejected their 
complaint stating that the applicants ‘decided to acquire Hungarian citizenship while being aware of the 
consequences which such a decision would entail under Slovak law. Thus they were not denied Slovak 
citizenship arbitrarily in view of the applicable legal provisions’. See ‘Decision: Applications nos. 14927/12 and 
30415/12 Itván FEHÉR against Slovakia and Erzsébet DOLNÍK against Slovakia’, European Court of Human 
Rights (Third Section), 21 May 2013, available at <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=001-
121167> [accessed 8 June 2013]. See also, ‘Statement of the Slovak Foreign and European Affairs Ministry of 
the European Court of Human Rights regarding state citizenship of the Slovak Republic’, Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 6 June 2013. 
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Slovakia, and that since Orbán’s government had been in power, the goal of 
territorial autonomy had been repeated at every conference on the Hungarian 
minority living abroad. He argued that Slovakia was probably perceived as the 
‘weakest neighbour’ and based on this it was expected that autonomy could be 
achieved in Slovakia first. ‘Hungarians still consider the Trianon agreement as 
unfair’.863 Čarnogurský further claimed that 15 years ago, one Hungarian politician 
told him that after the fall of communism Hungarians hoped to achieve territorial 
autonomy for the Hungarian minority in the neighbouring countries. ‘However, so 
far they have not succeeded’.864 
 
When discussing autonomy it is important to note that on 1 March 2011, the 
Hungarian Delegation to the European People’s Party invited the Hungarian Council 
for Autonomy from the Carpathian Basin to a meeting at the European Parliament in 
Brussels. Representatives of Hungarian minorities were invited to discuss minority 
issues; the chairman of SMK, Jozef Berényi, who had observer status, was present, 
as was Pál Csáky.
865
 Interestingly, no attention was given to this event in the Slovak 
media. However, the importance of this meeting is expressed in the concluding 
statement of the Hungarian Autonomous Council of the Carpathian Basin: 
 
On 1 March 2011 in Brussels the Hungarian Autonomous Council of the 
Carpathian Basin, embracing the organisations of the Hungarian national 
communities outside of Hungary, arrived at the following conclusions 
and decisions: In unanimity they stated that territorial, personal and 
special legal status autonomy is the only guarantee for their further 
existence and development. To this end they will use all legal means to 
meet these right expectations and demands of the Hungarian 
                                                          
863 Vanda Vavrová, ‘Čarnogurský: Ani nová slovenská vláda nezmení cieľ maďarskej zahraničnej politiky, 
Pravda, 28 September 2010, p. 3. Ján Čarnogurský was Slovak Prime Minister (1991-1992) and Minister of 
Justice (1998-2002). 
864 ‘Čarnogurský: Musíme si obhájiť štátnosť proti maďarskej ofenzíve’, SME, 27 September 2010, available at 
<http://www.sme.sk/c/5565968/carnogursky-musime-si-obhajit-statnost-proti-madarskej-ofenzive.html> 
[accessed 23 May 2011]. 
865 Months later, on 3 June 2011, SMK was eventually approved as a full member of KMAT. Significant was the 
following note: ‘Taking into account that the Hungarian Coalition Party has announced its intention to join, and 
agreed to act consistently for the autonomy of the Hungarian community, the Szekler National Council decides to 
approve that the Hungarian Coalition Party be a full member of the Hungarian Autonomy Council in the 
Carpathian Basin’. See ‘Decision regarding the inclusion of the Hungarian Coalition Party in the Hungarian 
Autonomy Council in the Carpathian Basin’, Szekler National Council, 3 June 2011, available at 
<http://www.sznt.ro/en/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=219%3Aresolutions-adopted-on-the-
3rd-of-june-2011&catid=11%3Ahatarozatok&Itemid=15&lang=en> [accessed 7 September 2012]. This note had 
wider ramifications clearly identifying SMK’s aim to achieve autonomy for the Hungarian community.  
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communities. Such a solution is indispensable from the perspective of 
the stability of Europe.
866
 
 
Referral to ‘the stability of Europe’ represented a potentially significant statement as 
it indicated the possibility of conflicts and tensions if the demanded autonomies were 
not fulfilled. After the meeting, the chairman of this Council, a Romanian MEP 
representing the Hungarian minority, László Tökés, said that the Council wanted 
Hungary to adopt a protective role for Hungarian minorities living in areas that were 
ceded to neighbouring countries under peace treaties concluding the two World 
Wars. Furthermore, he added that Hungarian communities wanted officials of their 
countries to start negotiations over the autonomy issue and that they asked the 
European Union to support their endeavours.
867
 In the resolution, the Council 
commented on Kosovo and the Ahtisaari plan. It stated, among other things, that 
after the period of state collapses in the 1990s and conflicts in the Balkans: 
 
New states emerged: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro. The last example is the settling of the status of Kosovo, 
when the Wilsonian principle of self-determination clashed with the 
principle of territorial integrity, another international fundamental law. 
Concerning this, we again draw attention to the provisions referring to 
minorities of the Ahtisaari-plan supported by the majority of EU member 
states, which sees normalization of the relation between minority and 
majority possible only through the guarantee of collective rights of 
national communities and through the three-level autonomy of the Serb 
community of Kosovo. […] It is our conviction that the self-
determination of peoples is as much a fundamental principle of world 
order as the respect of territorial integrity of states. […] The autonomy of 
national communities – and this is illustrated by a series of positive 
European examples – is the interest of majority nations as well, since a 
prosperous region serves the interest of an entire country, as well as that 
of Europe.
868
 
 
In 2011 the Slovak-Hungarian relationship remained tense. Another heated debate 
was initiated in April when the Hungarian Parliament passed the new Hungarian 
constitution considered by Slovak officials as controversial.
869 
On 25 May, the 
                                                          
866 ‘Hungarian communities call for autonomy in Brussels’, Hungarian Autonomy Council, Press release, 2 
March 2011, available at <http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/KMAT_brussels> [accessed 25 May 2011]. 
867 ‘Hungarian communities call for autonomy in Brussels’, Hungarian Autonomy Council, Press release, 2 
March 2011, available at <http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/KMAT_brussels> [accessed 25 May 2011]. 
868 ‘Resolution on European stability and on traditional national communities’, Press release, 3 March 2011, 
<http://www.tokeslaszlo.eu/article/kmat_brussels_resolution2> [accessed 25 May 2011]. 
869 ‘Maďarský parlament prijal návrh novej ústavy’, SME, 18 April 2011, available at <http://www.sme.sk/c/ 
5857162/madarsky-parlament-prijal-navrh-novej-ustavy.html> [accessed 10 May 2011]. 
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Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dzurinda, delivered a speech in the Parliament 
on Slovak-Hungarian relations in which he discussed the most disputed parts of the 
Hungarian constitution included in Article 23, Section D. According to the 
document, Hungarian citizens living abroad, without permanent residence in 
Hungary, could vote. This article also includes formulations about collective rights 
and Hungary taking responsibility for Hungarians living abroad. Again, it mentions 
the united Hungarian nation and supports the establishment of autonomies abroad on 
an ethnic principle. Dzurinda refused any extra-territorial impact of this constitution 
on Slovak territory and stressed that the rights of Slovak citizens were based on 
individual rights as stated in the Slovak constitution and other international 
documents, such as the Lisbon Treaty. He also referred to a problematic triangle that 
caused tensions: the dual citizenship law passed by Hungary, the new Hungarian 
constitution, and the reform of the Hungarian electoral law.
870
 On 27 May, the 
Slovak Parliament passed a declaration refusing the possibility of any extra-
territorial impacts of the Hungarian constitution in Slovakia.
871
  
 
The latest amendments to the Act on the State Language of the Slovak Republic 
were passed in May 2011. Slovak President Ivan Gašparovič returned the law to the 
Parliament, arguing that amendments in the use of minority languages should have 
been implemented through a new law and not via amendments. However, on 28 June 
2011, the Parliament overruled the President’s veto and thus the Act became 
effective from July 2011. Alongside other clauses, the law states that if an ethnic 
minority forms over 15 percent of the population of a municipality in two 
consecutive censuses, it can use its mother tongue in official contact and the 
municipality receives a bilingual status. However, this will only be applicable in ten 
years’ time.872 Hungary criticised the amendments by stating that it determines 
                                                          
870 ‘Prejav ministra zahraničných vecí SR Mikuláša Dzurindu v NR SR na tému slovensko - maďarské vzťahy’, 
18th session, National Council of the Slovak Republic, 25 May 2011, available at <http://www.nrsr.sk/ 
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rada Slovenskej Republiky, 27 May 2011. 
872 See ‘Zákon z 28. júna 2011, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon č. 184/1999 Z. z. o používaní jazykov 
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opportunities rather than obligations for Slovakia for the use of the ethnic minorities’ 
mother tongue.
873
 
 
In June 2011, the Venice Commission issued an analysis of the new Hungarian 
constitution in which it supported the Slovak claim that protection of ethnic minority 
rights is a responsibility of the state where they live.
874
 However, Budapest did not 
take the non-binding comments of the Commission into account.
875
 Indeed, the new 
Hungarian constitution came into force on 1 January 2012.
876
  
 
5.3 Implications of the Minority Issue for Slovak Foreign Policy towards 
Kosovo’s Statehood 
The aim of this section is to create a link between the role of the Hungarian minority 
and the debates on Kosovo’s independence in Slovakia. The dynamic interaction 
between all three actors is a crucial aspect to consider: the nature and policies of the 
Slovak and Hungarian governments influenced the evolution of the relationship, as 
did the actions of the Hungarian minority representatives. Each actor has constantly 
monitored activities of the other two and acted accordingly. This evolution was 
particularly important in the context of the debate on Kosovo in the period of 2007-
2011, as it had a significant impact on the Slovak standpoint on Kosovo. 
 
In early 2007, days before the Slovak Parliament discussed Kosovo’s future status, 
Miklós Duray, an SMK representative and long term supporter of autonomy for 
ethnic Hungarians, expressed his views on the status of the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia. He considered the Hungarian communities living outside Hungary, from 
the perspective of the set theory, as intersections. He argued that this would give an 
opportunity for establishing new alliances with neighbouring nations.
877
 On the 
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<http://www.politics.hu/20110601/hungary-said-disappointed-at-slovak-language-act-amendment/>[accessed 30 
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874 The Venice Commission, also known as the European Commission for Democracy by Law, is the Council of 
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877 Dag Daniš, ‘Duray: Potrebujeme program autonómie’, Pravda, 22 March 2007, p. 6.  
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question of whether he would request territorial autonomy for these minorities, he 
commented: ‘We don’t necessarily need to talk about autonomy in the sense of some 
special territory with special status. It could be territorial self-governance in a 
symmetrical sense’.878 He further claimed that he did not avoid the term autonomy as 
he considered self-governance and autonomy synonymous. However, in his view, 
Slovaks perceive autonomy as always leading to independence. Duray further 
explained that there are two types of self-determination for nations – ‘international 
and internal. Internal self-determination, I accept. To claim more would be 
suicide’.879 Slovak officials reacted sensitively to any similar autonomy demands. 
 
As Kosovo’s status process and its progression towards independence started to get 
more attention at the parliamentary level and in the Slovak media over the course of 
2007, the question was: how would Slovakia respond to the Ahtisaari proposal? 
Soon after Ahtisaari presented his plan to the UN Security Council, in March 2007, 
the Slovak Parliament started to discuss Kosovo’s status and the position Slovakia 
should take. As the previous chapter argued, the Slovak position on Kosovo became 
part of domestic politics and was used by political parties as a tactical tool. The 
debate on Kosovo was initiated by the leader of the opposition, Mikuláš Dzurinda, 
with an aim to challenge the government on its Kosovo stand. The prime factors 
impacting on the Slovak position towards Kosovo’s independence were the intra-
party rivalry and political opportunism from Dzurinda. In the end, these factors led 
to the Slovak Parliament’s resolution on Kosovo.  
 
However, there was an issue arising from the Ahtisaari plan – the collective minority 
rights. It needs to be specifically highlighted as this aspect of the plan played an 
important role, even though it has not received much attention. Ahtisaari’s proposal 
for Kosovo’s status settlement in Annex II, Article 3, Rights of Communities and 
                                                          
878 Duray illustrated this statement with an example. He said, ‘For instance the Komárno region [which is located 
in South Slovakia] would have inside Slovak Republic the same status as let’s say the Žilina region. SMK should 
elaborate this type of regional self-governance and promote it as its political program’. See Daniš, ‘Duray: 
Potrebujeme program autonómie’, Pravda, 22 March 2007. Currently, Slovakia is divided into 8 regions (region 
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kraj. Within this administrative division, Komárno is not considered to be a separate region. In other words, 
Duray suggested changes to the administrative division of Slovakia. Granting Komárno the status of a region 
would increase its territorial self-governance.  
879 Daniš, ‘Duray’, p. 6. 
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Their Members, provides members of communities with individual as well as 
collective rights.
880
 Under point 3.1 it states that: 
 
Members of communities shall have the right, individually or in 
Community, to: 
a. Express, maintain and develop their culture and preserve the essential 
elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and 
culture; 
b. Receive public education in one of the official languages of Kosovo of 
their choice at all levels; 
c. Receive pre-school, primary and secondary public education in their 
own language to the extent prescribed by law, with the thresholds for 
establishing specific classes or schools for this purpose being lower than 
normally stipulated for educational institutions; 
d. Establish and manage their own private educational and training 
establishments for which public financial assistance may be granted, in 
accordance with the law and international standards; 
e. Use their language and alphabet freely in private and in public; 
f. Use of their language and alphabet in their relations with the municipal 
authorities or local offices of central authorities in areas where they 
represent a sufficient share of the population in accordance with the law. 
The costs incurred by the use of an interpreter or a translator shall be 
borne by the competent authorities; 
g. Use and display Community symbols, in accordance with the law and 
international standards; 
h. Have personal names registered in their original form and in the script 
of their language as well as revert to original names that have been 
changed by force; 
i. Have local names, street names and other topographical indications 
which reflect and are sensitive to the multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, 
character of the area at issue; 
j. A guaranteed access to, and special representation in, broadcast media 
as well as programming in their language, in accordance with the law 
and international standards; 
k. To create and use their own media, including to provide information in 
their language through, inter alia, daily newspapers and wire services and 
the use of a reserved number of frequencies for electronic media in 
accordance with the law and international standards. Kosovo shall take 
all measures necessary to secure an international frequency plan to allow 
the Kosovo Serb Community access to a licensed Kosovo-wide 
independent Serbian language television channel; 
l. Enjoy unhindered contacts among themselves within Kosovo and 
establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts with persons in any 
States, in particular those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, 
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linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage, in 
accordance with the law and international standards; 
m. Enjoy unhindered contacts with, and participate without 
discrimination in the activities of local, regional and international non-
governmental organizations; 
n. Establish associations for culture, art, science and education as well as 
scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and 
development of their identity.
881
 
 
The collective rights as such were not at the core of the discussions on Kosovo in the 
Slovak Parliament. It was only MP Zala (SMER-SD) who referred to them during 
his parliamentary speech. Therefore, in the crucial time of March 2007, they were 
not of prime focus. However, once relations with Hungary deteriorated and several 
issues arose with the representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, 
collective rights were again on the table. A senior correspondent in Brussels 
commented on the reasons for the Slovak non-recognition: ‘Slovakia has a problem 
with the collective rights that are included in the Ahtisaari plan. Slovakia recognises 
the right of minorities but not collective rights’.882  
 
As set by the Slovak Constitution, the rights of Slovak citizens, including national 
minorities, are based on individual rights. Notably, also the Treaty on European 
Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, states in Article 2 that ‘the Union is 
founded on the […] respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities’.883 Significantly, as Toggenburg explains:  
 
By  focusing on ‘persons belonging to’ minorities (including persons 
belonging to national  minorities) rather  than  on  ‘minorities’  
themselves,  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  and  the  Charter  of Fundamental 
Rights both help preventing a misunderstanding, namely that the 
existence of minorities would automatically go hand in hand with a 
necessity to accept and introduce group rights. The wording of the 
Lisbon Treaty makes clear what the EU is concerned about, namely the 
individual right to equality of all persons that might due to their 
individual situation (age, disability) or their membership in an ethnic, 
                                                          
881 ‘Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Security-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
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882 Augustin Palokaj, comments to the author, 16 July 2010. Other interviewees who have asked to remain 
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883 ‘Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/13, 
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national, linguistic or religious minority face special threats or have 
special needs.
884
 
 
 
Slovak governing parties, together with the opposition, strongly opposed the 
introduction of collective rights for minorities. Morvay had already argued in 2003 
that the nature of the problem with collective rights in Slovakia lies in the fact that 
clearly a collective right is a right for self-governance (members of a minority could 
apply for this only as members of a collective). Eventually, this could then lead to 
autonomy.
885 
Moreover, generally, there are other forms of self-governance that 
could be demanded. In addition to the territorial self-governance within a state, 
requests could be made for non-territorial self-governance (cultural autonomy), 
independence or unification with a different country.
886
  
The Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kubiš, repeatedly opposed any idea of 
collective rights.
887
 However, a US dispatch from September 2006, reporting on 
Kubiš’s August visit to Kosovo, stated that although Slovakia was not supportive of 
the collective rights for minorities in general, it would support the collective rights of 
Serbs in Kosovo.
888
 This was an important note, inasmuch as it shows that in 2006, 
the MFA supported Ahtisaari’s mission and it appeared that despite the collective 
rights Slovakia would not have a problem with Kosovo’s statehood. As the previous 
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chapter demonstrated, early in 2007, in private discussions with US Embassy 
officials, Slovak MFA representatives expressed support for the Ahtisaari plan and 
Kosovo’s independence. However, this momentum – the willingness for accepting 
collective rights for the Serbian minority – was lost once Kosovo became a domestic 
political issue in Slovakia and it was debated in the Slovak Parliament. The 
significance of the Ahtisaari plan – specifically the relevant elements on collective 
rights – for internal Slovak affairs was neglected in the literature and was not the 
subject of a broader discussion.  
The ethnic Hungarian minority party SMK’s position on the Ahtisaari plan was 
overall supportive. In fact, it was the only political party in Slovakia in favour of it. 
In February 2007, approval of the Ahtisaari plan was officially declared by one of 
SMK’s representatives, Gyula Bárdos, during his visit with the Slovak President, 
Ivan Gašparovič.889  
 
The representatives of SMK have often stated that the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia bears no similarity to the situation in Kosovo. All concerns that Kosovo’s 
independence could trigger more radical demands by the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia were considered absurd. For instance, Duray argued that ‘the circumstances 
for this are not there in the Slovakian case’.890 Csáky claimed that Kosovo was 
looked at through the Slovak prism. ‘This is a false view, it’s incomparable. Nobody 
showed there to be any connection, in terms of idea, with the Hungarian minority. 
All countries that did not recognise Kosovo look at it through their own filter and 
they see precedent in it, Slovakia included’. He further added, ‘I am not excluding 
the idea that political borders of some countries could change, but everything should 
be solved only peacefully’.891 Despite the refusal of any connection between Kosovo 
and Slovakia these kinds of statements did not send a convincing message. 
 
As the previous chapter explained, in March 2007 the Slovak Parliament debated 
a number of draft proposals for the parliamentary declaration. During the session, 
Berényi presented SMK’s proposal and in it, he stated, among other things, that 
seeking a concrete solution for Kosovo should rest on three principles: international 
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regional stability, support of international institutions and solidarity with, and 
support of, minority groups.
892
 He explained SMK’s position as: 
 
We do not consider Kosovo’s solution [independence] to be a precedent. 
However, we perceive the conflict as a relevant lesson for everyone, 
irrespective of whether s/he is Slovak, English, Hungarian or Serbian. 
The minority policy needs to be treated with caution and feeling and not 
on the basis of everyday political interests. […] With regard to southern 
Slovakia, we are very pleased that the issue of Kosovo is still less 
connected, at least outwardly and openly, with the Slovak Hungarians. 
This connection is for me so absurd that I will mention only this much: 
Serbia, unlike the Slovak Republic, is not part of the European Union 
and NATO and at the same time, shortly and succinctly, the Slovaks are 
not Serbs and the Slovak Hungarians are not Kosovo Albanians. 
Therefore, to refer to southern Slovakia, when rejecting the Ahtisaari 
plan, is misleading and dangerous in terms of building this country. […] 
And at the very end, let me note that up until now, at some points slightly 
hectic domestic debate on Kosovo was not beneficial for the Slovak 
Republic. Not only did it cause unnecessary questions about our Euro-
Atlantic partners, but in a quiet and hidden way, it extended from the 
highest state posts, the feeling of distrust of Slovak Hungarians.
893
 
 
Furthermore, SMK approved the collective rights as presented in the Ahtisaari plan. 
As Berényi put it, ‘SMK has never had territorial autonomy in the programme, 
however, not excluding the Kosovo problem, we still think that collective rights in 
the area of education and culture are legitimate requirements of SMK, but for us 
Kosovo’s independence is not a precedent’.894  On this note, the Vice-Chairman of 
the party, Csáky, underlined the need to focus on the protection of the rights of the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo on the basis of collective rights. He further commented 
that for SMK, Kosovo was a precedent in the sense that it is necessary to guarantee, 
seriously and on a higher level, minority rights. He added that Slovakia too needed 
to adopt a minority law.
895
 This was a clear indication as to why SMK was in favour 
                                                          
892 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] p. 94. 
893 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, 5th day of proceedings, 8th session, 27 March 2007, Spoločná Česko-
Slovenská digitálna parlamentná knižnica, <http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/> [accessed 20 July 2012] pp. 98-100. It is 
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2007. 
895 ‘KDH ani SMK nenavrhnú odvolanie Kubiša’, Košický korzár, 12 February 2007, p. 5. 
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of the Ahtisaari plan and of the fact that the ethnic Hungarian party would like to 
have similar rights adopted in Slovakia.  
 
Despite repeated assurances from the ethnic Hungarian party SMK that there was no 
connection between Kosovo and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, it was this 
element that started to receive the most press attention. In fact, many people 
remained unconvinced. Kramplová, the former Slovak MP for ĽS-HZDS, perceived 
respect for international law to be the most decisive factor in the Slovak decision. 
The second reason she identified, however, was ‘continuous pressure from the 
Hungarian side with regard to autonomy’.896 In Kramplová’s own words, ‘the 
Hungarian question played a role although they [SMK] deny it’.897 A somewhat 
different perspective was given by a senior Slovak diplomat who commented, 
‘there’s no threat that the South [of Slovakia] would secede. It is a false and 
exaggerated argument’.898 However, this source went on to admit that SMK made 
mistakes in their political rhetoric, illustrating his point with reference to the 
comment made by SMK’s representative, Berényi, who, according to the diplomat, 
stated, ‘we [SMK] will wait to see what Kosovars achieve and we will try to enforce 
it in Slovakia’. This senior Slovak diplomat described this statement as ‘very 
stupid’.899 
 
Even though Kosovo was presented as a sui generis case, some official 
representatives from Hungary saw a link between Kosovo and other affairs.  For 
instance, the Slovak President, Ivan Gasparovič, strongly opposed statements by 
Zsolt Németh, Chairman of the Foreign committee of the Hungarian Parliament, that 
Hungarians should use the example of Kosovo as a means to legitimise their calls for 
autonomy rights. Németh (from FIDESZ) stated on 15 February 2008 in the 
Hungarian daily Magayar Nemzet that there is an important link to the solution of 
the Kosovo question, namely that not only will a new state be established but also a 
new type of territorial autonomy be created.
900
 Németh further added that he 
                                                          
896 Zdenka Kramplová, comments to the author, 3 May 2010. 
897 Zdenka Kramplová, comments to the author, 3 May 2010. She also noted that there are no tensions among 
people in southern Slovakia but that ‘these are things which the political parties have on their agenda […]’. 
898 Senior Slovak diplomat, comments to the author, July 2010. 
899 Senior Slovak diplomat, comments to the author, July 2010. 
900 ‘Prezident: K výrokom Németha o Kosove nemôžme byť podľa Gašparoviča ľahostajní’, TASR, 20 February 
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considered common and territorial autonomy to be a good solution for inter-ethnic 
problems in Central and Eastern Europe. He perceived the support on the part of the 
international community for Kosovo’s solution as good news for minorities in the 
region.
901
 The differing views on Kosovo’s status started to become more noticeable 
and created further tensions. Indeed, they had an influence on the evolution of the 
Slovak position. 
 
As a senior European diplomat stated, initially, it appeared that at the root of the 
Slovak view was a ‘pan-Slavic sentiment’ but, he continued, ‘I quickly reached the 
view that more important were the strained relations with Hungary and the actions of 
Hungarian politicians combined with the strong nationalist instincts of the Fico 
government itself’. As this observer noted, ‘It was not just a nationalist policy on the 
part of Slovakia towards Hungary that had caused this stand-off, but that Hungary 
was making it impossible for Slovakia to row back from its position and so return to 
the European mainstream’.902 He further explained that the actions on the part of 
Hungary described earlier, such as, as he stated, ‘president Sólyom’s  rather messy 
attempt to visit Slovakia, […] and FIDESZ’s campaigning, in which the word 
autonomy was heard quite a lot’, clearly made it politically difficult for Slovakia to 
reconsider its position on Kosovo. In his view, Fico, influenced by his nationalist 
sentiments – and perhaps even more by his coalition partners’ – ‘simply couldn’t 
make his government revert back to the decision they had taken in March 2007’.903 
As Demeš stated, ‘had there not been the internal Hungarian minority question we 
[Slovakia] would have recognised Kosovo. At the root of our policy lie Slovak-
Hungarian relations, which are yet to be solved, even though both countries are in 
NATO. All other explanations, such as international law, are only cover-up 
arguments. People see political complications. At the moment, relations with 
                                                          
901 ‘Prezident: K výrokom Németha o Kosove nemôžme byť podľa Gašparoviča ľahostajní’, TASR, 20 February 
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902 Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. As this diplomat noted there were some 
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Hungary are the worst they have been since 1993, and Kosovo suffers from this in 
regard to its non-recognition’.904 
 
At the EU level, Ulrike Lunacek, the Austrian MEP and EU Parliament Rapporteur for 
Kosovo, stated that ‘unfortunately, like the other four non-recognizers, with Slovakia 
the reasoning lies also in domestic policy (the Hungarian minority) and not in our 
common European interests in Kosovo (i.e. to have a common EU position in order to 
be more credible and make material and political efforts more effective). Unfortunately 
it also seems that the new government, even after the ICJ opinion of July 22 [2010], isn’t 
willing to recognize [it]’.905  
 
As one Slovak diplomatic representative concluded on the question of whether the 
Kosovo issue had an impact on Slovak foreign policy, ‘definitely, historians will 
judge whether [it was] for better or worse. In the meantime one thing happened: the 
deterioration of Slovak-Hungarian relations’.906  
 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, the Slovak standpoint on Kosovo needs to be understood 
in the particular political context of the interplay between Slovakia, the Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia, and Hungary. This interplay offers a way of understanding the 
tensions between these two countries based on the ethnic question. The issue of the 
Hungarian minority, discussed in this chapter, was a significant element. It can be 
argued that it did impact on the Slovak position; however, there are some additional 
aspects that are important to recognise.  
 
Comments from SMK figures and Hungarian official representatives, claims for 
autonomy and similar demands have been increasing in regularity since 2007. For all 
these reasons, it is clear that all these issues had an impact on Slovakia’s decision not 
                                                          
904 Pavol Demeš, comments to the author, 4 May 2010. Demeš is Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States’s (GMF) Bratislava office. He was Foreign policy advisor to the President of 
Slovak Republic (1993-1997) and Minister of International Relations of Czechoslovakia (1991-1992). 
905 Ulrike Lunacek, correspondence to the author, 27 July 2010. Earlier in 2009, the European Parliament also 
unsuccessfully encouraged ‘those EU member states which have not already done so to recognise the 
independence of Kosovo’. See ‘European Parliament resolution of 5 February 2009 on Kosovo and the role of the 
EU’, B6-0063/2009, The European Parliament, Strasbourg, 5 February 2009 
906 Slovak diplomatic representative, comments to the author, October 2009. 
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to recognise Kosovo. Any changes in its position became impossible due to the 
evolution of relations with Hungary and the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia.  
 
Perhaps the argument that Kosovo’s secession could be an example to follow for the 
Hungarian minority was overemphasised. Nevertheless, demands for autonomy 
began to be increasingly articulated, and it did not help that some Hungarian 
politicians made the connection between the two issues or that SMK representatives 
supported Kosovo Albanians in their efforts. This served to exacerbate the situation. 
Under these circumstances, it was hard to imagine that Slovakia would reconsider its 
position on Kosovo.  
The role of collective rights was very significant. Representatives of all Slovak 
political parties (except the Hungarian minority party) strictly refused to grant them. 
As regards the Ahtisaari plan and the statements on collective rights, it would have 
been very difficult – although not impossible – to accept the document once Kosovo 
became such a hot topic in Parliament. How would Slovakia explain that it supported 
collective rights in Kosovo but did not want to grant them on its own territory?  
 
As 2010 arrived, some thought it might be the year Slovakia would alter its position, 
in view of the fact that there was a change of Slovak government and the ICJ 
delivered its advisory opinion. However, the following points need to be factored 
into the debate: in Hungary, the right-wing FIDESZ won the April elections and was 
able to form a government on its own and in Slovakia, after the June elections, 
Dzurinda became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. These changes indicated the 
direction of the foreign political decisions on both sides. Dzurinda’s position, as an 
initiator of the Declaration on Kosovo’s status passed by the Slovak Parliament in 
March 2007, was more than clear. Orbán’s national policy with reference to the 
situation of Hungarians living abroad was known from his years in previous 
governments; since April 2007, he has only reinforced this stance. Soon after being 
elected, FIDESZ initiated a number of controversial amendments to the dual 
citizenship law, the Hungarian constitution and the electoral reform legislature. All 
these changes have had a direct impact on ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia and 
negatively impacted on the bilateral Slovak-Hungarian relations. It has become clear 
that any change in the Slovak position on Kosovo in the near future is very unlikely. 
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As one commentator concluded, ‘the sad thing for the observer is that between 2006-
2010 you had a nationalist government in Bratislava, where Fico made some rash 
moves in its relations with Hungary, and that was against the background of a 
relatively benign Hungarian government. And now you have the opposite, you have 
a much more accommodating flexible government in Bratislava but a harsher 
government in Budapest […]’.907  
The above comment demonstrates the relevance and role of Slovak-Hungarian 
relations in the context of the policy adopted towards Kosovo. As this chapter has 
shown, an internal affair related to ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia and the 
tensions between Slovakia and Hungary contributed to the Slovak non-recognition 
policy adopted towards Kosovo; in fact, they prevented it from reconsidering its 
position later on. 
 
                                                          
907 Senior European diplomat, comments to the author, April 2011. It is important to note that the government in 
Bratislava that this diplomat referred to (led by Prime Minister Iveta Radičová) lost a vote of confidence during 
the poll on the European Financial Stability Facility reform in October 2011 and as a result its term was shorter 
(2010-2012). For more information, see Jakub Groszkowski, ‘Slovakia: Early elections as a price for the 
ratification of the EFSF’, Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW Commnetary, 12 October 2011; by the same author 
‘Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible’, Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW Commnetary, 63, 14 October 2011, 
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the Slovak Parliament. Importantly, the two controversial parties – the ethnic Hungarian party SMK and the 
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party Most-Híd received 6.89 percent. In an attempt to improve its image after the last two unsuccessful 
elections, in September 2012, SMK changed its name from Party of the Hungarian Coalition (Strana Maďarskej 
Koalície/Magyar Koalíció Pártja (SMK)) to Party of the Hungarian Community (Strana Maďarskej 
Komunity/Magyar Közzöség Pártja (SMK)). See ‘SMK si schválila nový názov – Strana maďarskej komunity’, 
Pravda, 22 September 2012. According to Valášek, ‘people familiar with the prime minister-designate’s thinking 
say that he wants the respect and recognition of his EU peers, and fears that his past record and Orban’s presence 
across the border will taint him.’ See Tomáš Valášek, ‘Oh no, Orban clone? The EU ponders Slovak elections’, 
Centre for European Reform, 23 March 2012, available at <http://centreforeuropeanreform. blogspot.co.uk/ 
2012/03/oh-no-orban-clone-eu-ponders-slovak.html> [accessed 15 April 2012]. So far, the indication that after 
March 2012, Fico would opt for a non-controversial type of politics with Hungary has been fulfilled. 
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CONCLUSION 
  
‘Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas’.908 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the position of Slovakia as one of five EU 
member states that has not joined the majority in recognising Kosovo’s statehood 
and analyse what has determined its foreign policy. In doing so, the overall objective 
was to offer an insight into the national foreign policy decision-making process of an 
EU member state. 
 
It can be argued that, after its independence, Slovakia had to take three important 
foreign policy decisions: in 1999 towards the NATO intervention in FRY, in 2003 
towards the US-led invasion of Iraq and in 2008 towards Kosovo’s independence. In 
the first two cases, Slovak NATO aspirations, both under Prime Minister Dzurinda’s 
governments, clearly shaped the Slovak position and the support for military actions 
in both decisions. Particularly during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Slovak 
government openly emphasised its transatlantic link and support of US policy. 
However, in 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, the context was 
different. Slovakia was already an established member of the EU and NATO and 
could therefore pursue a more independent policy. 
 
When, at the end of 2005, Slovakia was elected a non-permanent member of the 
UNSC nobody expected that the issue of Kosovo would erupt as a topic which 
would strike chords on the Slovak domestic political scene. The 2002-2006 
government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda did not pay great attention to the solution of 
Kosovo’s status and this topic was not widely debated. Significantly, at the end of 
2006, even Eduard Kukan (SDKÚ-DS), the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs until 
June of that year, stated, ‘I think that the issue of Kosovo’s future status will contain 
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some kind of independence’.909 The then Political Director at the MFA, Miroslav 
Lajčák, conveyed the same message. As far as the Slovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was concerned, throughout 2006 it was supportive of the Ahtisaari mission, 
and after the parliamentary elections that June it continued in the same line, even 
though, it must be noted, many Slovak officials were rather unsatisfied with the way 
in which Ahtisaari had clearly predetermined the outcome of the process. 
Nevertheless, as US cables revealed, the MFA was until February 2007 more than 
willing to support the position of Washington and key EU members, such as France 
and Britain, on independence. Notably, a leaked US dispatch from early 2007 
seemed to suggest that even the Slovak National Party (SNS), although not 
particularly supportive of the idea, was prepared to accept Kosovo’s statehood.910 
 
While the MFA’s main priority was to ensure that it would retain a good relationship 
with its international partners, and Kubiš, being more of a diplomat than a politician, 
was worried about steps that could discredit Slovakia before its key partners, 
elsewhere within the Slovak polity there were rather different views on Kosovo. 
Despite Kubiš’s claims that the Slovak stand was clear, there was in fact no unity in 
the Slovak Government on the issue. The Prime Minister, President and members of 
the Government at various points made it clear that their views on Kosovo’s 
independence were rather different from that of the MFA. 
 
For Dzurinda, who was now the opposition leader, this created ideal conditions for 
attacking the government over its policy on Kosovo. In February 2007, Dzurinda 
took the lead on Kosovo and, in the name of his party SDKÚ-DS, presented the 
Slovak Parliament with the draft text of a declaration arguing that Kosovo should not 
be granted independence without Belgrade’s consent.911 To this effect, for Dzurinda, 
it was a question of making political capital out of the situation rather than a matter 
of solidarity with Serbia. Therefore, a foreign political issue was used for domestic 
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910 See ‘Slovak MFA supports EU position on Kosovo’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 07Bratislava16, 10 
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political gains. In the end, his initiative would come to dominate the Slovak domestic 
political scene.   
 
For the Slovak Foreign Minister, Ján Kubiš, staying with the EU on Kosovo and 
Slovakia’s cooperation with its EU and NATO partners remained the main issue at 
stake in the Kosovo question. As he saw it, Slovakia, as a small state, could not 
afford to stand alone and compromise its reputation as a reliable partner. After 
Slovakia’s accession to the EU and NATO it aimed to take the middle ground on 
foreign political matters and to re-affirm its commitment to its European and 
American partners. Thus, Kubiš’s main aim was to achieve a coordinated European 
position on Kosovo. Therefore, when he addressed the Slovak Parliament during the 
March 2007 debate on what position Slovakia should take, his main point was that 
Slovakia should behave as a responsible member of the EU, NATO and UNSC. 
Despite Kubiš’s frequent references to the fact that Slovakia could not afford to 
stand outside the EU on Kosovo, and that it was not in its interest to be in the 
minority, his attempts to influence MPs were unsuccessful. Certainly, as this thesis 
demonstrated, the question of Kosovo’s independence was no simple matter for 
Slovak diplomacy. 
 
In contrast to the case of Turkey’s accession negotiations, when the Slovak 
Parliament eventually accepted the view of the executive (MFA) – resulting in 
Slovakia’s support of  the start of EU negotiations with Ankara at the EU summit in 
December 2004 – in the case of Kosovo, the Parliament did not adopt the MFA’s 
view. In the end, and despite considerable disagreements over Kosovo, all opposition 
and coalition MPs were united on the question of Kosovo’s status (with the 
exception of the ethnic Hungarian SMK and one MP from KDH) and agreed on a 
declaration text proposed by the coalition (SMER-SD, ĽS-HZDS and SNS), with 
amendments suggested by one opposition MP. The declaration did not support 
Kosovo’s independence without Belgrade’s agreement; however, it expected the 
government’s co-operation with other EU states in order to find a joint solution for a 
future settlement in the Western Balkans. Largely, this wider support for Kosovo’s 
declaration among the MPs was a result of political calculations. Prior to the passing 
of the declaration, it became clear that Dzurinda tried to win SNS to his side by 
emphasising Slovak national interests and in effect, to split the coalition members. 
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Therefore, Fico was keen to put together a coalition draft text on the issue showing 
unity with his partners. This, however, had an impact on the language of the 
declaration, resulting in Kubiš’s political isolation on Kosovo. Nonetheless, 
privately, Kubiš still had Fico’s support in having a free hand if it would come to a 
vote in the UNSC.  
 
Competencies of the Slovak Parliament were overlooked in the European Defence 
and Security Assembly report, looking into the role of parliaments in the recognition 
of Kosovo, which was prepared in December 2008. It stated that, on the basis of the 
Slovak constitution, the Slovak Parliament has no power to recognise or refuse 
recognition of new states as this is a matter for the Slovak government to deal with 
as the key decision-maker on domestic and foreign policy.
912
 While it is true that the 
Parliament cannot recognize states, its competencies on EU-related matters do give it 
instruments to influence and control Slovakian standpoints on EU associated affairs, 
and Kosovo was clearly one of them. As a senior correspondent in Brussels 
commented, Slovakia underestimated the role of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee.
913
  
 
The importance of the Slovak Parliament’s declaration – and the debate around it – 
lies in the fact that for the first time, a parliamentary declaration had such a profound 
impact on a Slovak foreign policy issue. By expressing the view that Kosovo’s status 
solution should take into account Serbia’s legitimate needs, the Parliament 
considerably limited Kubiš’s manoeuvring space in the EU and the UN Security 
Council, where Slovakia was a non-permanent member. Given these developments, 
the MFA faced the biggest challenge – it could not give in to external lobbying, 
particularly by US representatives. Despite the willingness on the side of the MFA, 
and even Prime Minister Fico, to co-operate, the situation created after the passing of 
the parliamentary declaration did not allow for any changes. Parliament gave Kubiš a 
very clear mandate that went against Kosovo’s independence without Belgrade’s 
support.  
 
                                                          
912 See ‘The role of parliaments in the recognition of Kosovo’, Report submitted on behalf of the Parliamentary 
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Nevertheless, and despite the fact that he would not personally comment on the 
matter, evidence presented in this thesis shows that Kubiš, during private debates 
with the US Ambassador in Bratislava and meetings with SC partners, was keen to 
ensure that Slovakia would take the side of the rest of the EU in the Security Council 
(at that point France, Britain and Belgium). Crucially, it never came to the vote on a 
new SC resolution because Russia objected to the Ahtisaari plan for independence 
and indicated that it would veto a resolution supporting it. Obviously, considering 
the Parliament was strictly against granting independence to Kosovo without 
Belgrade’s support, Slovak support for any such resolution would have had severe 
consequences for Kubiš’s ministerial position. Indeed, he expected to face a vote of 
no confidence in the Parliament had this happened.   
 
On the one hand, Kubiš was bound by the parliamentary declaration, which set limits 
for the Slovak position; however, on the other, bearing in mind the importance of 
Slovak membership in the UNSC, he was ready to vote for a resolution if it would 
have come to it. This was significant, inasmuch as it shows that he tried to balance 
between the domestic political situation and the expectations coming from the 
international environment. Nevertheless, this balancing act was becoming 
increasingly difficult.  
 
At the same time, Kubiš tried to be cooperative in other ways, most notably on the 
creation of EULEX, the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo. The fact that EULEX 
was based on Resolution 1244 allowed Slovakia to participate in the mission and, 
significantly, preserve the EU unity on Kosovo’s stabilisation, even if there was not 
unity on the question of recognition.  
 
Despite the parliamentary resolution, at the end of 2007, it did not seem that all was 
lost. At least from Kubiš’s perspective, there was still potential for re-considering the 
Slovak view. However, this did not happen even though Slovak officials, diplomats 
and Prime Minister Fico had hoped to change the view of parliamentarians. In part, 
this was driven by the obvious fact that there was no agreement over recognition 
amongst the other EU member states. In particular, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and 
Spain were known to have strong reservations.  However, more importantly, the 
crucial ‘right moment’ to recognise Kosovo was prevented by the emergence of 
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another important domestic political issue: the question of Hungarian minority rights 
in Slovakia.  
 
Without a doubt, the topic of autonomy, the sensitive issue of collective rights and 
demands for increased self-governance for the region populated by ethnic 
Hungarians, considerably increased internal tensions between Slovakia and ethnic 
Hungarian MPs. However, even more so, it led to intensified external disagreements 
between Slovakia and Hungary at a time when Kosovo’s statehood became a hot 
political topic. Matters were not made any simpler by comments made in the media 
by representatives of Hungary – particularly under the FIDESZ leadership – creating 
links between Hungarian minorities living abroad and Kosovo. This considerably 
complicated the situation and posed a significant challenge for Slovak officials. 
Indeed, it caused great irritation in Slovakia and was officially condemned by Kubiš, 
as well as by other Slovak government representatives. These remarks reinforced the 
view that recognition of Kosovo – in light of the domestic political situation – would 
be counter-productive. This feeling was further strengthened after Hungary 
introduced the earlier debated dual citizenship law allowing ethnic Hungarians living 
abroad to apply for Hungarian citizenship. For all these reasons, for Slovak 
diplomacy the Kosovo issue became a far more problematic question to respond to 
than it would have been otherwise. Indeed, the political context in which Slovakia 
took the decision over Kosovo’s statehood forms part of the explanation why 
considerable importance was given to the ethnic minority issue in Slovakia when 
dealing with the Kosovo question. In this sense, the interaction that occurred 
between Slovakia, Hungary and the ethnic Hungarian minority living in Slovakia 
demonstrates the impact of ethnic politics on this foreign political decision.   
 
On the whole, Slovakia’s position towards Kosovo’s independence raised significant 
wide-ranging questions about the impact of EU membership on one of its relatively 
new member states and on the common foreign policy of the EU. Bearing in mind 
that Slovakia entered the EU in May 2004, less than three years after its membership, 
it was advocating a position against the majority of its member states.
 914
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Considering that a Europeanised foreign policy is characterised by adopting joint EU 
positions – perceiving them as a significant indicator – and in general, does not 
divert from the EU’s common views ‘even when they cause difficulties for the state 
concerned, whether in its bilateral relations or its domestic politics’,915 Slovak 
foreign policy on Kosovo was not Europeanised. Thus, emphasis needs to be put on 
Wong and Hill’s point that the EU’s influence on countries is stronger in respect to 
structures and procedures. Yet, in regards to policies, EU unity is by far not a 
guarantee, particularly due to the complexity of phenomena having an impact on the 
policy-making process. As this thesis showed, the impact of EU actors and attempts 
to influence Slovak policy did not materialise. In light of this, it can be concluded 
that even a traditionally EU-oriented country will break ranks with collective EU 
action if the domestic situation does not allow for it. Significantly, evidence in this 
thesis confirms Bickerton’s earlier mentioned view that ‘EU foreign policy is 
regularly trumped by the primacy of national politics; not, it should be noted, of 
national interest, but of the unpredictable conflicts that break out locally’.916 On the 
Slovak domestic political scene, rivalries between political parties over political 
power – or more precisely between their leaders – outplayed EU aims to stand united 
over Kosovo.   
 
After the EU accession, there are limitations as to how the EU can influence the 
member states’ policies, particularly because there is no explicit way to induce 
member states’ compliance with a particular policy. Once a country becomes a full-
fledged member, the less leverage the EU has on its foreign policy. In any case, upon 
EU entry, previously uncommon defections from unity manifest themselves more 
clearly. Most notably, this thesis demonstrated the limits of Europeanisation in a 
case where strong opposition to a particular course of action came as a result of a 
domestic political situation. Ultimately, as Kissinger succinctly stated, ‘the acid test 
of a policy (…) is its ability to obtain domestic support’.917 Because of this lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
years could be the one leading to its unravelling’. See Helen Pidd, ‘Slovakia rejects multibillion euro bailout fund 
to deal with debt crisis’, The Guardian, 12 October 2011.  
915 Hill and Wong, ‘Many actors, one path? The meaning of Europeanization in the context of foreign policy’, p. 
211. 
916 Bickerton, ‘Explaining Europe’s role in world affairs: governance, sovereignty and the paradox of ‘fragile 
institutionalism’, p. 19. 
917 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 
(Boston: Houghton Miffling, 1957), p. 326. 
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domestic support, EU pressure had relatively little impact on foreign policy-making 
in Slovakia. 
 
Determinants of Slovak non-recognition  
Looking back at the evolution of the Slovak position on Kosovo one thing is clear. 
The non-recognition was a result of an interaction between several factors but it was, 
in essence, an internal affair to Slovakia. In the first instance, domestic party politics 
was – despite perceptions to the contrary – more important than the Hungarian 
minority issue. There has been little understanding of what really lay behind the 
Slovak policy on Kosovo; a lack of recognition of the complexities of the domestic 
political situation led to the prevailing view that the ethnic Hungarian minority 
shaped the Slovak stance. While the Hungarian minority issue played a considerable 
role in the debate, it was only to the extent that it cemented the Slovak position and 
ultimately prevented any re-consideration of its view.  
 
Therefore, as this thesis demonstrated, the ethnic minority issue was in fact a 
secondary factor impacting on Slovak policy; rather, a more profound aspect lies 
underneath the issue. In fact it was party politics – an underestimated element in the 
study of Europeanisation – that was crucial in determining the Slovak position on 
Kosovo. While Dzurinda’s aim was to regain political influence, Fico’s was to retain 
it. As an anonymous source noted, Fico’s party, SMER-SD, did not have any 
foreign-political orientation and Dzurinda considered it an ideal situation for an 
attack on the Prime Minister. While domestic politics was not the only factor at play, 
it was the primary one; the literature has not taken it into account, as most of the 
scholarship focused mainly on the role of the Hungarian minority. In reality, it was 
the aim of retaining and regaining domestic political power that affected the policy 
direction and the way Slovak foreign policy representatives handled the situation 
after the parliamentary declaration on Kosovo. In short, this analysis showed that 
what was widely expected to be the reason for the Slovak position turned out to be of 
secondary importance.  
 
Yet, the prospect of not being in the mainstream on Kosovo was not something 
Slovak officials, particularly diplomats, were satisfied with. As one anonymous 
observer noted, ‘Neither did I like the way how independent Kosovo was established 
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and how states recognised it; nor do I like the group of countries [the five EU non-
recognisers] that Slovakia is part of’. Indeed, one could argue that Slovak diplomacy 
was looking for a way out of this situation; however, developments related to the 
ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia prevented any review of its position. In fact, 
the moment when the Slovak MFA was prepared ‘to go with the flow’ and even 
accept collective rights as included in the Ahtisaari plan was lost once the collective 
rights themselves – being for years a contentious topic in Slovak politics – were 
raised again on the domestic political scene.  
 
By excluding the context in which Slovakia took its decision we would be left with 
little understanding of the processes that influenced its position and without any 
insight into the agents that shaped Slovak foreign policy. In analysing the foreign 
policy-making process, this thesis showed that Slovakia conducted its policy over 
Kosovo in view of its domestic political situation. Given the two factors highlighted 
above, the role of political context played a crucial role in this matter. Furthermore, 
as a number of anonymous observers stated, rather than being against the actual 
independence of Kosovo, Slovakia was opposing the way in which Kosovo’s 
statehood was declared. In short, the important question was not whether Kosovo 
declared independence but rather how and in what circumstances. Either way, 
understanding this aspect of the issue – and seriously taking it into consideration – 
could have considerably contributed to a collective action on the side of the EU, 
creating more favourable conditions for the Slovak recognition of Kosovo.  
 
Of course, it is also essential to consider the importance of coalition-building on 
Kosovo. If one of the five EU member states had changed its position it could have 
been largely expected that Slovakia would have re-considered its view. Crucially, as 
it was widely understood among the Slovak diplomatic elite, a scenario in which 
Slovakia and Cyprus were the last two EU members against Kosovo’s statehood was 
specifically to be avoided. For Slovakia this would have meant drawing parallels 
with the Southern part of the country where a large Hungarian minority lives. This 
would have been a completely different issue altogether and a situation that was 
absolutely unacceptable for the Slovak government.  
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In his research study, Denca argued that behind the Slovak position on Kosovo was 
national interest and identity.
918
 Contrary to this view, this thesis claims that the 
decisive factor for the Slovak stance was domestic party politics and a tactical step 
by Dzurinda, the leader of opposition, to challenge the government. However, this 
political opportunism was interpreted as a discussion about Slovak national interests 
and one could only have expected that the nationalist Slovak National Party – then in 
the coalition – would positively respond to it. Therefore, it was the role of agency 
that set the scene for what followed. Despite the fact that the MFA undoubtedly 
plays a crucial role in Slovak foreign policy-making, in the Kosovo case it did not 
have the freedom it would have wished for. Certainly, had Slovakia’s position on 
Kosovo’s statehood been entirely up to the MFA, Slovakia would have recognised 
Kosovo as it was among its priorities to act as a responsible member of the EU, 
NATO and UNSC. In other words, the MFA considered it to be in the Slovak 
interest to support Kosovo’s independence and as a result, the EU unity on this issue. 
Moreover, and crucially, such a stance would have shown that, in actual fact, 
Slovakia was not concerned about its issues with the ethnic Hungarian minority and, 
as a result, it did not fear any implications of Kosovo’s independence on its own 
territory.  
 
Given the factors highlighted above, this thesis also argues against Denca’s point 
that the situation created around Kosovo – and the expectation that it would 
unilaterally declare independence – forced Slovak officials to agree on a joint 
position towards Kosovo.
919
 Indeed, this thesis challenges this view and claims that 
in order to understand this case, it is necessary to look for deeper meanings than 
those on the surface. The factors that influence countries’ decisions domestically are 
often hidden to the external observer. By looking at individual actors involved in this 
issue and breaking down the phases that have shaped the Slovak position on Kosovo, 
it was possible to analyse the foreign policy-making process and the steps that 
Slovakia took before and after Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. This 
thesis’s aim was to deliver insights into the significance of domestic factors on 
foreign policy formation in one of the EU member states. Although it is an 
                                                          
918 Sorin Ştefan Denca, ‘European Integration and Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the Cases of 
Hungary, Slovakia and Romania’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010). 
919 Denca, ‘European Integration and Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 218. 
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individual country study, it nevertheless aims to show aspects of foreign policy-
making that might be found in other member states.  
 
A significant point to address is that the Slovak view was not based on a 
predetermined position strategically prepared over a longer period of time; rather, a 
result of ‘coincidence’920 and an inter-play of domestic political factors, put Slovakia 
among the five EU non-recognisers. In other words, what seemed to have been pre-
arranged was in fact just a result of an accidentally created situation that required the 
MFA to take into account the unexpected parliamentary declaration on Kosovo and 
adjust its policy accordingly. Slovakia would have followed the majority of the EU 
member states in support of Kosovo’s independence and contributed to unity, 
however, domestic political rivalries and steps taken by Dzurinda prevented Slovak 
diplomacy to do so. In fact, Slovakia haphazardly found itself in a situation that most 
Slovak diplomats and MFA representatives were not comfortable with, as they 
wanted to see Slovakia in the mainstream. As one observer noted in regards to the 
Slovak position on Kosovo, ‘the role of coincidence in history is interesting – in 
politics it may sometimes look as a totally sophisticated conspiracy but it’s only a 
coincidence’. In other words, the Slovak position was a response to domestic 
circumstances rather than part of a detailed thought through design of opposition 
towards Kosovo’s independence. However, there was a lesson learnt – Slovakia was 
able to withstand pressure by the US and EU while still remaining constructive on 
the ground in Kosovo (i.e. participation in the EULEX mission, acceptance of 
Kosovo’s WB membership and support for Kosovo’s EBRD membership).921 
Furthermore, in November 2008 Slovakia also recognised Kosovo passports for 
‘humanitarian reasons’. This was viewed as an important shift in attitude considering 
that, when in September 2008 Kosovo representatives asked Slovakia to recognise 
                                                          
920 As two anonymous sources put it. 
921 In 2009, Slovakia did not support Kosovo’s bid for the IMF (International Monetary Fund). Nevertheless, as a 
European Commission official put it, ‘Slovakia voted against Kosovo’s membership in the IMF but worse would 
be not voting at all because you don’t reach the quota’. European Commission official, comments to the author, 
July 2010. The US in particular was very interested in Kosovo’s IMF and WB membership. This was clearly 
communicated in a leaked cable to a large number of embassies. In respect to its WB membership, it was 
specifically highlighted that ‘Kosovo’s success is a high priority for the United States and the US 
Administration’. See ‘Kudos and action request: voting for Kosovo’s World Bank membership’, Secretary of 
State (United States), reference ID 09STATE47360, 8 May 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/ 
09STATE47360.html> [accessed 14 December 2012]. 
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these passports, this request was refused.
922
 Initially, the visas were issued on a 
separate form and not directly into the passport. But since July 2012, Slovakia has 
officially recognised Kosovo passports – excluding diplomatic and service passports 
– meaning that visas are issued directly into the passport. However, these steps do 
not indicate a change of policy; rather they show adoption of a constructive and 
cooperative approach to the issue.
923
 
 
In addition, as an anonymous observer put it, the Kosovo issue was a useful exercise 
for Slovak foreign policy. Due to factors from the domestic environment, the US aim 
to move Slovakia to a ‘yes’ on Kosovo’s independence was not achieved. In this 
sense, it was able to resist the external pressure and insist on its position despite the 
fact that initially Slovak diplomats were not supportive of the Slovak position. In 
effect, this meant that a small state was able to formulate its own policy and defend it 
against its EU and US partners despite the unease that it created. Indeed, evidence 
for this case study confirms Ker-Lindsay’s view that the ability of the US and other 
UNSC permanent members to influence views of states over recognition issues ‘is 
not as great as one might imagine’.924 Similarly, although the Quint (US, UK, 
Germany, France and Italy) traditionally has considerable influence on foreign 
policy issues, its attempts to influence Slovak officials to change the Slovak policy 
on Kosovo did not materialise.  
 
Further research areas 
This thesis contributed to an understanding of why a change occurred in Slovak 
foreign policy; however, with respect to the other four EU members’ opposition 
                                                          
922 ‘Slovensko uznáva kosovské pasy, aj keď to úradníci popierali’, SME, 27 November 2008, available at 
<http://www.sme.sk/c/4196841/slovensko-uznava-kosovske-pasy-aj-ked-to-uradnici-popierali.html> [accessed 
21 May 2011]. 
923 ‘According to international law, the recognition of travel documents does not mean recognition of the entity 
which issued them. In this particular case, the recognition of passports issued by Kosovo authorities does not 
mean that Slovakia would recognise Kosovo’s independence’, explained Boris Gandel, spokesman of the Slovak 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See ‘Slovensko uznáva len kosovské pasy, štát naďalej nie’, SME, 21 July 2012. As 
Palokaj noted, before the 2010 elections, despite not changing its position towards Kosovo’s independence, 
Slovakia started to change its behaviour with the aim ‘to find the best way to disagree’. Augustin Palokaj, 
comments to the author, 16 July 2010. During an October 2009 meeting with the US Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for International Security Affairs Vershbow, the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Lajčák was reported 
to note that due to political situation in Slovakia Kosovo’s recognition at that time was not possible, however, 
Slovakia would remain ‘pragmatic and practical’. See ‘ASD Vershbow’s meeting with Slovak foreign minister 
Lajčák: good news on Afghanistan, concerns about Bosnia’, US Embassy Bratislava, reference ID 
09Bratislava455, 29 October 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09BRATISLAVA455.html> [accessed 
10 January 2013]. 
924 Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, p. 177. 
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towards Kosovo’s statehood, questions worth further examination remain. It would 
be of considerable interest to follow up this research and examine why it came to a 
change of policy, particularly in Romania and Spain. Notably, these countries were 
initially not entirely opposing Kosovo’s independence. In fact, they were, albeit 
privately, expressing support for the US line on Kosovo. This was specifically 
evident in the case of Romania; vital information for this argument was recorded in a 
number of leaked US wires. Reporting on meetings with Romanian and Spanish 
officials in 2006, US cables show that essentially, both countries were not strictly 
opposing Kosovo’s independence. In contrast, a secret US cable reported that during 
a May 2006 meeting with Nicholas Taubman, the US Ambassador to Romania, and 
Frank Wisner, the Secretary’s Special Representative to the Kosovo Status talks, the 
Romanian President Traian Băsescu confirmed – despite expressing concerns over 
Kosovo’s implications on regional stability – that Romania would stand behind the 
US efforts to resolve Kosovo’s status and ultimately, support independence. This 
was also reiterated during meetings with other Romanian representatives.
925
 Months 
later, in November 2006, Taubman confirmed Romanian ‘readiness to work hand-in-
glove with us [the US] in the Western Balkans including on Kosovo and Serbia’.926  
 
As for Spain, a wire from August 2006 reported that the Spanish MFA Sub-Director 
General for Central Europe and the Balkans, Raul Fuentes Milani, mostly supported 
the US line on Kosovo. However, he emphasised that more time should be devoted 
to the status talks in order to reach an agreement between both parties.
927
 Yet, soon 
                                                          
925 See ‘Romania pledges support on Kosovo independence during Wisner visit’, US Embassy Bucharest, 
reference ID 06Bucharest881, 30 May 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06BUCHAREST881.html> 
[accessed 19 March 2013]. Significantly, this cable reports Băsescu commenting that earlier on he had had a 
different view on Kosovo but after meeting with the US Assistant Secretary Fried and Vice President Cheney, he 
re-considered his position and was even quoted to note that ‘Kosovo status is not our baby, but is an American 
baby’. 
926 ‘Scenesetter for FBI Director Mueller’s visit to Bucharest’, US Embassy Bucharest, reference ID 
06Bucharest1693, 7 November 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06BUCHAREST1693.html> [accessed 
19 March 2013]. Romania would be a particularly interesting case to look at as there are certain indications that it 
could be the first country – of the five EU non-recognisers – that would reconsider its view towards Kosovo. 
Notably, in early June 2013, the Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta signalled a potential change of policy 
towards Kosovo’s statehood when he stated that he is leaning closer to the idea that Romania should coordinate 
its view on Kosovo with its EU and NATO partners ‘and thus acknowledging a fact’. See ‘PM Ponta: Personally, 
I believe Romania should embrace same stance on Kosovo as EU partners’, AGERPRES, Bsanna News, 4 June 
2013. See also ‘Romania’s Tough Line on Kosovo Starts to Crumble’, BalkanInsight, 12 June 2013. 
927 ‘Spain generally supports U.S. position on Kosovo’, US Embassy Madrid, reference IDMadrid2139, 28 
August 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06MADRID2139.html> [accessed 19 March 2013]. 
Additionally, as stated in the cable, Spain was very keen to be engaged in any sort of international advisory board 
on Kosovo. 
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after, Spain was already clear that it would disagree with the US and most of the EU 
states on the question of Kosovo’s status.928  
 
Although for Cyprus the Kosovo precedent created a worry, according to a cable, 
Euripides Evriviades, the Cypriot MFA Political Director and former Ambassador to 
the US, significantly stated that it was prepared to follow any consensus the EU 
reached during the Gymnich meeting in Bremen in March 2007.
929
 This leads to 
examining whether the meeting in Bremen could have been a crucial moment for 
reaching an agreement among the EU members. As far as Greece was concerned, in 
2005 it was not ruling out Kosovo’s independence and two years later, Dora 
Bakoyannis, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed ‘keen’ interest to 
discuss Kosovo during the NATO Ministerial in January 2007.
930
 In light of this, a 
comparative study of all five EU members which have not recognised Kosovo would 
allow isolating the factors specific to Slovakia and those that are a shared concern 
among the non-recognising EU states.  
 
Another significant aspect worth further analysis is the dynamics created by minority 
politics in Slovakia. In this respect, there is potential to access the issue of the 
Hungarian minority in more depth on the basis of the model of Triadic nexus 
introduced by sociologist Rogers Brubaker. This model includes three different types 
of nationalisms: those of the newly nationalising states where the minorities in 
question live, the external national ‘homelands’ and the national minorities.931 Based 
on this description a triadic relationship could be observed between Slovakia as the 
newly nationalising state, Hungary as the external national homeland, and the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Furthermore, considering that the ethnic Hungarian 
                                                          
928 See ‘Spain: In advance of Oct. 16 GAERC’, US Embassy Madrid, reference ID 06Madrid2624, 17 October 
2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06MADRID2624.html> [accessed 19 March 2013]; ‘Spanish views in 
advance of November GAERC’, US Embassy Madrid, reference ID 06Madrid2871, 13 November 2006, 
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06MADRID2871.html> [accessed 19 March 2013].  
929 ‘ROC to follow EU consensus on Kosovo independence’, US Embassy Nicosia, reference ID 07Nicosia263, 
27 March 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/03/07NICOSIA263.html> [accessed 21 March 2013]. 
930 See ‘Your visit to Greece’, US Embassy Athens, reference ID 05Athens830, 24 March 2005, 
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05ATHENS830.html> [accessed 20 March 2013]; ‘Greeks preview 
Afghanistan contributions’, US Embassy Athens, reference ID 07Athens148, 23 January 2007, 
<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07ATHENS148.html> [accessed 20 March 2013]. In this respect, in 2009, 
Bakoyannis was reported to state that Greece ‘will not be the first, but neither will it be the last’ country 
recognising Kosovo. See ‘Your visit to Athens’, US Embassy Athens, reference ID 09Athens1497, 23 September 
2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09ATHENS1497.html> [accessed 20 March 2013]. 
931 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4. 
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minority issue – similarly to the Slovak case – has resonated among the Romanian 
political elite, it would be particularly interesting to analyse whether links could be 
drawn with the findings of this study and to what extent the minority issue played a 
prime role in Romanian policy. Essentially, recent developments, particularly since 
the appointment of the latest Slovak government in 2012, show that tensions 
between Slovakia and Hungary in respect to the ethnic minority have decreased 
considerably. In contrast, disagreements between Hungary and Romania 
intensified.
932
 On this note, an important characteristic of Brubaker’s model is so-
called ‘reciprocal interfield monitoring’: in other words, all actors monitor the 
actions of the others and act accordingly.
933
 Therefore, it would be of further interest 
to compare developments in both Slovakia and Romania on the basis of the Triadic 
Nexus model.   
 
Current Slovakia-Kosovo relations 
In early December 2012, Enver Hoxhaj, the Kosovo Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
visited Slovakia. Notably, it was the first visit by a member of the Kosovo 
government since it declared independence in February 2008. Due to the Slovak 
non-recognition of Kosovo, it was an informal visit during which Hoxhaj met for a 
private talk with the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák and some 
Slovak MPs.
934
 During a briefing with journalists, Hoxhaj expressly thanked Slovak 
                                                          
932 Recent diplomatic disputes between Hungary and Romania were caused by flying an ethnic Hungarian 
minority flag in Transylvania, raising the autonomy question and even debating a change of the Romanian 
constitution. See ‘Hungary and Romania face off over an ethnic dispute’, Euroactiv.com, 21 February 2013; 
Marian Chiriac, ‘Romania and Hungary row over minority flag’, BalkanInsight, 8 February 2013; Corina 
Chirileasa, ‘Unofficial flag issue heats up Romania-Hungary relations, change of constitution demands on the 
table again’, Romania-insider.com, 7 February 2013. 
933 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 68. As Brubaker notes, in some cases this triangular relationship can lead 
to conflicts, particularly when the dominant elites in the new nationalising states promote the culture, language 
and political hegemony of the state-bearing nation, the representatives of the national minorities demand 
cultural/political autonomy as a reciprocal activity toward the nationalising state’s policies, and the elites in the 
external national homelands monitor the developments and protest against any violations of rights of the 
minorities. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 57. 
934 Tomáš Vasilko, ‘Kosovský minister zahraničia príde prvýkrát na Slovensko’, SME, 26 November 2012; 
Andrej Matišák, ‘Kosovský minister navštívi Slovensko’, Pravda, 27 November 2012. The visit was organised 
by the Slovak Atlantic Commission and its think-thank, the Central European Policy Institute. Interestingly, 
Rastislav Káčer, President of the Slovak Atlantic Commission and former Slovak Ambassador to the US, argued 
that in Slovakia, the debate around Kosovo’s independence was ‘always on the surface and without arguments of 
the Kosovo part’ and that ‘it’s time for dialogue, for a better and higher quality discussion’. See Andrej Matišák, 
‘Sadikiho prípad môže ovplyvniť pohľad na Kosovo’, Pravda, 5 December 2012. Furthermore, Káčer explained 
motivations for the visit: ‘Our aim is to initiate a competent Slovak discussion about Kosovo because until now, 
we debated more or less on the basis of emotions. We want to raise a debate about what Kosovo is, what its 
motivations are and where it is positioned in the Western Balkans’. ‘Minister zahraničných vecí Kosova navštívi 
Bratislavu‘, Slovenská Atlantická Komisia, 27 November 2012, available at <http://www.ata-sac.org/article-88-
885-MINISTER-ZAHRANICNYCH-VECI-KOSOVA-NAVSTIVI-BRATISLAVU/> [accessed 3 December 
2012]. 
224 
 
citizens, soldiers and think-thank representatives active in Kosovo. ‘I came as a 
friend and as a European’, he added.935 Nevertheless, touching on the question of 
recognition, he remarked that ‘time will come when Slovakia will recognise 
Kosovo’s independence’.936  
 
To this extent, Slovakia has, to some degree, entered into relations with Kosovo. In 
this respect, and despite the absence of recognition, one could observe Bratislava’s 
increased engagement with Pristina. In any case, considering the recent 
developments, there is a sense that Bratislava is attempting to be more constructive 
on Kosovo.
937
 One could argue that if domestic conditions in Slovakia were taken 
into consideration by its EU and US partners, more time was allowed for finding a 
solution between Belgrade and Pristina during the Ahtisaari led status talks and 
importantly, the focus was on ‘how’ Kosovo declares independence; by now 
agreement over its status could have been reached among EU members, Slovakia 
included. Nevertheless, whether these latest political steps towards improving the 
political relationship with Kosovo could be perceived as a significant move towards 
an eventual Slovak recognition any time soon has yet to be seen. 
 
In the meantime, over five years since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, 
its status still continues to be an unresolved issue for the EU.
938
 In this sense, perhaps 
                                                          
935 ‘Press conference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo E. Hoxhaj’, TA3, 4 December 2012. Notably, 
a few months after, on 8 March 2013, Hoxhaj visited also Greece – another of the five EU non-recognisers of 
Kosovo’s statehood – where he met with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Avramopoulos. A statement from 
their meeting shows that it was a constructive discussion aimed at expanding Greek-Kosovo relations, including 
the establishment of the Kosovo Commercial Affairs Office in Greece in order to improve economy and trade 
between both countries. Significantly, Avramopoulos remarked: ‘I believe that we are turning a new page in our 
cooperation today’. See ‘Statements of Foreign Minister Avramopoulos and E. Hoxhaj, the Foreign Minister of 
Kosovo, following their meeting’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hellenic Republic, 8 March 2013, available at 
<http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/statements-of-foreign-minister-avramopoulos-and-hoxhaj-the-for 
eign-minister-of-kosovo-following-their-meeting.html> [accessed 12 March 2013]. 
936 Andrej Matišák, ‘Sadikiho prípad môže ovplyvniť pohľad na Kosovo’, Pravda, 5 December 2012. 
937 In March 2013, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak 
Republic, Miroslav Lajčák, informally met with MPs from the Kosovo Parliament. The topics of discussion 
included Kosovo’s European perspective, the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and also ‘the opportunities 
for cooperation given the Slovak standpoint on Kosovo’s independence’. Emphasising Slovakia’s support for the 
Balkan region’s European perspective, Lajčák also noted that ‘there is no real alternative to dialogue between 
Belgrade and Pristina in resolving open issues and stabilising the situation in the region’. See ‘Minister Lajčák 
meets with Kosovo MPs’, Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Press release, 6 March 2013, 
available at <http://www.mzv.sk/pristina> [accessed 13 May 2013]. Soon after, in June 2013, Lajčák met in 
Zagreb with Enver Hoxhaj and among other topics discussed the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade and 
adoption of an agreement between the parties in April 2013. See ‘Minister Lajčák met with the representative of 
Pristina Enver Hoxhaj in Zagreb’, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 3 June 2013.  
938 In this respect, considerable progress was made on 19 April 2013 when after two years of the EU-mediated 
dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, led by Catherine Ashton, an agreement was reached between Belgrade and 
Pristina. The 15-point draft would grant a level of autonomy to about 40,000 ethnic Serbs living in the north of 
Kosovo. In areas where the ethnic Serbs build a majority of the mainly ethnic Albanian Kosovo population, they 
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as a European Commission official predicted, it will be no less than five years and no 
more than ten until the question of Kosovo’s status is resolved.939 As for Slovakia, 
despite all external efforts, it remains an internal affair. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
will be able to choose their police and justice officials, under the authority of Pristina. See Bojana Barlovac, 
‘Kosovo and Serbia Reach Historic Deal in Brussels’, BalkanInsight, 19 April 2013; ‘Serbia approves Kosovo 
deal: government’, AFP, 22 April 2013. However, despite being approved by both governments, its 
implementation in the northern region of Kosovo remains questionable as ethnic Serbs living in that area do not 
support it. As Luz Balaj, a Kosovo lawyer, stated, ‘The Serb citizens are aware that within this agreement there 
are elements of the recognition of Kosovo, because it is a bilateral agreement and [it] would oblige the citizens to 
stay loyal to the constitution’. See Linda Karadaku and Bojana Milovanovic, ‘Pristina-Belgrade agreement 
implementation in limbo, analysts say’, SETtimes.com, 3 May 2013. For an examination of the draft agreement, 
see Marko Prelec, ‘The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Why Less is More’, available at 
<http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/balkanregatta/2013/05/07/the-kosovo-serbia-agreement-why-less-is-more/> 
[accessed 9 May 2013].  
939 European Commission official, comments to the author, July 2010.   
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